

Section 4

Significant Organisational Change since 2006

4.1 INTRODUCTION

- 4.1.1 The Defence Forces has developed into a “world-class” military organisation, one it has strived to be since the publication of the White Paper on Defence (2000). This has required fundamental structural and organisational changes to the Forces that have presented demanding management challenges in planning and implementation. In particular, a number of largely unforeseen developments in the international security situation impacted directly on all security organisations, including the Defence Forces, and dictated the need for organisational change of an ever increasing scale.
- 4.1.2 This section will outline the key drivers of the major change in the Defence Forces since the publication of the first White Paper on Defence (2000) and the last public service benchmarking exercise in 2006, and describe the significant impact on the organisation, its structure, systems, processes and operations. It will demonstrate the key role played by Commissioned Officers in successfully meeting the challenges the Defence Forces face, and show that **these officers have greatly increased the efficiency and effectiveness of the organisation with significantly fewer personnel and within a reduced resource envelope.**
- 4.1.3 The main drivers of the exceptional change in the Defence Forces since the implementation of the White Paper on Defence (2000) and the last benchmarking exercise in 2006 have been the following;
- (i) Implementation of White Paper on Defence 2000 and 2015. (cf. 4.2)
 - (ii) United Nations Reform. (cf. 4.3)
 - (iii) NATO / PFP Membership. (cf. 4.4)
 - (iv) European Union Security & Defence Developments. (cf. 4.5)
 - (v) International Terrorism. (cf. 4.6)
- 4.1.5 This change, which officers have been responsible for designing and managing, has impacted every aspect of the Defence Forces, including its organisation, operations, equipment, culture, training and personnel numbers, and has fundamentally changed the nature of the job for officers. The significant effect of the change on the organisation and its personnel will be illustrated by reference to the **impact** across a range of key areas as follows;
- (i) UN Operations. (cf. 4.7)
 - (ii) NATO/PFP Operations. (cf. 4.8)
 - (iii) EU Operations. (cf. 4.9)
 - (iv) Emergency Planning & Counter-Terrorism. (cf. 4.10)
 - (v) Education, Training & Doctrine. (cf. 4.11)
 - (vi) Personnel Numbers. (cf. 4.12)

- (vii) Equipment & Infrastructure. (cf. 4.13)
- (viii) Information Communications Technology. (cf. 4.14)
- (ix) Operational Readiness. (cf. 4.15)
- (x) Reorganisation of the Air Corps & Naval Service. (cf. 4.16)
- (xi) Reorganisation of the Reserve Defence Forces. (cf. 4.17)
- (xii) Review & Reform of HRM Practices. (cf. 4.18)

- 4.1.6 While the success of the peace process has resulted in a reduction in the domestic anti-subversive workload of the Defence Forces, the developments in the areas of international peace support operations and the threat from international terrorism have increased the overall commitments of the Forces and required participation in new, more complex and demanding operations. The officers of the Defence Forces have had to ensure that these new commitments have been met while concurrently planning and implementing organisational change of a very significant order.

4.2 DRIVER – WHITE PAPER ON DEFENCE

- 4.2.1 The White Paper on Defence, published in February 2000, represented the first ever written Government statement on Defence. It outlined a medium term strategy, to 2010, aimed at achieving the primary aim of ensuring that:

“...Ireland has a world-class military organisation... to meet the requirement of Government in the changing national and international spheres.” (Government of Ireland, White Paper on Defence, 2000, foreword by the Minister for Defence)

- 4.2.2 Only six years earlier, in 1994, such an aim would have seemed impossible to achieve in the stated timeframe, if at all. In July of that year the Price Waterhouse Review of the Defence Forces had concluded that;

“...the Defence Forces is struggling to maintain a capacity in each of the roles assigned. Generally speaking, it is badly organised, too old, under equipped, under trained and suffering from a lack of recruitment and investment in necessary equipment and infrastructure over a prolonged period and is now at crisis point.”

(Price Waterhouse Review of the Defence Forces, 1994, p. iv)

- 4.2.3 However, the intervening period had seen the development and implementation of a major process of planned change in the Defence Forces that had identified and corrected many of the weaknesses in its structures, deployment, management systems and processes. This major change had inputs from consultants, but it was planned, implemented and managed by Defence Forces officers.
- 4.2.4 By 2000, the organisation had reached what was recognised by the Government in the White Paper as a “strong starting point” on the journey to ensuring that Ireland

had an affordable and sustainable Defence Forces appropriate to its need, having regard to both current and future requirements.

4.2.5 The purpose of the White Paper was to provide the policy framework within which the Defence Forces could develop further and complete the journey to the desired “world-class” status by ensuring the following requirements were met;

- (i) “To maintain a military force structure that provides a basis for responding to any major changes in Ireland’s strategic circumstances in the medium to long term, as well as demonstrating an appropriate commitment to national defence.
- (ii) To maintain a military force structure capable of responding to requests to provide aid to the civil power and in that context, contributing to the prevention of security challenges from abroad, including terrorism and arms smuggling.
- (iii) To fulfil Ireland’s international and regional responsibilities arising from UN membership by providing a range of military capabilities that can effectively be employed to participate in a broad range of multinational peace support and humanitarian relief operations.
- (iv) To demonstrate Ireland’s commitment to European security by having a suitable range of military capabilities that can be used to make appropriate contributions to regional security missions authorised by the UN.”

(White Paper on Defence, 2000, p. 23)

4.2.6 It was recognised that meeting these requirements would require the creation of a balanced and flexible military organisation that has sufficient depth in terms of personnel, doctrine, training, organisation and equipment to meet expected future needs. It was also clear that despite the significant scale of the change that had already taken place in the Defence Forces the organisation would have to be further transformed over the period to 2010. Consequently, the White Paper provided for further radical restructuring, reorganisation and downsizing of both the Permanent Defence Forces and the Reserve Forces. It also provided for action in a range of other areas including human resource management, finance, equipment procurement and organisational processes.

4.2.7 The White Paper had acknowledged that implementing the fundamental structural and organisational changes required to achieve its aims would pose a “demanding management challenge”. However, the developments in the international security environment required the Defence Forces to simultaneously change its operational focus and develop greatly enhanced capabilities in a very short timeframe. This, in turn, required further major change in almost every aspect of the Forces and greatly impacted the nature of the work of Defence Forces personnel, in particular its

officers, who were responsible for developing and managing the implementation of the change strategies and programmes.

- 4.2.8 The success of the organisation in meeting these new challenges and achieving the White Paper aim of having a “world-class organisation” was reflected in the report of Mr. Frank Murray, Chairman of the Defence Forces Sustaining Progress Review Group (performance verification group established under the terms of Sustaining Progress), in January 2004. It states, inter alia, that;

“The result (of the changes from 2000 to date) is that we now have a more efficient, strategically focused and credible Defence Forces which are affordable and sustainable now and in the long-term. The more streamlined organisation has shown itself to be capable of achieving its missions, including the taking on of new responsibilities in Europe under the European Security and Defence Policy (EDSP) and Partnership for Peace (PfP). This can also be seen in the emergency planning area post – September 11, 2001, in the maintenance of a very significant overseas presence (e.g. the recent deployment to Liberia) and in the commitment to Service Level Agreements and higher levels of service provision in areas like fishery protection and Garda air support.”

And, critically, that;

“Moreover, this is being achieved while the Defence budget is effectively held at the 2000 level. Few, if any, sectors could match this scale of achievement.”

(Report of Defence Forces Sustaining Progress Review Group,
Jan 2004)

4.2.9 White Paper 2015

Following on from the White Paper 2000, the White Paper 2015 sets out the strategic objectives of Government with respect to Defence outputs towards 2025. It sets out a medium- to long-term and forward-looking approach to defence provision. The decisions taken in this White Paper will influence the development of defence capabilities for the next decade and beyond whilst acknowledging that the future is inherently uncertain. The maintenance of such flexible and adaptable military capabilities represents a very pragmatic and appropriate approach to dealing with such uncertainty.

This White Paper contains a comprehensive security assessment that provides the context for the defence policy response. In setting out defence policy to meet these security challenges, it builds on an all-embracing Government response and effective engagement with international organisations. In this context, it situates defence

policy within the State's broader security framework. A key goal is to ensure that Ireland retains credible military capabilities that can meet anticipated future threats to the State's security, whilst ensuring that those capabilities remain flexible and responsive to a changing environment.

Defence capabilities and resources are also used to provide support to other state bodies in a variety of roles. This has significant benefits to the State in maximising the utility of defence capabilities and reducing the duplication of service delivery. While recognising the core functions of defence, this White Paper also sets out a framework through which defence can contribute further to our political, social and economic development.

Over 90 projects have been identified by the White Paper Joint Implementation Group. These include short, medium and long term projects in collaboration with multiple stakeholder project teams. On behalf of the Defence Forces, commissioned officers will lead and manage these projects in addition to current roles, duties and responsibilities.

The officers of the Defence Forces were responsible for developing and implementing the strategies and plans to deliver these capabilities.

4.3 DRIVER – UNITED NATIONS REFORM

- 4.3.1 In the 1990s the conflicts in the Balkans and in many parts of Africa, including Rwanda, led to considerable criticism of the UN and the effectiveness of its peacekeeping efforts. The Balkans conflicts also saw the deployment of NATO forces there, causing serious debate about the ability of Europe to deal with events happening on its own doorstep and posing a potential threat to its own security.
- 4.3.2 Analysis of the UN response centred on the effectiveness of traditional peacekeeping missions, which are conducted under Chapter 6 of the UN Charter. While Chapter 6 missions had been effective in the past, this was generally where the conflict had ended and the parties agreed to the deployment of UN peacekeepers and co-operated with them. However, throughout the 1990's many conflicts had tended to be too complex and intractable to be resolved by Chapter 6 missions.
- 4.3.3 The UN's reassessment of peacekeeping operations resulted, in August 2000, in a report of a panel tasked with producing tangible and implementable recommendations to improve UN peacekeeping and related activities. The *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (known as the "Brahimi Report" after the Panel chair, UN Under-Secretary General Lakhdar Brahimi) provided an in-depth critique of the conduct of UN operations and recommended sweeping changes in the way that UN peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding are conceived, planned and executed.

- 4.3.4 UN experience in the Balkans had shown the inability of peacekeepers on traditional type peacekeeping missions to protect themselves and the civilian population and to defend their mandate. To address this, the Panel made clear recommendations on **mandates, rules of engagement and force capability**. This resulted in a move to **peace enforcement** missions under Chapter 7 of the Charter, in order to provide the “more robust rules of engagement” required to allow peacekeepers to protect themselves, the civilian population, and their mandate.
- 4.3.5 The Brahimi Report also led to the more developed nations being called upon to provide **rapid reaction, self-sustaining peace enforcement capabilities** to respond to complex and volatile situations and for regional organisations to act on behalf of the UN in maintaining international peace and security, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 8 of the UN Charter.
- 4.3.6 Ireland contributes significantly to these missions forcing the Defence Forces to adapt and develop the most modern operational capabilities reflective of the increasingly complex and uncertain security environments into which they are deployed. The increased risk has seen the development of new systems of operation and necessitated a significant increase in the scope and intensity of pre-deployment training and preparation, including extensive Live Firing Tactical Training (LFTT).
- 4.4 **DRIVER – NATO / PfP MEMBERSHIP**
- 4.4.1 Ireland joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme in December 1999 and in 2001 joined the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP). The purpose of the Partnership for Peace is to increase stability, diminish threats to peace and build strengthened relationships by promoting practical co-operation among its participants.
- 4.4.2 On joining PfP Ireland set out its priority areas as co-operation in peacekeeping, humanitarian operations, search and rescue, co-operation in the protection of the environment, and management in marine matters.
- 4.4.3 The PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) operates on a 2 year cycle and has three different elements; Partnership Goals, study of overall NATO/PfP interoperability and planning and review assessment.
- 4.4.4 The Government wishes to contribute its UN peacekeeping experience by playing an active part in the Petersberg Tasks in support of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and sees PfP in general and the PARP in particular, as having a significant role to play in cooperation and planning for such tasks.
- 4.4.5 Our Partnership Goals were chosen with a view towards enhancing interoperability with our PfP partners, so that Defence Forces personnel can operate efficiently and effectively in a multi-national environment. The Goals provide detailed targets to be met by the Defence Forces in areas covering the full spectrum of military activity, including training, education, logistics, communications, equipment and doctrine.

- 4.4.6 The PARP also provides for assessment by NATO of performance in the achievement of the agreed goals in each area, **providing international validation of standards and capabilities**. Ireland is committed to making available a range of military capabilities outlined in a palette of forces for UN mandated peace support operations under NATO/PfP leadership.

4.5 DRIVER – EUROPEAN UNION SECURITY & DEFENCE DEVELOPMENTS

- 4.5.1 The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was adopted in 1999 in order to strengthen the EU's ability to resolve crises. The ESDP is an element of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), established by the 1993 Maastricht Treaty. ESDP allows the EU to undertake security operations, including the Petersberg Tasks (humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking).
- 4.5.2 In the aftermath of 9/11 the European Union decided to increase its fight against terrorism. Measures adopted included further development of the CFSP and making the ESDP operational, through the EU Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), which occurred in 2003. Also in 2003 the European Security Strategy (ESS) was adopted, which widened the scope of Petersberg tasks to areas such as joint disarmament operations, support for 3rd countries in combating terrorism, and security sector reform.
- 4.5.3 The Government has committed the Defence Forces to providing a broad range of military capabilities to the RRF. These are outlined in a Palette of Forces and range from small niche capabilities, such as staff officers and Special Forces, to an all-arms unit of 750 personnel. The required degree of readiness of these forces is from 5 days to 30(+) days.
- 4.5.4 Headline Goal 2010 sets the target of being able to respond with rapid and decisive action, applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations. This provides for the Battlegroup Concept, which enables forces to be deployed within 5 days of an EU decision. The Battlegroup is a specific form of the EU's rapid response elements and is the "minimum militarily effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package capable of standalone operations or for the initial phase of larger operations".
- 4.5.5 The Battlegroup is based on the principle of multinationality, with interoperability and military effectiveness being the key criteria. Operational readiness of participants will be subject to verification and certification by the EU Military Staff. Ireland has participated in the Battlegroup concept since 2006, **operating in a Nordic Battlegroup with Sweden, Finland and Estonia, and with Germany and the UK in subsequent Battlegroups**. Ireland continues this commitment with units and staff permanently posted to the established battlegroups.

4.6 DRIVER – INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

- 4.6.1 We have seen that the events of 11th September 2001, the Madrid and London bombings, and the attacks in Africa and Asia impacted the development of ESDP and the ESS. The most recent terror campaigns in Brussels, Paris and Tunisia reinforces the requirement for operational readiness by all State agencies and security forces. The requirement for increased counter-measures and enhanced emergency response capabilities in Ireland continues. A threat can also emerge suddenly as a result of factors that lie outside the control of Government. Events such as these are a continuing concern. In common with its European partners, Ireland is particularly concerned with the risk posed by persons travelling to certain conflict zones and the potential threat when they return. European citizens, including some from this State, have travelled to train and fight on the side of extremist groups in Syria and Iraq. There is also concern regarding the process of radicalisation and there are a range of influences, including the internet, which can enable this process. This process can lead to a potential threat of self-radicalised individuals acting alone – often referred to as “solo terrorism” or “lone wolves”.
- 4.6.2 These counter-measures included a focusing of the State’s intelligence effort on this area and closer cooperation with European colleagues as part of the process of providing enhanced protection against the new threat.
- 4.6.3 The Office of Emergency Planning (OEP) was established in the Department of Defence to promote the coordination of emergency planning across all Government Departments and to oversee the emergency planning process in general. It is a civil-military Office, with military officers providing expert input across a range of areas including Crisis Management and Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) issues.
- 4.6.4 The OEP also exercises an oversight role in relation to planning for peacetime emergencies, in order to make maximum use of national resources and to ensure compatibility and coordination between the different emergency planning requirements.

4.7 IMPACT – UN OPERATIONS

- 4.7.1 Traditional **peacekeeping** missions had been characterised by a slow lead-in time, a static operational posture, with soldiers engaged on observation posts and vehicle checkpoints, and reliance on the UN deployment and re-supply systems. The peacekeepers were in place with the consent of the parties to the conflict, although the missions could be difficult and dangerous, as the cooperation of the parties was not always assured. The UN mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL), to which Ireland had provided an infantry battalion since 1978, was such a mission.
- 4.7.2 Following the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon, Ireland withdrew its troops from the UN Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in November 2001, as the Brahimi Report was beginning to be implemented. The **peace enforcement** missions that Brahimi

envisaged for the future would be more robust in nature, requiring the threat or use of coercive force on all parties to a conflict.

- 4.7.3 Providing the Defence Forces with the capabilities required to operate successfully on the new type peace enforcement missions, characterised by rapid reaction, mobility, and self-deploying, self-sustaining forces, required significant developments in organisation, training, doctrine and equipment. It also required a change of culture and mindset within the Forces in respect of peace support missions. **The officers of the Defence Forces were responsible for developing and implementing the strategies and plans to deliver these capabilities.**
- 4.7.4 Their success in designing and managing the change process in this area was such that by December 2003, only two years after the withdrawal from Lebanon, the Defence Forces were able to deploy over 400 personnel, including 38 officers, as a Quick Reaction Force to Liberia.
- 4.7.5 The role played by the Irish Unit in Liberia was far from the traditional peacekeeping. The Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping, Hédi Annabi, described their role as follows;
- “....the Irish (in Liberia) provide the Quick Reaction capability of the UN operation there. They add muscle and credibility. This shows to the spoilers and troublemakers in Liberia that the peacekeeping operation there will not be humiliated..... this is hard edge stuff. It is some distance beyond traditional peacekeeping.”
(Annabi, Address to European Policy Centre, 10 Nov 2004)
- 4.7.6 Irish officers continue to be deployed to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) at UN HQ, New York, on deployments of two years each, to assist in the implementation of the Brahimi reform process.
- 4.7.7 The Defence Forces deployed a similar Quick Reaction Force contingent of 470 personnel and equipment to Tchad, Africa in 2008. The EUFOR Tchad/RCA mandate included "to take all necessary measures, within its capabilities and its area of operation in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic to protect civilians, facilitate delivery of humanitarian aid and ensure the safety of UN personnel". This deployment was seen as one of the most significant challenges undertaken by the Defence Forces due to the magnitude, scale and complexity of the environment. The mission started to deploy in February 2008, reaching its Initial Operational Capability on 15 March 2008. On 15 March 2009, a UN force took over under the MINURCAT mandate.
- 4.7.8 The Defence Forces have also supplied small niche capabilities, such as Special Forces, military observers (officers) and headquarters staff officers, to a range of UN led missions such as those in East Timor, Eritrea, Western Sahara, Iraq, Kosovo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Lebanon, Cyprus, Israel, and Syria.

4.8 IMPACT – NATO / PfP OPERATIONS

- 4.8.1 The PfP process has fundamentally changed the nature of the officer's job by bringing an international dimension to every activity. There is now an absolute requirement to achieve recognised international standards that apply even to the minutest aspects of training, education, equipment, procedures and processes and to have our performance in meeting these standards independently verified by international assessors.
- 4.8.2 The partnership programmes, which were developed with the assistance of expert advice provided by Defence Forces officers, are extremely demanding and have required a significant upgrading of the Forces and up-skilling of its personnel. **The planning and management of this process has been the responsibility of the officers of the Defence Forces.**
- 4.8.3 Membership of PfP has required the deployment of Defence Forces officers to NATO Headquarters in Brussels and to NATO Supreme HQ Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) at Mons, Belgium. These officers operate on 3-year rotations.
- 4.8.4 PfP membership and the attainment of the required standards of interoperability also require the ongoing participation by officers in a wide range of international seminars, workshops and exercises. For example, in 2016, officers will participate in up to 110 such courses, workshops and seminars of 2 to 20 days duration in over 15 countries. Irish officers also instruct on many of these courses.
- 4.8.5 The success of the Defence Forces, managed and led by its officers, in achieving the demanding international standards required by NATO/PfP was such that in 2003, only four years after we joined the Partnership and two years after joining PARP, Ireland was able to make its first contribution of combat forces to a NATO/PfP led peace support mission, an Infantry Group of 230 personnel was deployed as part of a Multinational Brigade in the UN mandated NATO/PfP led mission in Kosovo. As with all NATO/PfP missions, mission readiness and interoperability of the forces were assessed to NATO standards by a NATO team prior to deployment.
- 4.8.6 The Defence Forces also provided headquarters staff personnel, to the UN authorised NATO/PfP led mission in Afghanistan until 2015.

4.9 IMPACT – EU OPERATIONS

- 4.9.1 Developments in the area of EU Security and Defence have fundamentally changed the nature of the work of officers by adding a new and significant dimension to the activities of the Defence Forces.
- 4.9.2 The participation of Irish officers in the emerging environment was recognised by the Government, in the White Paper, as an important element of Ireland's capacity to influence events in a way that is sensitive to this country's needs and in keeping with

its military neutrality. Consequently, officers have been committed to working at every appropriate level in the emerging architecture, including providing staff to the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), and the EU Military Staff (EUMS). The EUMS is responsible for early warning, evaluating situations and strategic planning for Petersberg Task missions, including the earmarking of national and international European forces. It constitutes a source of technical expertise for the Union and acts as an interface between political and military authorities within the Union. It gives military support to the EUMC during the strategic planning phase of Petersberg Task missions, and develops working methods and operational concepts based on or compatible with those of NATO.

- 4.9.3 EU Integrated Development Teams are multinational technical teams used to develop detailed strategies and plans for the development of the Union's military capability. Reporting to the EU Military Committee or the EU Defence Agency the teams meet in Brussels, generally for one week in every month, although of the major teams, the Helsinki Task Force, meets 2/3 weeks out of every 4. Irish Captains, Commandants and Lieutenant Colonels, nominated by the Chief of Staff, participate as members of these teams. Their role is to contribute to the development of EU strategies and plans, while ensuring that these fully reflect Ireland's position on the issues concerned.
- 4.9.7 These developments have required officers to rapidly build on their existing skills and develop new ones. The establishment and development of the EU structures, capabilities and operational doctrine and procedures are new and evolving areas that require planners to operate from a "blank sheet" start.
- 4.9.8 Operating at the EU military level requires officers to have a full appreciation of the political/military environment, strategic management ability, language skills (e.g. the day-to-day working language of the EUMS is currently French) and geopolitical awareness. Officers had not previously operated at the military strategic level and our military education system had to be rapidly overhauled by Defence Forces officers to provide for this.
- 4.9.9 ESDP developments have presented considerable challenges to the Defence Forces and in particular its officers. **Officers have been required to participate in the development of the Union's strategies, concepts, policies, standards and plans, while simultaneously planning and managing the development of the Defence Forces' operational capabilities to the required standards and meeting current overseas commitments.** This involved radical overhaul of our education and training systems, significant upgrading of equipment and reform of the organisation's processes in every area.
- 4.9.10 Officers have developed the new doctrine for Irish participation in robust and complex peace support missions, including the rapid response feature, and overseen a significant increase in the levels of individual and collective training within the Forces. In addition, they have provided the military expertise to the equipment procurement programmes, identifying the overall requirements and detailed

specifications, as well as developing the strategies for the introduction of the new equipment into operational service.

4.10 IMPACT – EMERGENCY PLANNING & COUNTER-TERRORISM OPERATIONS

- 4.10.1 Prior to 9/11 the military intelligence efforts of the Defence Forces were focused on the subversive threat to the State and to the protection of our Forces serving overseas. However, since 2001 the efforts of Military Intelligence Section have had to be refocused to meet the greatly increased threat from international terrorism. Increased resources have been applied to the Section, whose duties have been greatly expanded.
- 4.10.2 The Section, staffed primarily by officers of Captain (“Line”), Commandant (“Line”) and Lieutenant Colonel (“Line”) rank, now works closely with European colleagues, as part of the process of providing enhanced protection against the new threat. Much of this work is highly sensitive and cannot be detailed for security reasons, but the Defence Forces, like all their European colleagues, have seen their workload increase hugely in response to the threat of organised international terrorism.
- 4.10.3 Officers have contributed to developments in the area of emergency planning through their key staffing role in the Office of Emergency Planning. This Office has developed strategic guidance for Government Departments covering a range of areas including emergency planning structures, roles of Government in emergency planning, risk assessment, communications, training, oversight and assessment and the international dimensions to emergency planning. This guidance facilitates the engagement of Ministers and their Departments in the emergency planning process.
- 4.10.4 At regional level, officers are engaged with external agencies including the Garda Síochána and Local Authorities in providing specialist advice on emergency planning matters.
- 4.10.5 The nature of the threat posed by international terrorist groups continues to evolve. This evolving threat has increased the risk of the use of Chemical/ Biological/ Radiological/ Nuclear/ Explosive devices or agents [CBRN(E)]. While the threat level in Ireland in the area of CBRN(E) is assessed as low, the Defence Forces has been required to develop the tactics, techniques and procedures to deal with the changing face of terrorism at home and abroad. All PDF personnel are training to a standard that will enable them to perform their primary military duties in a CBRN(E) environment.

4.11 IMPACT – EDUCATION, TRAINING & DOCTRINE

- 4.11.1 Deployment on robust peace enforcement operations, that are now the norm, requires higher levels of training, more refined doctrine and a different mindset than the traditional peacekeeping missions. The officers of the Defence Forces were responsible for developing this doctrine and delivering the required training at every level of the organisation.

- 4.11.2 Among the organisational changes effected since 2001 is the review and overhaul of the syllabus and conduct of each military course to bring us into line with our European partners and to enable us to meet our commitments in the emerging international peace support environment.
- 4.11.3 As part of this process and consistent with international best practice the senior Command and Staff (C&S) Course, which is mandatory for promotion to Lieutenant Colonel, has been upgraded and developed into a **Masters Degree Programme**, in conjunction with the National University of Ireland, Maynooth (Masters Degree in Leadership, Management and Defence Studies). **Each element of this course is now independently validated by civilian academic assessors.**
- 4.11.4 According to the White Paper on Defence (2015), external accreditation and verification of capabilities ensures that the educational and training outputs of the Defence Forces are in line with best international practice. Accreditation will be pursued where it is appropriate to military skills and capability requirements since the primary intended outcome is improved operational effectiveness. However, accreditation is also aimed at making the Defence Forces more attractive as a career and increasing retention rates as personnel gain higher awards the longer they stay in the Defence Forces and the further along the career path they advance, thus rewarding members for their participation in lifelong learning. Accreditation is also of benefit to individuals when they leave the Defence Forces as they have either a nationally or an internationally recognised qualification which may assist them in finding suitable future employment. Young Officers' Courses for Technical Corps such as Ordnance, Communication Information Services (CIS) and Engineers also include fully accredited Masters Degree Programmes.
- 4.11.5 Modern peace support operations focus on nation building or reconstruction. There is a particular emphasis on the Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) function, that is, the military function through which the commander links to civilian agencies in a theatre of operations. Consequently, doctrine and training programmes have been developed in this area and rolled out throughout the organisation. This has been particularly successful, with the United Nations Training School Ireland (UNTSI) in the Curragh now internationally recognised as a CIMIC centre of excellence. UNTSI also conducts internationally recognised and attended courses on Human Rights and on Law on Armed Conflict (LOAC). The school attracts students from over 30 countries.
- 4.11.6 The addition of large amounts of new, technologically advanced equipment, ranging from weapons systems, through transport vehicles, to aircraft and ships, has required a significant training effort to acquire the required skills both to maintain the equipment and to operate it effectively. **The development of the strategies and programmes to achieve this has been the responsibility of the officers of the Defence Forces** and the fact that the equipment is now operating efficiently and effectively at home and in demanding environments overseas is testament to their success in this area.

4.12 IMPACT – Reductions in Personnel Numbers

4.12.1 To fully appreciate the current “manning levels” of the Defence Forces, this section will summarise the continual reduction in headcount and infrastructure since 1990. This continuous pattern of change is unique in the public sector from two perspectives:

- Nowhere else in the Public Sector has such continuous change been an integral part of work practice
- Each review/reorganisation has resulted in a reduction in personnel numbers.

4.12.2 At what point does an organisation pass the critical mass to operate safely and effectively? To fully comprehend the massive reforms implemented by the Defence Forces it is necessary to look back on the numerous Commissions, Boards, Reports and Reorganisations have that informed and guided this continuous process.

4.12.3 Gleeson Commission

The Commission On Remuneration And Conditions Of Service In The Defence Forces (Gleeson Commission) was established on 29 July 1989 to “carry out a major review of the remuneration and conditions of service of the Defence Forces having regard to their separate and distinct role and organisation and to make recommendations.”

This was the first independent commission in the history of the State to examine pay and conditions in the Defence Forces. It was also the first opportunity which members of the Defence Forces had to make a case on their own behalf directly to an independent body.

The Gleeson Commission reported in July 1990 and primarily focused on pay and conditions but also referenced “a combination of factors including the organisational arrangements and financial constraints under which senior management have had to operate, the problems created by a lack of a precise definition of the role of the DF, and the absence of clarity in Defence Policy”. Of particular importance in the report were the definition of the ‘military salary’¹ and the recommendation that a management review be undertaken by professional management consultants to provide the ‘impetus for change’ to both the military and civil management.

As the first independent body to examine pay and conditions in the Defence Forces, the findings of the Gleeson Commission effectively established the basis and structure of Defence Forces pay going forward.

4.12.4 Efficiency Audit Group (EAG)

In April 1988 the Government established the Efficiency Audit Group (EAG) ‘to examine the workings and practises of each Government Department with a view to recommending improved or alternative practices and methods which would reduce costs and improve efficiency’.

¹ Paragraph 3.2.10 ‘... regimental pay and military service allowance must together be seen as constituting what in other employments would be seen as the standard weekly or monthly pay.’

A series of major reviews of the nation's defence organisation was conducted as part of this wider Efficiency Audit Group's (EAG) review of the public sector during the 1990s.

4.12.5 EAG 1 – 1991

This mostly concerned the Department of Defence (DoD) and made a series of recommendations to improve management efficiency. The most radical proposals were:

- To transfer the full accountability for Defence Forces operational expenditure to the Chief of Staff thus aligning financial with operational and personnel authority.
- A proposed second best option was the total allocation of military budgets to the Chief of Staff with internal budgets cascading down within the military. This option has been implemented.
- A 40% reduction in senior personnel (Assistant Principal Officer and above) in the Department of Defence.

4.12.6 Review of the Peacetime Establishment of the Defence Forces – 1991

This was an internal review convened by the Chief of Staff which reported in November 1991. Its findings formed part of the military input to EAG 2.

4.12.7 EAG 2 – 1992

This review focused on internal military administration and looked at how efficiencies could be introduced into military structures.

4.12.8 EAG 3 – 1994

In 1993 the Government redefined the roles of the Defence Forces and decided that an overhaul of the DF be undertaken under the aegis of the EAG. This was to be a fundamental review of the Defence Forces structure, systems, command, deployment and geographic locations. The EAG commissioned Price Waterhouse Management Consultants to undertake a study to develop feasible options towards achieving this major overhaul.

4.12.9 The EAG in its report in 1994 proposed the establishment of a Defence Forces Strategic Management Committee (SMC) to oversee the progress of the Strategic Management Initiative² and to facilitate discussion and agreement on major policy issues. Other key conclusions of the EAG were based on developing the Defence Forces as an all arms conventional force with the following characteristics:

- A light-infantry based army element with minimal requirements for heavy indirect fire support and relatively low requirements for widespread dispersal other than in border areas.
- An air element flexible enough to undertake a variety of non-military tasks but contributing to the army's rapid response capability.

² The Strategic Management Initiative (SMI) was launched in 1994 with the stated objective of presenting public service management with an opportunity to make a substantial contribution to national development, through the provision of services to the public which were both excellent in quality and effective in delivery.

- A naval element flexible enough to carry out what are essentially coastguard functions and assist in some military tasks.
 - Young, fit and well trained personnel.
 - Mobility and a capacity for rapid deployment.
 - A reduction of about 50% in the number of permanent facilities occupied by the Defence Forces.
- 4.12.10 In July 1995 the Government accepted in principle the conclusions of the EAG and established the Defence Forces Strategic Management Committee and an Implementation Group to prepare a fully costed implementation plan, based on a three brigade Army, an Air Corps and a Naval Service with a total strength of 11,500 all ranks.
- 4.12.11 At its Annual Delegate Conference in 1995, RACO in an analysis of the EAG 3 report highlighted that the logical consequence demanded a considerable rationalisation of infrastructure and would necessitate the closure of a minimum of 9 barracks and posts. Unfortunately the EAG report was implemented without such a rationalisation which resulted in a fragmented army deployment and an additional percentage of resources being devoted to housekeeping. Three years later a limited rationalisation was attempted with the closure of 7 barracks.
- 4.12.12 **Defence Forces Review Implementation Plan (DFRIP)**
In 1996, in line with the EAG recommendations, the DFRIP proposed and costed an 11,500 strong force with streamlined command and control and organisational structures, specifically:
- The restructuring of the three Military Branches in the Department of Defence
 - The establishment of a Strategic Planning Office in Defence Forces Headquarters.
 - The elimination of the four Army Territorial Commands to be replaced by a three Brigade structure and the Defence Forces Training Centre.
 - The establishment of a Logistics Base in the Curragh.
 - The introduction of a Voluntary Early Retirement Scheme for Defence Forces personnel
- 4.12.13 **Air Corp and Naval Service Review Reviews 1999.**
A review of the Air Corps and Naval Service was completed in 1999 which resulted in their reorganisation and consolidation to Baldonnel and Haulbowline respectively.
- 4.12.14 While the Defence Forces were undergoing this fundamental reorganisation to position itself to continue its delivery of efficient and effective services to the State the Government decided, in 1998, to introduce a White Paper On Defence.
- 4.12.15 **WHITE PAPER ON DEFENCE 2000**

A White Paper sets out Government policy for the medium term and is normally preceded by a Green Paper discussion process. The 2000 White Paper on Defence dispensed with the Green paper process, restated the 1993 Roles of the Defence Forces and further reduced personnel numbers to 10,500 with an additional 250 in

training. This White Paper process was a lost opportunity. In effect it was more akin to a financial review of the Defence Forces than a White Paper. The reorganisation consequent on the White Paper had the effect of depleting the full strength units proposed by EAG 3 to meet the new personnel figures and without any further rationalisation of infrastructure stretching the Army more thinly over the same number of barracks and posts.

4.12.16 In 2003 the 250 'in training' category was abolished reducing the overall numbers to 10,500. During the late 1990's and early 2000's the Defence Forces updated its equipment, refocused its training strategy and improved its infrastructure, financing the programmes from the personnel savings and the sale of some of the closed barracks. This reorganisation, re-equipment and infrastructural modernisation was all the more necessary considering the role of and the resources available to the Defence Forces during the previous 20 years. The concept of self financing, a new concept in the Public Service particularly during the Celtic Tiger years when the common answer elsewhere was to throw money at problems, enabled the Defence Forces to divert the savings from reduced personnel numbers to improving its capabilities and outputs.

4.12.17 In 2010 the ceiling of Defence Forces personnel was set by Government at 10,000. In 2011 the ceiling for Defence Forces' personnel was again reduced, this time to 9,500. Between 2009 and 2012 a further 9 barracks and posts were closed leaving the Defence Forces with a total of 14 occupied barracks and 2 training areas nationwide. In addition the number of non-permanent posts, generally used for training and by the Reserve Defence Forces has also been reduced. Since 1990 (pre-boom) the strength of the Defence Forces has continuously fallen from 13,233 to the 2012 (post-boom) figure of 9,500 i.e. 28%, while simultaneously increasing its capabilities and outputs, making it unique within the Public Sector.

4.12.18 2012 ARMY REORGANISATION

In 2011 the Government decided to reduce the Army from 3 to 2 Brigades within the overall Defence Forces strength of 9,500 personnel. The elimination of one Brigade necessitated the abolition of some units and the amalgamation of others, resulting in large redeployments of personnel and units around the country. These new structures for the Defence Forces are now in place, at considerable effort and inconvenience to members.

4.12.19 In 2014, the Green Paper and White Paper process was initiated, with the White Paper on Defence published in 2015. The reason why such a major reorganisation of the Army was completed in 2012 as a stand-alone decision without the benefit of the subsequent Green Paper/White Paper consultation process raises uncomfortable questions, not least of which is 'is the real reason behind the decision a deliberate attempt to set the finishing point to these debates – decide the end state and then commence the consultation and deliberations to arrive at the same end state'.

4.12.20 In all there have been a total of 8 reviews/reorganisation of the Defence Forces in just 22 years – on average approximately one every three years. This frequency would cause major disruption in any organisation and it has required exceptional leadership by Defence Forces personnel to ensure that the organisation has not just remained fit for purpose but actually increased its outputs and capabilities.

4.12.21 Since 1990 the Defence Forces has reduced its overall strength by 28%, reduced its senior officer number by 25% and closed 16 military barracks, using some of the personnel savings to update its equipment, refocus its training strategy and improve its remaining infrastructure. Picture for a moment the difference the applications of the Defence Forces modernisation model to the general public service would make to the Public Service pay bill and efficiency levels.

DEFENCE FORCES BARRACKS AND POSTS 2016

Barracks/Post	Used By		Current Status
McKee Barracks Dublin	All Services		Elements of Defence Forces HQ
Bricins Hospital	All Services		Military Medical Facility
Kilworth	All Services		Training Area
Glen Imaal	All Services		Training Area
Seven Barracks in Curragh Camp	All Services	7 Barracks amalgamated into Defence Forces Training Centre and Logistic Base.	The Military College Combat Support College Combat Service Support College Mechanised Infantry Company Cavalry Squadron CIS Company Engineer Company Ordnance Company
1 Army Brigade			
Collins Barracks Cork	Army		1 Infantry Brigade HQ. 1 Field Artillery Regiment 1 Cavalry Squadron 1 Engineer Group 1 Field CIS Company 1 Transport Company 1 Ordnance Company 1 Military Police Company
Limerick	Army		12 Infantry Battalion
Kilkenny	Army		3 Infantry Battalion
Galway	Army		1 Infantry Battalion
2 Army Brigade			
Cathal Brugha Barracks Dublin	Army		2 Infantry Brigade HQ. 7 Infantry Battalion 2 Cavalry Squadron 2 Field CIS Company 2 Transport Company 2 Ordnance Company 2 Military Police Company
Athlone	Army		6 Infantry Battalion 2 Field Artillery Regiment

Section 4

Significant Organisational Change Since 2006

			2 Engineer Group Transport Platoon Ordnance Platoon
Dundalk	Army		27 Infantry Battalion
Gormanstown Camp, Co Meath	AC and Army	Air Corp elements centralised in Baldonnel	Inf Company Post
Finner	Army		28 Infantry Battalion
Air Corps			
Baldonnel	Air Corps		Air Corps
Naval Service			
Haulbowline	Naval Svce		Naval Service

DEFENCE FORCES BARRACKS AND POSTS CLOSED 1998 - 2012

Castlebar Barracks	Army	Closed 2012	Mayo County Council
Camp Muckno Castleblaney	Army	Closed 1998	HSE
Clancy Barracks Dublin	Army	Closed 1998	Sold
Collins Barracks Dublin	Army	Closed 1998	National Museum Of Ireland
Connolly Barracks, Longford	Army	Closed 2009	VEC and Longford County Council
Columb Barracks, Mullingar	Army	Closed 2012	For Sale: Dept Of Defence
DFHQ/DOD Infirmary Rd, Dublin	All	Closed 2013	Offices for DPP
Fitzgerald Camp, Fermoy	Army	Closed 1998	Cork Council and IDA
Kickham Barracks, Clonmel	Army	Closed 2012	For Sale: Dept Of Defence
Rock Hill, Letterkenny	Army	Closed 2009	For Sale: Dept of Defence
Lifford	Army	Closed 2009	For Sale: Dept of Defence
Magee Barracks, Kildare	Army	Closed 1998	For Sale: Dept of Defence
Monaghan	Army	Closed 2009	VEC
Murphy Barracks, Ballincollig	Army	Closed 1998	Sold
Devoy Barracks, Naas	All Services	Closed 1998	Sold – fully re-developed
O'Neill Barracks, Cavan	Army	Closed 2012	Sold VEC

Defence Forces Personnel Numbers 1990 - 2012

Ranks	1990	Percentage of Strength	EAG 3	Percentage of Strength	2012	Percentage of Strength
Senior Officers	702	5.3%	597	5.2%	525	5.5%
Junior Officers	916	6.9%	750	6.5%	708	7.4%
NCOs	5,046	38%	4,256	37%	3,661	38.5%

Privates	6,569	49.6%	5,897	51.3%	4,606	48.5%
Total	13,233		11,500		9,500	

4.12.22 IMPACT ON OFFICER NUMBERS

The establishment for officers in the Defence Forces in 2016 is 1,233. The current strength is 1,113. Prior to the 2012 DF reorganisation the establishment for officers in the DF was 1,437 in total, with strength on 31 Dec 2011 of 1,303 officers. The employment control framework (ECF) which Annex N refers to has reduced the establishment of officers within the Defence Forces from 1,437 to 1,233 (14% reduction).

During the period 2006-2016, 657 officers have exited the organisation³. 401 of these retirements were of a voluntary nature. During the same period the Defence Forces have commissioned only 442 officers across the Army, Air Corps and Naval Service.

4.12.23 Based upon current trends in the Defence Forces, is it probable that the actual strength of officers within the Defence Forces will fall below 1,100 by 31 Dec 2016. This figure is NOT reflective of the operational 'day to day' availability of officers within staffs and units. In addition to the actual vacancies within the officer numbers, there are also a very significant number of operational and administrative factors that disproportionately impact upon the actual number of officers available for duties on a daily basis. The following factors have a significant effect on the availability of officers:

- a. Officers on leave of absence (LOA). There are currently 28 officers on LOA for in excess of one (1) year. The DF is NOT authorised to promote or induct against these figures and they are carried on the overall DF strength.
- b. Officers on Secondment. There are currently three (3) officers on long-term secondment both on and off island. Again the DF is NOT authorised to promote or induct against these figures and they are carried on the overall DF strength.
- c. Inaccurate Recognition of Numbers in ECF. Junior Officers on overseas duty are NOT factored as appointments in the ECF. In effect this means that there are currently 68 junior officer appointments VACANT on island as these officers are deployed overseas.
- d. Inaccurate Recognition of Full Time Training Requirements. Students on Junior and Senior Command & Staff Courses. There is NO allocation on C.S.4 to take account of officers partaking of the JCSC or SCSC. Therefore for the duration of these courses (6.5 months and 9 months respectively) the various Bdes/Fmns will carry those officers on their overall strength. For the forthcoming courses

³ 503 from the Army (57% turnover), 85 from the Air Corps (51% turnover) & 69 from the Naval Service (38% turnover).

due to commence on 29 Aug 2016, this will necessitate 32 Cpts and 15 Comdts appointments within Bdes/Fmns being vacant.

By November 2016, the effective day to day on island operational strength of officers will be 877.⁴ This will result in 299 'real' vacancies within DF Bdes/Fmns for considerable periods into the future. The majority of these vacancies will affect the ranks of Captain and Commandant (and NS equivalents).

4.12.24 FUTURE MANNING LEVEL PROJECTIONS

The majority of officer exits from the Defence Forces over the last 10 year period are from the Army component. The average annual amount of officer exits from the Defence Forces over the period 2006-2016 has been 66 while (induction/recruitment) commissioning figures for the same period have averaged 44.

4.12.25 The average annual retirement rate over the last 10-year period is 66 officers per year. However when the last three (3) years are analysed this rate increases to **77 officer retirements per year**. This significant increase is likely to continue as strongly reflected in the Climate Survey 2016.

4.12.26 The failure of the ECF to accurately reflect full time appointments is questionable. The result is that operational units are currently operating with less than 50% of the designed strength of officers. In addition, the creation of additional overseas units (current EU ISTAR TF which has been established for a period of 18 months) has had 27 officer appointments that are NOT reflected in the Defence Forces ECF numbers.

4.12.27 The strength figure for Army Officers is at its lowest since at least 1969⁵. The current figure is 841. This figure will continue to decline until larger Cadet Classes are commissioned. What is also clear is that the shortage of officers at both Captain and Commandant rank will continue for a significant period until larger Cadet Classes are promoted to the rank of Captain. In effect this will NOT be resolvable until at least **2024/5**.

4.12.28 IMPLICATIONS- OFFICERS NUMBERS

Commissioned officer numbers in operational units are running at 50% of actual designed strength. The additional burden of work is being conducted by those serving, to a point where risk management, administrative and operational governance and the wellbeing of the commissioned officers is being continually challenged.

To maintain operational output, the instance of postings for officers is 8.82 times in a five-year period (2011-2016). This frequency and duration of posting is alarming

⁴ The current authorised ECF overseas figure is 77 officers in total.

⁵ J1 (DF HR Branch) strength returns only go back as far as 1970.

with significant implications on these officers. 17.6% of Army Officers are overseas at any one time.

- 4.12.29 Officer numbers will continue to fall over the next number of years even while providing for larger Cadet Classes. The critical shortage of Capts/Lt (NS) and to a lesser extent Comdts/Lt Cdrs will continue for at least the next eight (8) to ten (10) years, until the larger Cadet Classes are promoted (if they remain in service?).
- 4.12.30 The continued and growing overseas commitments will necessitate continued absences of Lts/Capt from home operational units. Formation Units are currently operating with considerable vacancies. The “manning levels” of commissioned officers are clearly inconsistent with the Department of Defence Human Resource strategy of “timely provision of appropriately qualified personnel”. Operational capability is inextricably linked to “trained manning levels”. The continued exodus of highly qualified and experienced professionals continues from the Defence Forces. Management have not initiated any retention initiatives.
- 4.12.31 Military skill sets can take considerable time to develop *safely and effectively* and at considerable expense. In the absence of effective and “fit for purpose” HR policies, the organisation and its members are exposed to greater risk, governance challenges and excessive workloads that compromise “well being”.

The ‘Wellbeing in the Defence Forces’ Climate Survey 2015 identifies, quantifies and contextualises many of these issues.

- 4.12.32 The benchmarking report recommendations in 2007 established rates of remuneration based on industry rank grade equivalent in consideration of sector specific factors of employment. *It is the position of the Association that Pay Restoration to levels applied by the 2008 Pay Scales should form the initial phase of pay consideration.*
- 4.12.33 The Defence Forces have delivered on all organisation objectives identified by Government. This statement is qualified by reference to Annual Reports from the Department of Defence during this period. The Defence Forces have reorganised, downsized numbers and geographic footprint while optimising operational output in all dimensions of business. The performance and results are led by commissioned officers.
- 4.12.34 It is RACO’s position that the job profile of all commissioned ranks has increased in roles and magnified in the grade equivalence since the last benchmarking in 2006. Sections 1-5 of this submission demonstrate the evolution of the Defence Forces during this period highlighting the strategic policy changes and implications of its introduction on the job and work of commissioned officers. Annex XX demonstrates, as an example, the rank of Captain and the job specification changes during this period.

4.12.35 Since 2008, the introduction of FEMPI Acts, combined with Public Service Pay Agreements, has seen the continual diminution of service pay, pension and conditions of service. During the same period, the workload and magnitude of responsibility has increased across the commissioned ranks. The reduction in Army officer numbers in 2012 essentially resulted in “less doing more” which has been further compounded by the inadequate manning numbers designed in the Employment Control Framework (ECF) 2009.

4.12.36 The Defence Forces, led and managed by its officers, are now producing significantly more productivity and outputs than they were at the time of the last benchmarking exercise in 2006 – and they are doing it with fewer personnel and with no new additional funding.

4.13 IMPACT – EQUIPMENT & INFRASTRUCTURE

4.13.1 The new operational scenario has required a major re-equipping of the Forces. This has been achieved with no new finance being provided. All of the investment has been funded by payroll savings and the proceeds from the sale of surplus military property.

4.13.2 Major equipment purchases since 2000 have included MOWAG Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs), a ship replacement programme, Pilatus training aircraft, 6 utility helicopters and the Javelin anti-armour guided weapon system. Other equipment has included military transport, mine clearing equipment, air defence guns and radars, individual and collective Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) protection equipment and engineering equipment.

4.13.3 Officers play a key role in the procurement of new equipment and in its introduction into the Forces. They develop the procurement programmes based on an assessment of the operational requirement; they develop the specifications for the items, test alternatives and introduce the new items into service. Officers also develop the training courses required for the new equipment. For major items, such as the MOWAG APCs, this involves developing doctrine for their use, together with training programmes not just for the operators (drivers, gunners) but also all personnel who will use them. Maintenance personnel must also be trained and maintenance programmes developed and implemented.

4.13.4 Since 2000, significant levels and types of new equipment had not only to be procured but also brought into operational service with unusually short lead times because of the pressing operational requirements. The success of these programmes and their management by officers is seen, for example, in the fact that 18 of the MOWAG APCs were fully operational in Liberia within approximately 18 months of delivery to Ireland.

4.13.5 Major infrastructure development projects within the Defence Forces have ranged from the upgrading of accommodation blocks to the building of new aircraft hangers

and have included every occupied military post. Again, **no new or additional finance was provided** and all projects have been funded by payroll savings and property sales.

- 4.13.6 Major projects are undertaken by outside contractors on either a “build” or “design and build” basis. However, oversight of all aspects of projects is the responsibility of Defence Forces engineer officers, generally with officers of the rank of Commandant (Engineer) being the project managers.

4.14 IMPACT – INFORMATION COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY

- 4.14.1 Since the last benchmarking exercise there have been significant developments within the Defence Forces in the area of Information Communications Technology. These reflect the fact that military operations generally have been transformed by technological developments.
- 4.14.2 In line with the White Paper requirement that greater use should be made of modern technology in the training function, a computerised simulation training system has been introduced that enables training at all levels and across a broad range of scenarios and functions, from operations to logistical support.
- 4.14.3 There has also been a considerable investment in state of the art HF, VHF, UHF, microwave and satellite communications systems. These facilitate the deployment of troops anywhere in the world, and provide for interoperability with the forces of other nations with whom the Defence Forces may operate.
- 4.14.4 A Tactical Battlefield Management System has been developed in-house by officers of the CIS Corps (“Line” officers and engineers). This command and control software package gives commanders on the ground the ability to visually plot the movement of forces on a digitised map and includes the facility for sending data.
- 4.14.5 A Management Information Framework system is being developed by the Defence Forces in partnership with the Department of Defence that incorporates the Defence Forces’ strategic inventory management and personnel management systems. The ICT architecture for this project has been designed, supported and maintained by officers of the CIS Corps.

4.15 IMPACT – OPERATIONAL READINESS

- 4.15.1 The rapid response feature of our peace support commitments places significant new demands on personnel, because it means the Defence Forces are now required to maintain forces in a high state of operational readiness prepared to deploy overseas at notice ranging from 5 to 30(+) days. These personnel must be fully trained and fit to deploy and maintain this status for long period. **Prior to deployment, operational readiness is assessed and verified by international assessors.**

- 4.15.2 The Defence Forces now also requires its own logistics support and deployment capability for these forces, necessitating the development of a national stores reception centre and expertise in air and sea lift.
- 4.15.3 Historically, officers were selected for overseas service on a central, or national, basis. The large pool of available volunteers meant that individual officers could opt out of overseas service for periods to suit their domestic situations. However, the increase in number and change in the nature of missions required a change to this system and the White Paper recognised that there could not be the same scope for overseas service on the basis of the individual choice of the volunteer.
- 4.15.4 In order to address this issue the Forces have, since 2000, adopted the “Lead Brigade concept”, under which the three Army Brigades are given direct responsibility, on a rotation basis, for the formation and preparation of units deploying overseas.
- 4.15.5 This means that Army officers no longer have the flexibility they enjoyed previously in this area. They must now be prepared to go overseas when their Brigade is tasked with supplying the personnel for a particular mission.
- 4.15.6 **The increase in the number of overseas mission has impacted greatly on the personnel of the Forces, with rotations overseas now being significantly more frequent.** This applies, in particular, to “Line” officers because of the high number of overseas appointments for their professional category. In excess of 50% of our current overseas missions involve only officers.
- 4.15.7 **LIVE FIRE TACTICAL TRAINING (LFTT)**
The development of Defence Forces live fire tactical training (LFTT) over the last ten years has evolved with the nature of Defence Forces operational and overseas deployments. The training environment that Defence Forces Officers now operate is unsurpassed in the context of risk, realism, intensity and responsibility. The very nature of overseas deployments now requires that all troops must undergo the highest level of training possible within the governance of international best practice parameters (*IRSAG, International Range Safety Advisory Group*).
- 4.15.8 The management of this Progression of Training (*Operational shooting policy volume 3*) places additional demands on all military commanders who must ensure that safety is balanced with the necessity to prepare troops for any eventuality that may present itself on land or overseas. The supervision of this risk is fundamental to the training, be it during the activity, or in preparation of members of the Defence Forces to undergo the activity. The skills and qualifications associated with this risk management now more than ever encompass a much broader spectrum than just the individual soldier (*health and safety at work Act 2005*). Peripheral factors have equal status where the responsibility for policy, responsibility, authorization, maintenance and inspection must also be factored (*Joint Services Publication 403 Vol 1-5*).
- 4.15.9 The governance of this training is scrutinized by subject matter experts both on island but also under the terms of international best practice. Defence Forces

Officers operate under the strictest parameters, (*Technical Advisory Section Pam 21*) for LFTT training, not only in terms of safety and responsibility, but also in terms of clearly defined training levels that are imperative in current environment of NATO/PFP interoperability.

4.15.10 RISK ASSOCIATED WITH LFTT.

LFTT by its very nature is the highest point of tactical training; simply put, you cannot progress further from LFTT. The dangers associated with this activity are considerable; this risk to the soldier is managed through rigorous proprietary training in order that all personnel are suitably qualified and experienced persons prepared for the activity (*Ladder of Self-Responsibility and Accountability 2015 Defence Infrastructure Organisation*). The vast majority of Army personnel now undergo LFTT on an annual basis ;(TM 623 Ch 8) this places substantial responsibility on all commanders to manage this training realistically but safely. Operating in the LFTT environment places significant demands on the soldier, in addition Officers must conduct this training as range conducting officers (RCO) and as such place the safety of troops in their hands, (Pam 21 Regulations for the planning, conduct and Supervision of LFTT). The role of conducting these exercises is extremely demanding on Defence Forces Officers, and the volume of this activity expose these Officers to large volumes of LFTT, and consequently significantly increased levels of risk, on an annual basis.

4.16 IMPACT – REORGANISATION OF THE AIR CORPS & NAVAL SERVICE

- 4.16.1 In line with the terms of the White Paper, both the Naval Service and the Air Corps were fundamentally restructured and reorganised from 2001 to 2002 in accordance with plans developed and implemented by officers of these Services and approved by Government.
- 4.16.2 The new structures and systems facilitated both Services in greatly increasing their outputs. In the Naval Service, “days at sea” have increased by up to 20% since 2000, while “flying hours” in the case of the Air Corps have risen by up to 28%.
- 4.16.3 Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) and Service Level Agreements have also been implemented by both Services with other departments and bodies.
- 4.16.4 In 2003 the Air Corps agreed an SLA with the Department of Health and Children for the provision of air ambulance services. Similarly, under the terms of an SLA signed in 2005 the Air Corps provides pilots, ground crew and technical support to the Garda Air Support Unit (GASU).
- 4.16.5 The Naval Service has agreed MOUs and SLAs with various departments and bodies covering a range of areas including education, observational data for weather forecasting, and the provision of medical services at sea. Under the terms of one such agreement, the Cork Institute of Technology and the Naval Service operate the National Maritime College of Ireland (NMCI), which became operational in 2004, in partnership.

- 4.16.7 Since 2015, the Naval Service has contributed a ship to Operation Pontus, the humanitarian relief and rescue operation in the Mediterranean. The lack of an overseas establishment for Naval Service Officers in the ECF has adversely affected the Service in this case, creating significant domestic vacancies.

4.17 IMPACT – REORGANISATION OF THE RESERVE DEFENCE FORCES

- 4.17.1 Since 2000, the Reserve Defence Forces have been restructured, reorganised and downsized, in accordance with the requirements of the White Paper. This has been planned and implemented by officers of the Permanent Defence Forces. The development and maintenance of effective Reserve capabilities has presented significant challenges.
- 4.17.2 Initial implementation of the plans in this area saw the establishment of 24,000 reservists being reduced to 12,500, with the number of units being reduced by 43%. The Reserve now mirrors the PDF in its structure and will eventually have integrated elements that will train and operate within the PDF units that they are assigned to.
- 4.17.3 With this restructuring, the number of PDF officers assigned to work exclusively with the Reserve was reduced by 46.53%, although training standards and capabilities were significantly increased.
- 4.17.4 In 2012, a review of the RDF recommended that the retention of the RDF was a prudential measure in order to ensure the availability of additional capacity to support the PDF in crisis situations. However, this recommendation was subject to the implementation of significant reform in order to ensure that the RDF could discharge this role. A range of measures designed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the RDF were also recommended.
- 4.17.5 At end March 2013, new organisational structures were introduced for the AR and NSR. A new “Single Force” structure abolished the previous stand alone AR Brigades and established Army Units with both Permanent and Reserve elements. This reorganisation reduced the number of Reserve Units and revised the establishment of the AR to 3,869 personnel. The NSR retained four Units with a revised establishment of 200 personnel, whilst retaining a nation-wide geographic footprint. Ongoing monitoring of the implementation process has indicated that the establishment of the NSR should be revised to 300 personnel (75 per Unit) and this will be implemented. This will revise the overarching establishment of the AR and NSR to 4,169 personnel.
- 4.17.6 This restructuring, coupled with the reorganisation of the PDF, meant that all dedicated RDF Cadre appointments within the PDF were abolished. Nevertheless, the ongoing requirement for PDF units to administer RDF units within the “Single Force Structure” means significant additional tasks for PDF officers, with no additional allowances, resources or pay.

4.18 IMPACT – REVIEW & REFORM OF HRM PRACTICES

- 4.18.1 The White Paper (2000) recognised that the management and development of personnel is critical to mission success and required the development of an Integrated Personnel Management System for the Forces.
- 4.18.2 As part of the process of developing this system each element of the HRM system has been reviewed, key elements of the Integrated Personnel Management System, including revised officer recruitment and promotion arrangements, were implemented and a Defence Forces Human Resource Management Strategy was introduced. **Officers have been the key planners and implementers in this area.**
- 4.18.3 In 2002, the work of an External Advisory Group revealed serious issues regarding bullying and harassment in the Forces, particularly during training. The report of the Group indicated a need for a change of culture within the organisation.
- 4.18.4 An Independent Monitoring Group, with representatives of officers, enlisted personnel, the Chief of Staff, and the Minister for Defence, operating in partnership, oversaw the implementation of the External Advisory Group's wide-ranging recommendations. This required root and branch reform that included revised complaints procedures and the introduction of an independent Ombudsman for the Defence Forces. A follow-up response issued in September 2015 revealed very significant progress in reform.
- 4.18.5 **The Defence Forces is recognised as a model for the Public Sector, with fully implemented and externally moderated policies and supporting procedures in this area. The officers of the Defence Forces, who adopted a partnership approach in order to ensure success, have driven the changes in the culture and practices of the organisation.**
- 4.18.6 According to the White Paper on Defence (2015), "the recruitment, training and development, and retention of suitable military personnel are essential factors in developing the military capabilities required in order to discharge the roles assigned by Government". While this document is clear and prescriptive on **Recruitment** policy, there is no clearly defined **Retention** policy for the Defence Forces. With the Defence Forces continuing to lose corporate knowledge through the exodus of its middle managers at an alarming rate, this lack of an effective retention strategy, be it through appropriate terms and conditions of service, or adequate allowances commensurate to professional competence is unsustainable. The Defence Forces cannot continue to replace highly skilled leaders with inductees, while maintaining required operational capabilities and effectiveness.

4.19 IMPACT- FINANCIAL CRISIS AND PUBLIC SECTOR PAY CUTS

- 4.19.1 Since 2008, the Public Sector has been subject both to pay and allowance cuts but also reductions to overall numbers in these organisations.

A Brief History of FEMPI and associated legislation (Ref DPER)**i. Financial Emergency Measures in the Public Interest Act 2009**

The purpose of the Financial Emergency Measures in the Public Interest Act 2009 was to introduce a number of financial emergency measures in the public interest. These measures were the making of a new deduction from the remuneration of public servants who are members of a public service pension scheme or who are entitled to a benefit under such a scheme or receive a payment in lieu of membership; provisions to allow public bodies to reduce the professional fees paid by them to external service providers; changes in the early childcare supplement and in the Farm Waste Management Scheme.

ii. Financial Emergency Measures in the Public Interest (No 2) Act 2009

This Act provided for reductions in public service pay with effect from 1 January 2010. The rate of reduction varied by salary level but amounted to an average of around 6.5%.

iii. Financial Emergency Measures in the Public Interest Act 2010

This Act provided for a further reduction to the remuneration of members of the Government. The Act also provided for a reduction to the amounts payable by way of pension to retired public servants.

iv. Financial Emergency Measures in the Public Interest (Amendment) Act 2011

This Act provided for the reduction of judicial pay and pensions, following a constitutional amendment. The Act also further reduced the pay of members of the Government, whose members had voluntarily reduced their pay upon taking office, prior to this legislation coming into force.

v. Financial Emergency Measures in the Public Interest Act 2013

This Act provided for a reduction in remuneration for public servants earning more than €65,000, and a further reduction in the amount paid to those in receipt of a public service pension in excess of € 32,500. The Act also provided for a suspension of incremental progression until 2016 for all public servants, unless they are covered by a collective agreement modifying the terms of the incremental suspension which has been registered with the Labour Relations Commission.

vi. Section 12 of the Financial Emergency Measures in the Public Interest Act 2013 obliges the Minister of Public Expenditure and Reform to carry out a review of the operation, effectiveness and impact of the Financial Emergency Measure in the Public Interest Acts, having regard to the overall economic conditions in the State and national competitiveness. The latest report of the findings of the review relating to the reductions in pay is available [here](#).

vii. Public Service Stability Agreement 2013-2016 (Haddington Road Agreement)

In 2013, following extensive negotiations, agreement was reached with a number of unions representing public service workers on a range of reform and productivity measures. Collectively, these sectoral agreements are referred to as the Haddington Road Agreement. The Agreement and accompanying FAQs are available at the link below:

viii. Financial Emergency Measures in the Public Interest Act 2015

The Government has published approved text of new legislation to give effect to the provisions of the Lansdowne Road Agreement. The Financial Emergency Measures in the Public Interest (FEMPI) Act 2015 makes amendments to the existing FEMPI legislation, which has underpinned the various public service pay and pensions reductions since 2009. This Act in turn underpins the Lansdowne Road Agreement which secures the efficiencies, enhanced performance and accountability of the earlier Agreements as well as commencing the process for the partial restoration of public service pay. The agreed phased and careful restoration of remuneration to public servants, focusing on those lower-paid, is part of the prudent approach of the Government in managing the ongoing improvements in public finances. In addition, the Act contains provisions to regularize the position with regard to the arrangements for remuneration of members of the Judiciary.

ix. It is important to note that the Lansdowne Road agreement explicitly mentions both the Garda and Def Forces and states;

- There will be no cost-increasing claims for improvements in pay or conditions of employment by trade unions, Garda and Defence Force associations or employees during the period of the Agreement;
- They continue to be committed to promoting industrial harmony, and
- Strikes or other forms of industrial action by trade unions, employees or employers are precluded in respect of any matters covered by this Agreement, where the employer, trade union or staff association are acting in accordance with the provisions of this agreement.

4.19.2 Obviously, in light of recent proposed industrial action one could argue that parties that adhere to this agreement should NOT be disadvantaged. The decision to allow other Associations access the WRC mechanism is an important precedent.

4.19.3 The findings of the Commission will contribute to and inform Government's considerations in relation to Public Service remuneration and would assist the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform in discharging its negotiation function on behalf of Government.

- 4.19.4 The Pay Commission will consider such other remuneration matters (this suggests that these other remuneration matters are subordinate to the FEMPI restrictions) as it may be asked to consider by the Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform from time to time.

4.20 Support Services to Meet the Modern Challenges

- 4.20.1 International Best Practice of Armed Forces is to support the “military family” and their personnel by a range of support provisions which include; suitable accommodation on new posting, embracing travel time in the working week, efficient administration of travel and meal costs for those forced to be separated from their families and partners. These are nothing new to Military Organisations intent on supporting their service personnel.

- 4.20.2 Management’s failure to identify and adequately provide support policies to reduce the additional hardships of the Defence Forces personnel contradicts the theme recognising that “our people are our greatest asset”. In contrast to the support provisions available to other international military personnel in an effort to support the “military family”, our Members are currently frustrated by outdated policies. Rather than support personnel who have been forced to continually relocate from home stations, our Members face unnecessary hardships, including **indefinite relocation and posting timelines, inadequate Change of Station Allowance, inequitable insurance Loadings/Levies** which negate the supposed occupational health care provision, and inadequate **Foreign Service Allowances**, which subject our Members to inferior conditions of service in comparison to other public servants.

4.21 SUMMARY

- 4.21.1 The Defence Forces has undergone radical restructuring, with significant reorganisation and downsizing of both the Permanent Defence Forces and the Reserve Forces. Major and largely unforeseen developments in the international security environment have impacted on the Defence Forces and dictated the need for even greater organisational change, which has been managed and led by Defence Forces officers.
- 4.21.2 Our international commitments, to the UN, EU, NATO/PfP and OSCE have presented new and demanding challenges. We have contributed to the building of the EU’s security and defence architecture and its strategies and plans for capability building and built the Defence Forces’ own capabilities to international standards, while concurrently participating in a range of new, more complex and demanding overseas peace support missions.
- 4.21.3 The increased threat from international terrorism also resulted in new and expanded roles for the Defence Forces in Ireland. The military intelligence effort has continued to increase and refocus, and the Defence Forces has assumed a crucial role in the increasingly important field of national emergency planning.
- 4.21.4 Developing the Defence Force’s capabilities to international standards which are subject to independent external validation has required major change across all areas of the organisation, including structure, equipment and infrastructure and education, training and doctrine. This had been led by officers.

- 4.21.5 Preparing troops for more robust peace enforcement missions required a change to the culture of the organisation and the mind-set of its personnel, who were used to the traditional and generally less demanding peacekeeping role.
- 4.21.6 With positive and effective leadership provided by its officers, the Defence Forces have successfully met all of these challenges. The result is that we now have an effective internationally accredited Force that is simultaneously operating both at home and on a number of international dimensions on behalf of the UN, EU, NATO/PfP and OSCE.
- 4.21.7 The organisation has also become significantly more efficient since the last benchmarking exercise. The development of the Defence Forces across all areas, including equipment and infrastructure, has been financed exclusively by payroll savings and the proceeds of the disposal of surplus property. **We are doing much more – but with less personnel and with no new finance.**
- 4.21.8 The Defence Forces' military posture and capabilities have been modernised - but so too has our "corporate" posture as an agency of the State, with radical reform of our organisational processes and systems, including our HRM practices and our education and training. The result is that the Ireland now has Defence Forces that, while small in scale, are truly "world-class".
- 4.21.9 Commissioned Officers, as the managers and leaders at every level, have played a central role in the creation of the new Defence Forces. Throughout this process they have faced significant additional demands, many of which are ongoing and now form an integral part of the officer's job. The manner in which they have faced the challenges presented and embraced significant and ongoing change has, throughout, reflected the traditional loyalty of the Officer Corps to the State.
- 4.21.10 Since 2008, the introduction of FEMPI Acts, combined with Public Service Pay Agreements, has seen the continual diminution of service pay, pension and conditions of service. During the same period, the workload and magnitude of responsibility has increased across the commissioned ranks. The reduction in Army officer numbers in 2012 essentially resulted in "less doing more" which has been further compounded by the inadequate manning numbers designed in the Employment Control Framework 2009.
- 4.21.11 There has been a failure by Military and Civilian Management to reward and recognise the unique nature of military service, and provide the adequate supports to Members and their families. This contradicts the theme recognising that "our people are our greatest asset". In contrast to the support provisions available to other international military personnel in an effort to support the "military family", our Members are currently frustrated by outdated policies. Rather than support personnel who have been forced to continually relocate from home stations, our Members face unnecessary hardships, including **indefinite relocation and posting timelines, inadequate Change of Station Allowance, inequitable insurance Loadings/Levies** which negate the supposed occupational health care provision, and inadequate **Foreign Service Allowances**, which subject our Members to inferior conditions of service in comparison to other public servants.

- 4.21.12 There is no clearly defined Retention policy for the Defence Forces. With the Defence Forces continuing to lose significant corporate knowledge through the exodus of its middle managers at an alarming rate, this lack of an effective retention strategy, be it through appropriate terms and conditions of service, or adequate allowances commensurate to professional competence is unsustainable. Officers continue to double and triple-job with no adequate support as a result of a failure by management to effectively manage the significant changes the organisation has undergone since 2006. Without adequate supports and some form of incentive, whether it be pay restoration, abolition of the taxation that is the Pension Related Deduction (PRD), or a long-overdue increase in Military Service Allowance (MSA), retention will continue to be hugely problematic, and a threat to the operational viability of the Defence Forces.
- 4.21.13 The benchmarking report recommendations in 2007 established rates of remuneration based on industry rank grade equivalent in consideration of sector specific factors of employment. *It is the position of the Association that Pay Restoration to levels applied by the 2008 Pay Scales should form the initial phase of pay consideration.*

Section 5

Impact of Developments on Commissioned Officers

5.1 Defence Forces Organisation & Developments

"The single greatest asset the Defence Forces has is its personnel" (White Paper 2015).

The Membership note the comments in the White Paper where it places emphasis on ensuring an excellence of approach in relation to human resources management so that the Defence Organisation is an employer of choice while also delivering efficient and effective defence outputs.

- 5.1.1 Eight reviews/reorganisations have been implemented on the Defence Forces in just 22 years. On average, one every three years. The Defence Forces have created greater efficiencies through innovative operational activities supported by modern technology platforms. The Defence Forces have increased profile through operational output domestically while expanding international operational influence representing Ireland. The Defence Forces are participating in a broad range of Crisis Management and Peace Support Operations overseas through the auspices of UN/EU/OSCE & NATO PfP with a total of over 491 personnel serving on these Missions.
- 5.1.2 A previous review process by external consultants (Price Waterhouse Cooper), commissioned by the Department of Defence, identified that Ireland's Force Structure should be based on a Force consisting of Army, Navy & Air Corps with an overall strength of 11,500 personnel. Subsequent Government decisions up to 2012 have cut this force strength to the current 9,500 with a loss of 1 x Infantry Brigade (2,500 personnel). The impact was most significant on commissioned officers with a loss of 114 appointments.
- 5.1.3 The 2012 reductions, in contradiction to the previous external consultants recommendations, were purely based on budget restraints that could only be resourced by reduction in personnel.
- 5.1.4 The White Paper 2015 emphasises the real and ever present threats to the state and its citizens. The requirement for additional financial resources to support a Defence Forces that is "fit for purpose" has never been more relevant.

5.2 Reorganisation 2012- Manning Levels and Implications on Officers

- 5.2.1 The establishment for officers in the Defence Forces is 1,233, the current strength is 1,113. Prior to the 2012 DF Reorganisation the establishment for officers in the DF was 1,437 in total, with strength on 31 Dec 2011 of 1,303 officers – Annex C refers.
- 5.2.2 The employment control framework (ECF) which Annex N refers to has reduced the establishment of officers within the DF from 1,437 to 1,233(14% reduction).

- 5.2.3 During the period 2006-2016, 657 officers have exited the organisation¹. Of those exits 401 of these retirements were of a voluntary nature. During the same period the DF have commissioned 442 officers across the Army, Air Corps and Naval Service.
- 5.2.4 Based upon current trends in the Defence Forces is it probable that the actual strength of officers within the Defence Forces will fall below 1,100 by 31 Dec 2016. This figure is NOT reflective of the operational 'day to day' availability of officers within staffs and units.
- 5.2.5 In addition to the actual vacancies within the officer numbers, there are also a very significant number of operational and administrative factors that disproportionately impact upon the actual number of officers available for duties on a daily basis. The following factors have a significant effect on the availability of officers:
- I. Officers on leave of absence (LOA). There are currently 28 officers on LOA for in excess of one (1) year. The DF is NOT authorised to promote or induct against these figures and they are carried on the overall DF strength.
 - II. Officers on Secondment. There are currently three (3) officers on long-term secondment both on and off island. Again the DF is NOT authorised to promote or induct against these figures and they are carried on the overall DF strength.
 - III. Inaccurate Recognition of Numbers in ECF. Junior Officers on overseas duty are NOT factored as appointments in the ECF. In effect this means that there are currently 57 junior officers appointments VACANT on island as these officers are deployed overseas. This figure will increase to 68 upon the deployment of 109 Bn to UNIFIL in Nov 2016.
 - IV. Inaccurate Recognition of Full Time Training Requirements. Students on Junior and Senior Command & Staff Courses. There is NO allocation on C.S.4 to take account of officers partaking of the JCSC or SCSC and NS equivalent courses. Therefore for the duration of these courses 6.5 months and nine (9) months respectively the various Bdes/Fmns will carry those officers on their overall strength. For the forthcoming courses due to commence on 29 Aug 2016, this will necessitate 38 Cpts and 20 Comdts appointments within Bdes/Fmns being vacant.
- 5.2.6 By November 2016, the effective day to day on island operational strength of officers will be 877.² This will result in 299 'real' vacancies within DF Bdes/Fmns for considerable periods into the future. The majority of these vacancies will affect the ranks of Capt/Lt (NS) and Comdt/Lt Cdr.
- 5.3 Future Manning Level Projections**
- 5.3.1 The majority of officer exits from the DF over the last 10-year period are from the Army component. The average annual amount of officer exits from the DF over the

¹ 503 from the Army (57% turnover), 85 from the Air Corps (51% turnover) & 69 from the Naval Service (38% turnover).

² The current authorised ECF overseas figure is 77 officers in total.

period 2006-2016 has been 66 while (induction/recruitment) commissioning figures for the same period have averaged 44.

- 5.3.2 The average annual retirement rate over the last 10-year period is 66 officers per year. However when the **last three (3)** years are analysed this rate increases to **77 officer retirements per year**. This significant increase is likely to continue as strongly reflected in the Climate Survey 2016.
- 5.3.3 The failure of the ECF to accurately reflect full time appointments is questionable. The result is that operational units are currently operating with less than 50% of the designed strength of officers. In addition, the creation of additional overseas units (current EU ISTAR TF which has been established for a period of 18 months) has had 27 officer appointments that are NOT reflected in the Defence Forces ECF numbers.
- 5.3.4 The strength figure for Army Officers is at its lowest since at least 1969. The current figure is 841. This figure will continue to decline until larger Cadet Classes are commissioned. What is also clear is that the shortage of officers at both Captain and Commandant rank will continue for a significant period until larger Cadet Classes are promoted to the rank of Captain. In effect this will NOT be resolvable until at least **2024/5**.
- 5.3.5 At present the Naval Service is still operating eight ships based on an ECF that was originally designed for seven ships in 2001. The reorganisation of 2013 also reduced the Naval Service ECF numbers by a further 50 personnel which is the equivalent of losing a full ships complement.

5.4 Implications of Inadequate Manning Levels

- 5.4.1 Commissioned officer numbers in operational units are running at 50% of actual designed strength. The additional burden of work is being conducted by those serving to a point where risk management, administrative and operational governance and the wellbeing of the commissioned officers is being continually challenged. The Climate Survey Report published in September 2016 contextualises this significant impact.
- 5.4.2 To maintain operational output, the instance of postings for officers is now 8.82 times in a five-year period (2011-2016). This frequency and duration of posting is alarming with very significant implications on these officers.
- 5.4.3 17.6% of Army Officers are overseas continually.
- 5.4.4 Officer numbers will continue to fall over the next number of years even while providing for larger Cadet Classes. The critical shortage of Cpts/Lt (NS) and to a lesser extent Comdts/Lt Cdrs will continue for at least the next eight (8) to ten (10) years, until the larger Cadet Classes are promoted- if they remain in service?
- 5.4.5 The continued and growing overseas commitments will necessitate continued absences of Lts/Cpts from home operational units. Formation Units are currently operating with considerable vacancies.

- 5.4.6 The “manning levels” of commissioned officers are clearly inconsistent with the Department of Defence Human Resource strategy of “timely provision of appropriately qualified personnel”.
- 5.4.6 Operational capability is inextricably linked to “trained manning levels” and such a model is used by the British Armed Forces when determining their operational capability. The continued exodus of highly qualified and experienced professionals continues from the Defence Forces. Management have not initiated any retention initiatives.
- 5.4.7 Military skill sets can take considerable time to develop *safely and effectively and at considerable expense*. In the absence of effective and “fit for purpose” HR policies, the organisation and its members are exposed to greater risk, governance challenges and excessive workloads that compromise “well being”.

5.5 Human Capital – Impact on Risk, Governance and Wellbeing

- 5.5.1 The last reorganisation of the Defence Forces in 2012 continues to place very significant demands on commissioned officers. These ever increasing demands and the implications on the officer’s personal and professional wellbeing is forcing a rise in the number of voluntary retirements. The closure of barracks, disbandment of units, the establishment of new units and the forced increase in time away from family and home have placed enormous stresses on workload, family relationships and the financial viability associated with continual relocation and service in the Defence Forces. The ‘Wellbeing in the Defence Forces’ Climate Survey 2016 identifies, quantifies and contextualises many of these issues (Department of Defence website).
- 5.5.2 The benchmarking report recommendations in 2007 established rates of remuneration based on industry rank grade equivalent in consideration of sector specific factors of employment. *It is the position of the Association that Pay Restoration to levels applied by the 2008 Pay Scales should form the initial phase of pay consideration.*
- 5.5.3 The Defence Forces have delivered on all organisation objectives identified by Government. This statement is qualified by reference to Annual Reports from the Department of Defence during this period. The Defence Forces have reorganised, downsized numbers and geographic footprint while optimising operational output in all dimensions of business. The performance and results are led by commissioned officers.
- 5.5.4 It is RACO’s position that the job profile of all commissioned ranks has increased in roles and magnified in the grade equivalence since the last benchmarking in 2006. Sections 1-5 of this submission demonstrate the evolution of the Defence Forces during this period highlighting the strategic policy changes and implications of its introduction on the job and work of commissioned officers. Annex O demonstrates, as an example, the rank of Captain and the job specification changes during this period.
- 5.5.5 Since 2008, the introduction of FEMPI Acts, combined with Public Service Pay Agreements, has seen the continual diminution of service pay, pension and

conditions of service. During the same period, the workload and magnitude of responsibility has increased across the commissioned ranks. The reduction in Army officer numbers in 2012 essentially resulted in “less doing more” which has been further compounded by the inadequate manning numbers designed in the Employment Control Framework 2009.

5.6 Employment Control Framework (ECF)

5.6.1 The current deficit in unit “manning levels” of formation and service units is compounded by an inadequate organisation Employment Control Framework (ECF) since 2009. The implications of the inadequate manning levels, the Association contends, is inextricably linked to the on-going “retention” issues of highly qualified and experienced professionals. The exit statistics and exit interviews conducted by the Defence Forces in 2016 can assist in confirming this position.

5.6.2 For example, the Defence Forces ECF fails to include the following numbers of officers resulting in these appointments being filled at the expense of formation and service operational units. This continual “ad hoc” arrangement placing additional burdens on those remaining.

- I. Overseas Lieutenant's: **24**
- II. Overseas Captains: **40**
- III. Nordic Battle Group: **27**
- IV. Junior Command & Staff = **30** Captains
- V. Senior Command Operations Course = **8** Lieutenants (NS)
- VI. Senior Command & Staff = **20** Commandants (Army, NS & AC)
- VII. Secondments/LOA = **24** (these consequential vacancies are blocked)
- VIII. Appointments for Naval Service and Air Corps Officers overseas

Note: These are real numbers on a continual basis.

5.6.3 The reduction in the Defence Force Army Component Establishment of 114 Officers in the 2012 reorganisation removed the critical rank numbers that provided essential ‘capacity’ for the Defence Forces operational output. The current manning level statistics of units “strength in station” is at less than 50% of designated establishments with respect to the commissioned ranks in a significant number of units. RACO visited all stations in November 2016 noting manning level numbers of officers.

5.6.4 Foreign military organisations build this critical capacity by factoring the essential numbers overseas and on essential development courses of training. Some Army Units are forced to operate with 50% strength of its Officers. This is the reality on the ground. Similar demands are being experienced to cover the rising vacancies of Commissioned Ranks in the Naval Service (38) and Air Corps (32) where timelines for specialist training are particularly lengthy (2-5 years).

5.6.5 The implications of so many vacancies is that the remaining Officers are subjected to heavier work loads and further relocation for protracted periods on operational service, both domestic and overseas and at sea. These demands of service have increased dramatically in the last 10 years with senior officers spending an average of 52% of their time away from home station and junior officers up to 70%. This

does not include fulltime deployment to overseas and humanitarian missions. *Alarming, not one support provision has been developed in the same period. In fact critical support schemes have been removed or reduced by Government and Department of Defence initiatives during this period.*

- 5.6.6 The average number of postings at the ranks of Commandant and Captain in the Army is 8.82 in a 5 year period often with as little as one week timeline of notice to move with no return date. The impact on a household is that our Members are weekend partners/parents. The implications are obvious; childcare demands increase, sustenance costs of travel, accommodation and dining at the new post/location increases. The financial and relationship impact are a cause of significant concern.
- 5.6.7 All of these real and unique demands of military service are forcing decisions around *career V family friendly jobs* in the greater public or private sector in which a wider range of family designed support provisions is available.
- 5.6.8 Over 136 officers (10%) departed ahead of normal retirement ages since 2013. With the consequential increase in the demands of service, the Defence Forces may struggle to recruit greater number of females who may not see these challenges of service as compatible with the more family friendly policies enjoyed by the Public or Private Sector.
- 5.6.9 The Defence Forces Numbers are below the numbers identified by Government. The current "trained strength" is below 9,000. The obvious issues surrounding the retention of skilled professionals goes unrecognised by management rather than address the underlying causes. *Organisation turnover is healthy but only when vacancies can be filled efficiently.* The obvious cost benefit of retention policies must be factored to address the continual "brain drain".
- 5.6.10 Military skill sets, due to their hazardous nature, can take considerable time to develop safely and effectively, from 2-5 years in many disciplines. The implications of the number of vacancies is that it places additional burdens on those serving where they must now carry out multiple roles in addition to their own responsibilities. This can compromise safety. As an example, *Fatigue and safety concerns was clearly identified by external Safety Management System Review in of the Air Corps in 2013, many of the recommendations of which are yet to be implemented.*

5.7 Impact of Vacancies & Additional Roles/Duties

- 5.7.1 The impact of inadequate manning levels essentially means that our personnel are being continuously multiroled. With unit manning levels in operational units running at 50% or less in many instances on a daily basis, the additional burden on those serving officers is very significant. Officers are being posted as required "by order" with no timelines in order to fill critical vacancies domestically, overseas and at sea.
- 5.7.2 **Risk Management-** The nature of military service requires structured education, training and development of military expertise and experience. Failure to ensure the appropriate standards, time and safe development of these capabilities can ultimately compromise safety posing greater risk to all those stakeholders. The

failure to introduce quick impact retention policies where an organisation is unable to effectively fill vacancies with trained staff requires immediate attention. *The gap in corporate knowledge and military expertise is already compromising specialist operational capabilities.*

- 5.7.3 Governance-** Administrative and operational governance and supervision are essential to effective management. Where manning levels are inadequate, the additional burdens on those remaining combined with lack of continuity in key staffing appointments, compromises the efficiency and effectiveness of administration, command and operational management. These staffing weaknesses have and continue to place significant burdens on those serving.
- 5.7.4 Wellbeing-** The recent “wellbeing” climate survey of Defence Forces personnel was recently published (29 September 2016) by the Minister for Defence. Mr Paul Kehoe T.D. The report (170 pages) was a *quantitative* report measuring the *extent* of satisfaction or otherwise on a wide range of organisation “wellbeing” issues ranging from work life balance, fairness of procedures/policies, culture, commitment and human resource policies. Where the findings had both positive and negative results, particular issues identified by the report were quite alarming when an organisation such as the Defence Forces and its unique ethos and culture are considered.
- 5.7.5** Commissioned officers, due to the nature of their service conditions and ethos of duty, continually deliver on all demands made of them. The recent climate survey identified very significant findings with respect to how officers view the reciprocation of these commitments by the organisation. Most alarming were the results relating to “commitment to service”. Commitment in the military context is quite unique across the services of the State. Commitment by those serving in the military is a crucial characteristic of a successful military force, in particular, when factored in achieving your mission or objective under a very real threat to one’s own life, that of your comrades or those citizens who have been entrusted to your care.
- 5.7.6** Underpinning and in parallel to this commitment is the “psychological contract” that should exist between the “employer” and those who serve the State. The psychological contract is the “unwritten” element of the contract. Rousseau (1995) defined psychological contract initially as a set of person’s individual beliefs regarding the reciprocal obligations and benefits established in an exchange relationship. If managed effectively, the relationship will foster mutual trust between the parties, matching the objectives and commitments of the organisation to those of their employees. But a negative psychological contract can result in employees becoming disenchanted, demotivated and resentful.
- 5.7.8** Psychological contract breach may occur if employees perceive that their organisation, or its agents, has failed to deliver on what they perceive was promised. Employees or employers who perceive a breach are likely to respond negatively. Responses may occur in the form of reduced loyalty, commitment, and organisational citizenship behaviours. Based on the results of the Climate Survey, this inherent failure would certainly appear to be the case in the Defence Forces.
- 5.7.9** The survey results indicate that a majority of DF members do not have high levels of affective commitment to the Defence Forces. A significant majority of respondents (60%) indicated that they felt they were doing something worthwhile for their

country- there appears to be a high commitment to the idea of being in the DF and what that means- yet the majority of respondents report low levels of commitment to the organisation itself (as opposed to the purpose). This is alarming and why is this so? This could be seen as a demonstration of personnel being proud to be in an organisation and what it represents but not believing the organisation is “fit for purpose” in delivering the designed objectives of the state.

5.7.10 Further reinforcing the alarm in these findings is the survey results on personnel’s intentions to leave the Defence Forces. The survey revealed that 27% signalled their intention to leave as a result of commuting distances alone. Satisfaction with military life has dropped significantly since 2008. In 2008 64% of respondents were satisfied with military life, this has noticeably dropped to 48% in 2015. The survey responses to commitment indicate that if opportunities present themselves outside of the DF, personnel particularly those with less length of service and in ranks up to Senior Officer are choosing and will continue to leave unless management address the situation. Over 10% of Commissioned Officers have voluntarily left the DF since 2013 leaving significant gaps in corporate expertise which is even more worrying when the time factor to develop “professional military skill sets” is factored (2-5 years). The current effective strength of the DF is below 9,000 out of its designed establishment of 9,500 signalling a “failed” human resource policy in contradiction of the Department of Defence strategic goals.

5.7.11 The survey findings reveal that there is much discontent as a consequence of the last reorganisation in 2013. The 2013 reorganisation rationale was based on the limitations of a reduced budgetary envelope as opposed to the actual operational requirements defined by the roles assigned by Government. Troops are travelling from Donegal, Galway and Athlone to support the inadequate manning levels of the eastern Dublin based regional units.

5.7.12 As it currently stands, the manning levels are inadequate and insufficient with management failing to address the “retention” crisis. The force effective trained strength is currently below 9,000 out of an establishment for 9,500. The sole human resourcing initiative being considered by management is through “recruitment”. *This initiative is in spite of the obvious and considerable cost benefit associated with “retaining” the experienced and trained professionals in which the DF has invested.* Interestingly, the Climate Survey Report objective included research on issues relating to “retention”. Alarming, the report fails to conclude or address how the current retention crisis should be addressed. *No recommendations were made in the report.* The failure to make recommendations on one of the most significant challenges to the DF is quite alarming and questionable.

5.8 Industrial Relations

5.8.1 The States Industrial Relations architecture has changed significantly in 2016. Representative Associations are precluded by law from having Trade Union Status and affiliation to the Irish Congress of Trade Unions.

5.8.2 Where RACO have accepted this position for all the appropriate reasons, our request for a 3rd Party Review of the Parallel Process and Defence Forces Conciliation & Arbitration Process has yet to receive any response to requests submitted in 2015 and more recently in light of latest developments.

- 5.8.3 The White Paper 2015 reinforces Managements commitment to Industrial Relations through the Defence Forces Conciliation and Arbitration Scheme. This commitment is particularly important, however, it must be real.

5.9 Defence Force Conciliation & Arbitration Scheme (C&A)

- 5.9 The troubled history of pay and conditions of service within the Defence Forces compelled the introduction of legislation and the establishment of RACO in 1990. After much political unrest and public commentary on the Defence Forces, the Government directed the introduction of legislation for the establishment of representation. The Houses of the Oireachtas objective in the establishment of Representation was to provide “a representative voice on remuneration and other conditions of service” providing a scheme designed to deliver effective negotiation mechanisms.

- 5.9.1 RACO Members’ are the leaders and managers that have implemented and delivered every element of the Defence Forces change and output over the last twenty-five years. Unlike Public Service Unions, there are no industrial relations actions Representative Associations can take to influence decisions. RACO accept this position for all the obvious reasons, but with that acceptance was the understanding that Management would be *transparent* in their actions and *engage* with the association on issues that affect their Members.

- 5.9.2 The denial and frustration of process does not lead to harmonious relations. The C&A Scheme reinforced by Haddington Road Agreement and now Lansdowne Road Agreement provides that where there is a dispute on an issue, a 3rd Party is available to adjudicate or arbitrate. *Why is it that Management continually deny process prior to imposing unilateral decisions on issues that come under the scope of Representation?*

- 5.9.3 Most reasonable commentators would agree that, where the *only* industrial relations tool is the reliance on agreements made between the parties, greater significance and respect should be placed on “process”. The continued denial and frustration of such basic process has now rendered this scheme dysfunctional. A motion put to conference by the National Executive was for an external review of the Conciliation & Arbitration Process as a consequence of this dysfunction.

5.10 Parallel Process

- 5.10.1 RACO have expressed their concerns to the Official Side questioning the current relevance of the Parallel Process. Social Partnership, the structures under which the Parallel Process was introduced, is dead since 2009. The Association’s experience in the latest National Pay Talks has again brought into question the relevance of this current Parallel Process Structure where it was obvious that the only negotiations that was being conducted was with the Public Service Unions of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions. This was evidenced by the large number of “side deals” that were negotiated by Public Service Unions and summarised in the Chairman’s Notes. This we learned, not at the pay talks, but in the Industrial Relations Journal IRN 22 published on 11 June 2015.

5.10.2 The continued absence of suitable negotiation status at such National Pay Talks places our Members at a significant disadvantage to Public Sector Unions. These Unions are negotiating and voting on pay & conditions that directly affect our Members and our Association has no credible negotiating influence. Where RACO accept the Government's position on Defence Forces Representative Association Membership of Trade Unions, how can the Association have confidence in a Parallel Process in which we are denied credible negotiation status? In the context of a changing Workplace Relation landscape, the Association and Government must now consider how best to address the current obvious imbalance of the Parallel Process and develop adequate mechanisms and structures through which to address Representative Associations.

5.10.3 **To this end, we are requesting the Commission to support our request to initiate an external review of the current model of representation by Associations at National Level examining the structures and equivalence of participation and voting status where Pay & Conditions of Service of our Members are concerned.**

5.11 Support Services to Meet the Modern Challenges

5.11.1 International Best Practice of Armed Forces is to support the "military family" and their personnel by a range of support provisions which include; suitable accommodation on new posting, embracing travel time in the working week, efficient administration of travel and meal costs for those forced to be separated from their families and partners. These provisions are nothing new to Military Organisations intent on supporting their service personnel and in most other international militaries they are an accepted norm.

5.11.2 Management's failure to identify and adequately provide support policies to reduce the additional hardships of the Defence Forces personnel contradicts the theme recognising that "our people are our greatest asset". In contrast to the support provisions available to other international military personnel in an effort to support the "military family", our Members are currently frustrated by out-dated policies. Rather than support personnel who have been forced to continually relocate from home stations, our Members face unnecessary hardships, which include;

5.11.3 **Indefinite relocation and posting timelines.** Members are being relocated, on occasion with notice as short as 1 week without any consideration of personal circumstances. Our Members do not receive appointment duration or a return date to their home post. They are unable to reasonably plan normal family or personal affairs.

5.11.4 **Inadequate Change of Station Allowance.** Members are increasingly subjected to situations where Military Management approve claims and the Civilian Side deny these claims, often based on questionable interpretations of out-dated Regulations and Policies that have failed to move with the times. Whilst in dispute, our Members are financially "out of pocket" while removed from their family homes causing additional personal stress. The most significant anomaly is the fact that the average number of postings is 8.82 over 5 years but the out-dated regulation only provides for a maximum of 9months disturbance allowance in a 5 year period. The Association requests that the Commission consider this anomaly.

- 5.11.5 **Lifetime Community Rating- Insurance Loadings/Levies:** Government's in other countries recognise military service and the requirements around occupational health care provision. Where insurance levies are applied by blanket legislation, respective Government's derogate those in Military Service. A subsequent Certificate of Service presented to an Insurance provider negates any levies such as Lifetime Community Rating.

The experience of our Members is quite the contrary. Government introduced legislation; there was no consultation and no response from Management forcing the Association to seek information through Freedom Of Information. The Gleeson Commission and subsequent pay reviews have already factored the DF Health Provisions by reducing pay rates of our Members. Now the Government applies another levy forcing our Members to purchase redundant policies that have no tangible benefit only to avoid future levies on retirement. There is an obvious contradiction where, on one hand, the DF requires personnel to engage in an occupational health plan to which the Director of the Medical Corps has full access to Medical Care & records and, on the other, the statutory requirement forcing personnel to purchase private indemnity health care plans the purchase of which is solely to avoid future levies.

- 5.11.7. **Foreign Service Allowances:** Officers are being posted overseas at such short notice that Financial Support Package's are not provided in a timeframe to facilitate adequate personal or family relocation plans. How can this be happening? Unlike other Public Servants, Officers are posted on the majority of Missions with highly restrictive timelines often precluding the sourcing and securing of schools forcing families apart for up to 2 years. This would not happen in other sectors of the Public Service but yet; management appears indifferent to the contradictions and unique circumstances of our Members.

- 5.11.8 Our Members accept and understand the demands associated with military service. So too they understand that, similar to other nations, appropriate support provisions can and should be provided to facilitate the harsh and unpleasant challenges that are unique to Military Service. Why to the Department of Defence regularly provide allowance schedules that are not equivalent to other Public Servants?

- 5.12. **Single Pension Scheme:** A New Public Service Pension Scheme was introduced for New Entrants in 2013. Only through lobbying by associations and unions concerned was the scheme adjusted *somewhat* to cater for the demands of service to the Defence Forces.

- 5.12.1 This New Scheme is punitive to new entrants and will not serve our Members or the DF well for the future. The implications of Service Age Restrictions related to Rank already impose strict timelines with which Officers can optimise benefits. These benefits are unlikely to sustain a family home unless the Officers can progress through the career structures within the restricted timelines. Reduced numbers of appointments since the 2012/13 Reorganisation limits potential.

- 5.12.2 Unlike Public Servants, all of who can serve until retirement ages of 66 moving out to 68, the Defence Forces Officer must optimise before 58 years. Our Members pay increased pension contributions from their pay relative to Public Servants to secure and optimise their benefits within these restricted timelines. The most recent

policies of the Department of Defence would appear to influence forced retirement without the possibility of optimising superannuation arrangements. Many future officers will be forced to retire at 54 years of age in the rank of Captain. This implication of policy change has a significant impact on commitment and retention, both very serious factors recognised by external commissions and reports (Gleeson & Climate Survey)

5.13 Modernisation or Defence Cuts – The Real Cost or Benefit?

- 5.13.1 In just 22 years eight reviews/reorganisations have been implemented on the Defence Forces. On average, one every three years. The Defence Forces have created greater efficiencies through innovative operational activities supported by modern technology platforms. The Defence Forces have increased profile through operational output domestically while expanding international operational influence representing Ireland. The Defence Forces are participating in a broad range of Crisis Management and Peace Support Operations and humanitarian missions overseas through the auspices of UN/EU/OSCE & NATO PfP with a total of over 491 personnel serving on these Missions.
- 5.13.2 The most recent reorganisation of the Army Component took place in 2013. Government decided to reduce the Army from 3 to 2 Brigades within the overall Defence Forces strength of 9,500 personnel. The elimination of one Brigade necessitated the abolition of some units and the amalgamation of others, resulting in large redeployments of personnel and units around the country. Both the Air Corps and Naval Service also had a reduction in strength with the NS losing a ships complement.
- 5.13.3 Since the 1990 the Defence Forces has reduced its overall strength by 28%, reduced its senior officer number by 25% and closed 16 military barracks, using the personnel pay saving to update its equipment, refocus its training strategy and improve its remaining infrastructure. Picture for a moment the difference the applications of the Defence Forces modernisation model to the general public service would make to the Public Service pay bill and efficiency levels.
- 5.13.4 The Defence Forces are unable to maintain manning levels to the designed establishment. Currently below 9,000 "trained strength" out of a designed 9,500. The only form of savings left to the Department of Defence is through continued cuts to headcount.
- 5.13.5 The significant additional burdens to effect these changes and savings has been on the commissioned officers who have to lead and manage these strategic and operational changes, at great personal and professional cost. Where the organisation was considered "fit for purpose" in 2008, it would appear that the 2013 Reorganisation of the Army Component has been a "step too far" which is now compromising operational capabilities. Examples can be given in oral submission.
- 5.13.6 The reduction in officer numbers, the reduced career and service time potential (58 years rank of Commandant to 54 years rank of Captain), reduced remuneration package and the impact on personal wellbeing due to the high instance of time separated from family and community has essentially resulted in officers seeking employment external to the Defence Forces.

- 5.13.7 The Gleeson Commission findings and guidance regarding pay and retention of skilled professionals has come to now come reality.

3.7.10 "..... one factor which must be taken into account is the need to arrive at rates of pay which are sufficient to enable the DF to recruit and retain personnel of the proper quality."

Para 3.7.11 "To ignore identifiable problems of recruitment would be to run the risk that the Defence Forces would be unable to secure the services of sufficient numbers of suitable personnel. To ignore clear evidence of difficulties would lead to out-flow of skilled personnel. In either event, the capacity of the Defence Forces to carry out the tasks assigned to them could be undermined and the problems would take many years to remedy."

The Climate Survey Findings of 2016 confirms the current status.

The final comments from the conclusions and recommendations section of the climate survey relate to pay and its potential impact on commitment to the organisation. *"While it is accepted that issues such as pay and other resources are outside the direct control of the DF, this is something which needs to be examined. If not, the DF will continue to lose highly qualified and skilled members"* (p.168)

- 5.13.8 The continual and radical downsizing and restructures have had a very significant impact on both the Defence Forces and those who serve. The Climate Survey (2016) qualifies and quantifies the current status. Reflection on recruitment and retention trends reinforces the manning crisis and the challenges in maintaining specialist experience and expertise in which the Defence Forces has invested in its personnel.
- 5.13.9 With the White Paper 2015 Projects about to commence, reflection on the impact of currently serving should be a priority for Management. The cost benefit should be carefully evaluated with respect to human resource policies of the future.

Section 6

Comparisons with Private, Public and International Military Professionals

- 6.1 This Section discusses key subject areas outlined in the Terms of Reference:
- Comparable appropriate rates for identifiable groups with prevailing private sector/market rates. This should have regard to evidence on recruitment and retention trends in respect of each group.
 - Comparing appropriate rates for identifiable groups within the public service with their equivalents in other jurisdictions, particularly where internationally traded skillsets are required, having due regard to differences in living costs.
- 6.1.1 Section 6 identifies the difficulty in establishing comparators in the private/private sector or with other international militaries. The reason for the difficulty is as a consequence of the diverse range of roles and extent of duties performed by commissioned officers. Previous Benchmarking Reports, in 2001 and 2006, and the Government Commission on Remuneration and Conditions of Service in 1990 (the Gleeson Commission) highlighted the challenges in utilising such comparators.
- 6.1.2 While section 2 outlined the nature of the profession of commissioned officers, this section explains the diverse nature of roles and functions of the three services (Army, Naval Service and Air Corps) relative to comparators in the private/public sector and international military professionals. This submission will focus on common conditions of service and employee benefits in that regard.
- 6.1.3 The roles undertaken by the military officer are multifaceted and include elements of various professions, such as accounting, medicine and law, rather than understood as a single “job”. Service in a particular rank would see an officer rotate through a full range of appointments appropriate to that rank, service branch and professional category, both at home and overseas. Typically, commissioned officers are both trained military leaders and specialist professionals in a diverse range of specialist skill sets necessary to deliver the necessary operational output.
- 6.1.4 While there are similar individual domestic and international comparators, there is no one single organisation encompassing the range of functions in a comparable manner. Therefore, this section reflects on certain private sector benefits by way of comparison and additionally examines some international military pay and benefit structures.
- 6.1.5 Section 6 reflects on the nature of military life and tacitly acknowledges that military life is recognised as ‘a life less ordinary’. In reviewing not just pay issues but the wider conditions of service that support this distinctive occupation relative to other sectors, the section reflects on conditions of employment such as working time, annual leave, promotions, medical cover, level of vacancies, efficiency requirements, retention issues and continual reorganisation.

- 6.2. The Defence Forces are unique and distinct within the public service. Serving personnel operate in a high-risk environments, subject to military law, posted to location “by order” at any time. Serving officers submit to restrictions being placed on their rights of expressions, personal liberty, assembly and collective bargaining. These restrictions are enacted through express legal exemptions contained in various statutes and EU Directives. This section sets out to elucidate the components of military service that separate commissioned officers for other proposed comparators.
- 6.2.1 The foremost assessment of remuneration and conditions of service in the Defence Forces was the ‘Report of the Commission on Remuneration and Conditions of Service in the Defence Forces’ published in 1990. This report, known as the ‘Gleeson Commission’, and the more recent CSO Research Paper,¹ recognises the Defence Forces and an Garda Síochána ‘as unique exclusive within the public sector’.
- 6.2.2 The Gleeson Commission was premised on the understanding that the levels of Defence Forces pay must be appreciated in the context of military duty, responsibilities, condition of service and the uniqueness of the role.² The Commission concluded that the ‘fairest approach to pay determination would be [to] compare rates of pay in the DF with a representative range of jobs in a wide variety of employments in the public and private sector’. Therefore, Gleeson took the following factors into account:
- I. The range and complexity of duties involved;
 - II. The scope for initiative and judgement;
 - III. The physical and mental skills required;
 - IV. Training and experience;
 - V. The degree of supervision experienced and exercised;
 - VI. The level of responsibility for other staff and for equipment, and responsibility in terms of decision making authority;
 - VII. The working environment (including physical conditions and hazards).
- 6.2.3 In addition, the Report of the Public Service Benchmarking Body, published in 2007, acknowledged that there were no direct comparators in the Private Sector for the Defence Forces. However, this report did suggest an analytical job evaluation, involving the ‘examination of jobs which are dissimilar in the nature of their content, but of similar size in terms of being rated as equivalent under an analytical job evaluation scheme’.
- 6.2.4 The constituent elements of remuneration for Defence Forces personnel are Regimental Pay (basic pay) and Military Service Allowance (MSA). These are paid on a continuous basis to all members of the Forces, apart from recruits, cadets and officers above the rank of Colonel, regardless of appointment held or duties undertaken. Together these two elements comprise what the Gleeson Commission described as the “Military Salary”.

¹ CSO Research Paper, ‘*Specific Analysis of the Public/Private Sector Pay Differential for National Employment Survey 2009 & 2010 Data*’

² Para 3.7.21 Report of the Commission on Remuneration and conditions of service in the Defence Forces.

- 6.2.5 In 2002, the Public Service Benchmarking Body (PSBB 1) stated that MSA was “deemed part of basic pay and . . . [was] treated as such when the Body considered the recommendations for those sectors of the public service.”

6.3 Comparisons with other Private Sector Equivalents.

- 6.3.1 The Irish economy is not homogenous and as such growth patterns vary depending on the sector concerned. This adds further complexity to a comparative analysis. Sectors such as Fintech, Pharma, Financial Services and IT are expected to lead with strong growth rates, while IDA Ireland continues efforts to enhance job creation opportunities in the Maritime and Energy Sectors.
- 6.3.2 Therefore, in a growing Irish Economy, the Defence Forces is competing with employers for talent across numerous sectors and career paths. A limiting factor in this competitive environment is, as Gleeson stated, ‘the need to arrive at rates of pay which are sufficient to enable the DF to recruit and retain personnel of the proper quality’.³ An inability to address this factor in the preceding years has resulted in a ‘brain drain’ of officers (as detailed in the executive summary), the consequences of which were predictively identified as creating recruitment issues that ‘run the risk that the Defence Forces would be unable to secure the services of sufficient numbers of suitable personnel’⁴. This will inevitably have an impact that will limit capacity to perform assigned tasks. Furthermore, it will require significant energy and recourses to address this issue, particular if swift action is not undertaken.
- 6.3.3 Pay increases for roles in key sectors, such as Human Resource Management, Logistics and Supply Chain Management and Information Technology, are identified as likely to grow as much as 6% to 9% in 2016/2017. These roles have been and continue to be traditional roles for officers as a consequence of their specialist experience in leadership, management, discipline, education and training.
- 6.3.4 As stated, military officers have a diverse range of roles, functions and responsibilities. The range and complexity of duties require high levels of initiative and judgement within a working environment that is physically demanding and often hazardous. As the of the Defence Forces, officers are expected to set the highest standards in their management roles, while taking constant consideration of the various risk and governance factors. Officers have onerous staff responsibilities often combined with valuable equipment portfolios and significant decision-making and command and authority responsibilities. Accordingly, the comparators in private industry outlined in table 6.1 below are deemed relevant.

³ The Gleeson Commission, at para 3.7.10.

⁴ The Gleeson Commission, at para 3.7.11.

Table 6.1 – Suggested Comparators with similar Roles in Private Industry

Appointment	Low	Mid	High
Chief Operations Officer (Colonel)	140,000	175,000	210,000
HR Director (Colonel)	95,000	127,500	160,000
Learning & Development Director (Colonel)	85,000	102,500	120,000
Sales Manager (Commandant)	60,000	70,000	80,000
Learning & Development Manager (Commandant)	50,000	65,000	80,000
HR Manager (Commandant)	55,000	77,500	100,000
Business Development Manager (Captain)	60,000	75,000	85,000
HR Business Partner (Captain)	45,000	57,500	70,000
Learning & Development Specialist (Captain)	45,000	52,500	60,000
Sales Executive (Lieutenant)	28,000	30,000	35,000
HR Generalist/Specialist (Lieutenant)	35,000	42,500	50,000
Technical Trainer (Lieutenant)	40,000	50,000	60,000

**Stats from Salary and Employment Insights Ireland 2016,
Lincoln Recruitment Specialists*

6.3.5 Private Sector Comparators - Standard Non-pay Related Benefits. The *Sigmar Recruitment* 'Employee Benefits Report' for 2014 states that in the Private sector, standard non-pay benefits were rated in the order outline in table 6.2 below. Of particular note is the percentage of employers offering the benefit in each case.

Table 6.2 Private Sector Comparator - Standard Non-pay related Benefits.

Rating	Pay Benefit	% of Employers offering Benefit to Employees	Available to Military Personnel/ Comments
1	Private Health Insurance	58%	Yes. Limited to individual officer i.e. no family cover. Officers over the age of 34 years of age, are required to purchase private health insurance to avoid LCR levies.
2	Pension Contributions	56%	Yes. The majority of Officers now pay PRSI Class 'A' contribution. This is a higher rate contribution in recognition of accrual period enforced early retirement ages (54-60).
3	Paid Sick Days	66%	Yes. Recognising the need to quickly get back to a higher standard of

			health and fitness.
4	Educational Support	37%	Yes. The recognised minimum standard of education for commissioned officers is at degree level. Courses are funded in line with Defence Forces' requirements. 3 rd level financial undertakings typically apply at twice the standard Public service norm, i.e. 2 years undertaking for each year of education.
5	Flexitime	31%	No, not compatible with military operations.
6	Additional Vacation Days	31%	No. All leave is a privilege and subject to the contingencies of the service.
7	Life Assurance Policies	38%	No. Despite the significant risks associated with the occupation. Life Assurance Policies are available to officers through the CAOGA scheme but the cost of the scheme is borne fully by each individual. Military personnel also suffer significant loadings on mortgage protection and life policies as a consequence of their military service.
8	Long Term Disability	20%	No. Despite the significant risks associated with the occupation.
9	Savings Scheme	14%	No.
10	Subsidised Food	31%	No. Food in messes is at cost to the individual.
11	Laptop	40%	No.
12	Tax Saver Travel Scheme	24%	Available at cost to the individual. Not borne by the employer.
13	Travel Insurance	17%	No.
14	Gym Membership	22%	As part of physical fitness requirements, many DF locations have basic gymnasiums but not to commercial standards.
15	Parking	40%	Space generally available within barracks but not dedicated spaces.
16	Paid Parental Leave	16% (Now provided on a statutory basis)	Not transposed to DFR – despite new regulations coming into law on the 01 Sept 2016.
17	Employee Stock Options	18%	No.
18	Child Care	6%	No.
19	Company Car	11%	No.
20	On Site Canteen	31%	Yes. Barracks generally operate dining halls which primarily feed personnel on regimental duties who are

			restricted and confined to barracks on a 24-hour basis. Additionally, personnel on residential training courses are rationed as it is not feasible to release personnel out of barracks while on such duty or training. Personnel are frequently posted away from home and may live in and avail of military accommodation and rations for a limited period. Accommodation and feeding after 9 months are charged at cost.
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6.3.6 Other Non-pay benefits identified include:

- *Subscriptions to or Memberships of Professional Bodies.* Only Officers who are required to maintain a professional body qualification or membership in order to be permitted to practice their profession, may be refunded such annual costs. These are restricted to civil engineers, medical doctors and Explosive Ordnance Disposal officers.
- *Employee Discount Scheme.* Unsurprisingly, and in line with all public servants, employee discounts schemes are not available to the members of the Defence Forces.
- *Bonus and Incentive schemes.* There are no financial bonus schemes available within the DF.
- *Performance Related Pay (PRP).* Performance related non-pay benefits within the private sector such as stock options, share purchase plans, long-term incentive plans, bonuses, etc. are additional means available to employers to reward their employees for attaining and/or exceeding targets/desired outcomes. There are no Performance Related Pay Schemes in the Defence Forces available to officers below the rank of General⁵.

6.3.7 *Private Health Insurance Benefits.* The *Inbucon* Survey indicates that 65.23% of managers are now provided with medical insurance. This was an increase of 7.82% from the 2000 figure. The *Sigmar Recruitment* "Employee Benefit Report 2014" report confirms the importance of health cover as a benefit and notes that 58% of employers provide private health cover for their employees.

6.4 Comparison with other International Military Professionals.

6.4.1 Due to the number of ranks, specialities and services within various military structures it is extremely difficult to develop accurate comparators with other armed forces. Additionally, the comparative analysis must consider other relevant factors such as the cost of living, taxation system and deductions from pay for rations, quarters and uniform.

⁵ Brigadier General, Major General and Lieutenant General. These ranks are not represented by the representative associations.

- 6.4.2 Data relating to French and German military forces demonstrates that the standard of pay for Defence Force officers is generally poor in comparison to these forces. The French military also distinguishes between officers not only on the basis of rank and speciality, but also a number of other factors including marital status, the number of familial children, the geographic location and completion (or otherwise) of the appropriate professional development course. Hence, a French non-specialist Lieutenant Colonel with no children, in Provence with 4 years service in that rank, but 18 years overall service will be in receipt of a gross salary of €95,527 per annum. This compares to a maximum of circa €79,341 (including MSA) for an equivalent Irish Lieutenant Colonel regardless of marital status, children, location or professional qualifications.
- 6.4.3 A similar German Lieutenant Colonel gets €76,912 per annum, but also receives overtime after 41 hours a week (ranging from €2.35 to €5.02 per hour) in addition to €135.98 per month if married with one child, and €116.24 for the second and third child per month. While the fourth and subsequent children necessitate an additional €362.18 per month per child.
- 6.4.4 A Lieutenant Colonel in the UK armed forces is in receipt of a maximum basic pay of circa €95,000. Furthermore, basic pay and allowances for British officers were increased in 2015 by 1% and a further 1% in 2016. Additionally, UK Forces have a matrix of allowances and services that support not only the military life but support the families within the military life. Additional allowances are paid to servicemen in London to take account of the higher cost of living. Other initiatives include providing family housing, extended Change of Station or relocation allowances and educational allowances and supports for families.

Table 6.3 – Comparison of International Commissioned Pay Rates for Officer Line Rates

RANK	UK (Army)*	NZ (Army)*	DF (Army Line) (Basic & MSA)
Colonel	£84,878-£93,304 (€99,307-€109,165)	Unavailable	€76,600 – 92,229
Lieutenant Colonel	£70,059-£81,123 (€81,969-€94,913)	Unavailable	€66,785-€74,341
Commandant	£49,918-£59,783 (€58,404-€69,946)	\$88,700-120,474 (€58,985-€80,115)	€57,294-€67,705
Captain	£39,629-£47,127 (€46,365-€55,138)	\$77,365-103,889 (€51,447-€69,086)	€45,077-€57,237
Lieutenant	£30,923-£34,180 (€36,179-€39,990)	\$63,020-84,162 (€41,908-€55,967)	€34,130 -€44,010
2/Lieutenant	£25,727 (€30,100)	\$52,989-68,572 (€35,237-€45,600)	€28,985 - €32,838

DF pay rates include Rate 1 Basic Pay excluding MSA of €4,730. International rates are Basic Pay only. UK figures skewed by recent 15% drop in value of Sterling relative to Euro.

**Currency conversions accurate as at 22 Nov 2016.*

6.4.5 In summary, as indicated across this submission, army line officer retention rates are low with significant numbers of officers opting to voluntarily exit from the Defence Forces. The majority of those officers exiting are in the rank of captain and commandant and are departing primarily to the private sector. Officers are generally exiting to take up positions in operations, senior IT, training, education and HR roles within other organisations. Essentially, this cohort is highly regarded in private industry due to their education and experience and they generally move into the mid to high range managerial positions with greater potential for promotion and superior associated benefits. The prospect of employment that offers greater security of tenure in terms of hours, location of work and annual leave is of noted significance.

6.4.6 Air Corps Pilots and Air Traffic Controllers are retiring early to take up positions with the aviation industry. Many pilots move out to a commercial airliner or the Irish aviation Authority as commercial liner pilots or governance and training roles respectively. Here, as detailed in Annex 'F-2' rates of pay for experienced pilots ranges from €108,000 to 150,000 with Air Traffic Controllers reaching €105,000.

6.4.7 Naval Service Operation Branch and Marine Engineer Officers are retiring early to take up positions within the Irish Merchant Navy or aboard international cruise liners. Internationally, many positions operate on a six-month on/six-month off basis and attract salaries up to €78,000 per annum.

6.5. Comparisons with An Garda Síochána

6.5.1 Notionally, commissioned officers of the Defence Forces are aligned with the ranks with an Garda Síochána. However, as the Gleeson Commission noted, these rank structures are not an accurate comparator. This is because an Garda Síochána has significantly fewer ranks and a smaller number of specialities when compared to the commissioned ranks of the Defence Forces. However, if inferences are to be drawn, it is important to examine not only the range of payments received by an Garda Síochána, i.e. €53,404 to €98,100 or €51,660 to €94,998, but also to establish the true rate of overall Garda pay. To that end, it is important to note that Garda incomes are supplemented both by overtime to the rank of inspector and to a range of additional allowances available to all officers. The table below shows the average potential earning of comparable Garda ranks.

Table 6.4 – Garda Pay Rates

RANK	PRSI 'A'	PRSI 'B'	Pts on Increment Scale	Additional Allowances as a % of Basic Pay*	Overall Potential Max Earnings 'A'	Overall Potential Max Earnings 'B'
Chief Supt	€82,278 – 98,100	€79,699- 94,998	7	15.26%	€133,070	€109,495
Supt	€68,853 – 80116	€66,636- 77,608	8	16.39%	€93,305	€90,328

Inspector	€53,404 – 59,178	€51,660- 57,243	7	36.75%	€80,926	€78,279
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*Based on letter (Dated 01 Nov 2012) from the office of the Garda Commissioner to the Public Accounts Committee (see Annex **XXXX**)

- 6.5.2 What Table 6.4 indicates is that the comparable Garda ranks earn similar amount of basic pay to the Defence Force officers. However, unlike members of the Defence Forces, additional Garda work hours are controlled by shift and, therefore, overall incomes are supplemented by overtime payments. This has a significant effect on the overall level of pay that an Garda Síochána receive (15.25 – 36.75 %).

6.5 Public Service Support Benefits

- 6.5.1 Observations on the payment of Military Service Allowance (MSA) as part of basic pay. As with any profession, there are particular aspects associated with military life that are unique and which, consequently, cannot easily be factored into a pay comparison exercise. These are unique disadvantages and are currently compensated by way of the payment of MSA. These aspects of military service include the following:

- I. Liability for duty 24 hours a day, 7 days a week;
- II. Long and unsocial hours of duty;
- III. Requirement to serve a fixed term of engagement;
- IV. Restrictions on personal liberty because of the code of military discipline;
- V. Early retirement on age grounds;
- VI. Risk of personal danger/loss of life;
- VII. Poor and uncomfortable conditions;
- VIII. Personal responsibility for the use of lethal weapons;
- IX. Disruption of family life because of frequent absences from home.

- 6.5.2 In Sept 2013, the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform published the outcome of its review on public service allowances and premium payments. In the section on Allowances for the Defence Forces, the report stated that in addition to the aforementioned criteria, the payment of MSA...

“represents value for money and is cost effective, because, unlike other areas of the Public Service and due to the nature of the duties performed, overtime, shift allowance or other such premium payments are not available to members of the Defence Forces. (If this overtime or shift payments were to be paid to personnel to compensate them for additional hours of duty it would cost significantly more to implement).”

“also serves to compensate personnel for the restriction on the right to engage in industrial action, a restriction that is unique to the Defence Forces. This also allows the Government a backup workforce to be put into position when other sectors withdraw their labour. It enables management to refuse to pay additional claims for

remuneration for duties outside of normal hours as management can state that personnel are in receipt of MSA and are appropriately compensated."

- 6.5.3 Government is now stating that the payment of MSA to personnel provides significant value for money, but that its payment also justifies restrictions on the right to strike and the non-payment of legitimate claims for additional responsibilities or duties. In the context that military personnel are exempt the provisions of the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997; this continued demand to increase productivity and output without any conventional employee law protections or industrial relations mechanisms is punitive.

6.6 Redeployment in the Public Service.

- 6.6.1 The Haddington Road Agreement retained existing redeployment limits for public service at 45 KMs. The agreement did introduce some changes to procedures for the redeployment of staff in the civil service and non-commercial semi-state bodies to improve cross-sectoral redeployments. However, it remains the case that it is not possible for military personnel to redeploy into the wider public service nor vice versa.

- 6.6.2 The ability to redeploy personnel to other departments provides alternatives to long distance postings. However, similar flexibilities or movement limits are not available to members of the Defence Forces. Defence Force Regulations do not limit the number of moves within a period nor the redeployment distances.

- 6.6.3 **Defence Forces Change of Station Allowance (COSA).** The intention of COSA is to ensure in so far as it is possible, that reasonable out of pocket expenses resulting from a posting to a new station are fully recouped. There are a number of qualifying criteria in this respect. Firstly, the officer concerned must be posted to a location greater than 40 KMs from their home address. Additionally, they must be in a position to prove that they are a 'house owner' or 'house holder' in order to qualify for the allowance. The benefit period is limited to a 9-month period and may be extended out to 15 months where an officer is purchasing a house at the new location (and where married quarters are not available at the new station). This system is unfit for purpose considering the prevalence of negative equity home (hampering the ability to sell and move), the restricted number of married quarters made available, family commitments tied to home location. These factors, coupled with the high incidence of postings, renders the possibility of moving an officer's family to a new location as nigh impossible. Therefore, officers are traveling long distances each week and many family lives are confined to weekend and leave periods. The average number of postings for senior officers remains in the region of 8.82 postings in a 5-year period.

- 6.6.4 **Recoupable Expenses Associated with COSA.** Officers posted over 40 KMs may, for a period of 9 months, claim back the cost of:

- I. Travel to and from their former posting or home address, whichever is shorter, covering one return journey per week at a Public Transport Rate and capped at €107.07 a week.

- II. Messing, the cost of meals charged to them while at the new posting in the mess.
- III. Accommodation. Standard living-in room in the officer's messing. Much of the accommodation in messes is deemed substandard and consequently no charge is applied.
- IV. If the officer decides to move their primary residence the following recoupable expenses associated with the move of residence may be paid to an officer who was an owner-occupier at the old station:
 - 1. Costs associated with the purchase of a house at the new station;
 - 2. Stamp Duty;
 - 3. Solicitors' Fees;
 - 4. Incidental Legal Expenses;
 - 5. Expenses connected with loan or mortgage (including guarantee and survey fees);
 - 6. Private Survey Drain Test;
 - 7. Interest Payable on Bridging Finance (less any rebate for income tax).

6.6.5 Where an officer incurs costs selling their home, the following costs may be recouped:

- I. Auctioneers' Fees;
- II. Advertising Expenses;
- III. Solicitors' Fees;
- IV. Incidental Legal Expenses;
- V. Mortgage Redemption Penalty;
- VI. Cost of conveyance of furniture and effects from home address to new station;
- VII. Overlapping rent or analogous charges;
- VIII. Vouched costs of the transfer of a telephone and TV aerial where these had been installed at the officer's expense at the old station;
- IX. Vouched rent where the officer and his/her family move to temporary furnished accommodation to a maximum of £63.85 per week.

6.6.6 The allowances pertaining to Change of Station that are currently applied to Commissioned Officers have been in effect for over 21 years (since 13 July 1995). The provisions of this document (DFR S3 Pay and Allowances, DFR S3 Amendment 291 and DFR Q10) for expenses such as incidental, miscellaneous, and special circumstances are for the most part completely outdated and in urgent need of review and updating in order to be aligned with modern day norms.

6.6.7 Current provisions are incongruous to military service demands thereby placing undue pressures on officers frequently ordered to move location on both domestic and foreign postings. Some of the difficulties experienced with this antiquated system of application are outlined below;

- Where an Officer has moved twice during a five (5) year period, they can only claim for nine (9) months on the first move and six (6) months on the second move. This completely ignores the duration of the new station. Consequently, the individual is 'out of pocket' for substantial periods during those postings.

- The unnecessarily onerous requirement to prove your current address, by means of a utility bill, often proves difficult. The majority of officers receive their bills by email yet the DF Regulation requires that original copies be provided.

6.6.8 **Comparison with Civil Service COSA.** The allowances pertaining to Change of Station that are applied to the Civilian Staff employed within the Department of Defence are governed by Department of Defence Circular #6/1989 (Ref No: E/105/3/82 dated 07 Mar 1989). This policy states that '*[t]he limits to these allowances are reviewed with effect from 1 January each year and are set out in the relevant Circular*'. This short but crucial comment provides much greater flexibility for Civil Servants within the Department of Defence to assess their circumstances in line with the current climate taking account of inflation, renting, commuting, taxation and all the other family and stress related concerns.

6.6.9 In a similar manner, the DPER Circular on the matter clearly states that '*[i]f it is necessary to continue an allowance beyond the first 15 months, the amount may not exceed after that period one-half the appropriate maximum amount. Under no circumstances may an allowance be paid for a total period of more than 18 months in all without the authority of the Department of Finance, which will be given only in exceptional circumstances*'. Commissioned Officers should be in a position to avail of this additional flexibility when required rather than confined to a maximum of nine (9) months in any given five (5) year period.

6.7 **European Union Working Time Directive 2003/88/EC.**

6.7.1 The EU's Working Time Directives (WTD) were devised to protect workers' health and safety by setting out hours of rest and work for all 'workers' across the EU. Provisions include:

- I. Limit to weekly working hours, which must not exceed 48 hours on average, including any overtime.
- II. Minimum daily rest period of 11 consecutive hours in every 24.
- III. Rest break during working hours if the worker is on duty for longer than 6 hours.
- IV. Minimum weekly rest period of 24 uninterrupted hours for each 7-day period, in addition to the 11 hours daily rest.
- V. Paid annual leave of at least 4 weeks per year.
- VI. Extra protection for night work.
- VII. Average working hours must not exceed 8 hours per 24-hour period.
- VIII. Night workers must not perform heavy or dangerous work for longer than 8 hours in any 24-hour period.
- IX. Night workers have the right to free health assessments and, under certain circumstances, to transfer to day work.

6.7.2 **Organisation of Working Time Act 1997.** The provisions of the WTD were transposed into Irish statute by the *Organisation of Working Time Act 1997*. Ireland elected to include certain derogations to the WTD. Consequently, these protections did not apply to members of the Defence Forces or an Garda Síochaná under the 1997 Act. Accordingly, members of the Defence Forces remain liable for continual duty on a 24/7/365 basis without any

prescribed health and safety resting protections. The lack of such protections are reflected in Defence Forces work patterns that are an essential element of military life. These include routine shifts that extend beyond 11 hours. Situations where not certain personnel cannot avail of the rest-off period following a 24-hour regimental duty. Additionally, the requirement to partake in exercises of 4 to 14 days duration are the norm for troops on career courses or deploying overseas.

6.7.3 Challenge to Derogations European Union Court of Justice (EUCJ). The EUCJ has held that this derogation must be limited to exceptional contexts such as natural or technological disasters, attacks or serious accidents, and that the normal activities of such workers are to be covered by the Directive.⁶

6.7.4 Example of Transposition of the WTD into the Bundeswehr (German Military). On the 01 January 2016, the German Federal Government transposed the WTD into military regulations. This represents a paradigm shift for the Bundeswehr in their handling of working time for their service personnel. Consequently, the use of duty hours as a resource, now needs to be rethought at all levels of the Bundeswehr. Previously, as in Ireland, hours worked were determined by the tasking without any consideration maximum time limits.

6.7.5 The standard time in the military working week time is set between 41 and 48 hours and hence the Bundeswehr were required to take a more considered approach to determining, controlling and optimising its training and operational activity to ensure compliance occupational health and safety legislation. Provision was also made for daily rest breaks and the minimum amounts of uninterrupted daily and weekly rest periods.

6.7.6 Consequently, the Bundeswehr now boasts a higher level of health protection due to the precedence given to time off in lieu,⁷ the greater predictability of duties and the level of remuneration for overtime.

6.8. Annual Leave.

6.8.1 Members of the Defence Forces are exempted from the standard public service leave arrangement. This is due mainly to the exemption from the WTD. Additionally, annual leave is deemed to be an entitlement in the Defence Forces, the granting of which is a privilege.⁸ Annual leave is ultimately subject to the contingencies of military service and liable to be cancelled at any time without notice or recompense.

6.8.2 Unlike other sectors, there are no overtime payments for routine additional hours worked in the Defence Forces. All other workers, whether private or public sector are limited to a 48-hour week, with set rest periods on either a daily or weekly basis.

⁶ Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on implementation by Member States of Directive 2003/88/EC ('The Working Time Directive') 2012.

⁷ German Bundestag Printed Paper 18/7250 18th electoral term, 26 January 2016 - Information from the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces - Annual Report 2015 (57th Report).

⁸ Para 4.1 DFR A11 Leave.

6.8.3 Annual leave is set at 31 days for junior officer and 43 for senior officer. While this appears to be a generous allotment, it must be understood that all personnel are subject to a 7-day liability. Any analysis must factor that officers are required to take weekend leave as part of annual leave, i.e. a two-week period of 14 days leave is exactly that, 14 days out of the annual entitlement. In contrast, other sectors would be required to take 10 for the same period. If applying a 5-day liability standard (which is not congruent with military 24/7 service), the 31 and 43 days equates to 22 days and 30 days respectively.

6.8.4 All personnel may carry over 24 days leave but rarely can do so. Commissioned officers have no pre-discharge or re-engagement leave entitlements.

6.9 Level of Military Training and 3rd Level Education

6.9.1 There is a simple idiom that militaries need to train for things they know and educate for the things they do not know. Due to the nature of military operations, armed forces incontrovertibly are required in times of crisis or conflict to be self-sufficient. Accordingly, in performing such operations, militaries require personnel with a wide range of skill-sets that also have civilian application.⁹ Therefore, commissioned officers are typically leaders and managers that have mostly level 8 or level 9 degrees in addition to a requirement to maintain the appropriate level of operational readiness.

6.10 Promotion Systems

6.10.1 All militaries are characterised by hierarchical promotion systems. In 2011 the promotion system for commissioned officers was reviewed. This latest manifestation advanced a more meritorious system by removing promotion primarily on seniority and ensured the involvement of Competency Based Appraisal selection for higher rank.

6.10.2 Typically, after 15 to 32 months training officers are commissioned to the rank of Second Lieutenant or Lieutenant¹⁰ and from there, prescribed time restrictions and qualifying performance criteria must be achieved by individual officers to advance to the next higher rank.

6.10.3 For each potential rank promotion, there is a qualifying period (4 to 6 years) plus the requirement to undergo and successfully complete a career course. These residential career courses (varying in duration from 8 to 40 weeks) are now accredited, in partnership with NUI Maynooth, resulting in the award of up to a level 9 degree¹¹ upon successful completion.

⁹ Civil, mechanical, electrical, marine engineers, IT, Personnel Managers, Logisticians, Transport Managers, Finance, legal expertise, Medical doctors.

¹⁰ 2/Lt for school leavers and Lt for HETAC level 7 graduates.

¹¹ Senior Command and Staff Course graduates receive an MA Leadership, Management and Defence studies.

6.10.4 The above system contrasts substantially with promotions in the Civil Service and private sector where promotion to higher rank is possible in absence of some of the aforementioned criteria.

6.10.5 However, it must be noted that the requirement to 'tick a series of boxes' in order to be able to complete for promotion has contributed to the churn of appointments at Unit, Formations, and DFHQ level in addition to overseas commitments. As stated, senior officers will typically serve in 8 different appointments over a 5-year period.

6.11 Accommodation on Post.

6.11.1 Most military locations provide accommodation for operational and training requirements. All new trainees to the Defence Forces are required to undergo basic training appropriate to their stream and grade. This induction training is residential in nature and inductees are confined to the barrack environs for certain periods. Newly trained officers will generally be posted to an operational unit within the State. The norm in militaries, due to the operational requirement, is to have personnel available at short notice to deploy outside of barracks. Therefore, local commanders are required to keep a minimum number of personnel living in barracks in order to be available at short notice to deploy.

6.11.2 Various systems are in place to accommodate personnel with barracks for which a basic charge is deducted from pay. It has recently been indicated personnel living in barracks may accrue a Benefit-in-Kind liability. This is despite the operational requirement to keep personnel in military accommodation.

6.11.3 It must be highlighted that where accommodation is deemed substandard there is no charge applied. Where accommodation is deemed standard (basic hostel equivalence) a charge is deducted from pay.

6.12 Frequency of Postings & Redeployment

6.12.1 The instance of weekly commuting for officers in the Defence Forces has always been high due to the requirement to cover operational and training requirements domestically and internationally. Since the reorganisation of the DF in 2012, the loss of 114 officer appointments and five further barrack closures, the level of posting and commuting has significantly increased.

6.11.2 Considering the number of postings within and outside the State it is not possible for officers to continually move upon notification of their next posting. Moving house is cost prohibitive. As stated. There is a Change of Station Allowance available but it is capped for a period of 9 months and mileage limit of €107.07 per week regardless of actual distance travelled.

6.12 Security of Tenure for Defence Forces Personnel

6.12.1 Security of Tenure for Defence Forces personnel is based on several factors. These include entry ages based on type on commission offered, maintaining medical and fitness standards and compulsory retirement ages.

6.12.2 Security of Tenure - Shorter Military Work-life Span. Initial cadetship entry age is 18 and in 2005 the entry age for Cadetships was raised to 28 years of age. Direct entry ages for special service officers is as high as 35.¹²

6.12.3 The following types of commissions are offered to newly inducted officers:

- i. Short Service Commissions (SSCs). Since 2005, SSCs have become the norm for officer cadet pilots (12 years) and Naval Officers (5 years). After a period of successful training or education, a commission without limitation may be offered.
- ii. Current draft induction terms and conditions limit newly inducted Medical Officers to an initial 2-year SSC, then an additional 3-year SSC before a Commission without limitation is offered. This offer will only be extended where vacancies exist and subject to a 3-year undertaking from year 5.
- iii. A Commission without limitation is offered to successful army cadets, but as with all commissioned officers in the Defence Forces, continued service and security of tenure is ultimately dependent on compulsory retirement ages and on individuals retaining the defined physical and medical standards.

6.12.4 **Annual Medical and Fitness Standards.** Prior to entering the Defence Forces potential candidates must meet strict physical and medical standards designed to ensure their ability to undergo and maintain military operations. Additionally, once passed out, all personnel are required to undergo annual medical examination and fitness testing.

6.12.5 Despite being exposed to significant risk, personnel who cannot meet medical or fitness standards will be subject to medical down-grading and face potential discharge. This has an obvious effect on earning potential. Unlike other Public Sector there is no specific occupational injury scheme recognising inherent military risk for military personnel. While PRSI Class 'A' contributors may have access to social welfare cover, pre-1994 Class "C" officers have no similar cover.

6.12.6 It is worth noting that the induction of officers at the higher end of the age scale has an impact, particularly on new entrants since 2013, as maximising pension eligibility extends out to a minimum of 30 years. New entrants when comparing previous service pension provisions do not value a scheme where, in addition to over career average earnings, one must achieve 30 years to maximise pension entitlements. This results in relatively junior officers opting to retire much earlier stage than previous generations.

¹² Typically specialist entry for Engineers, Medical Officers and Band Conductors.

- 6.12.6 **Security of Tenure and Retirement ages.** All ranks within the Defence Forces have prescribed retirement ages well below the public service norm. Retirement on ages grounds for commissioned officers ranges from 54 to 60 years of age.

Table 6.5 Years of Lost Potentials Earning due to Compulsory Retirement Ages

Rank	PRSI Class 'A'	Yrs. Loss of Potential Earnings	PRSI Class 'C'	Yrs. Loss of Potential Earnings
Lieutenant	56	11	49	16
Captain	56	9	54	11
Commandant	58	7	56	9
Lieutenant Colonel	58	7	58	7
Colonel	60	5	60	5

- 6.12.7 The PSPC will be aware that the State contributory old age pension entitlement is being extended to 68 years of age. However, officers will be compulsory retired from ages 54 to 60 depending on their rank. In addition, due to the introduction of the Single Pension Scheme, these officers must rely on a significantly reduced career earning average in terms of their pension entitlement.

6.13 Health Provision

- 6.13.1 Health provisions including general medical treatment, surgery, dental, optical, etc. is provided for serving personnel. Where the service/treatment is not provided by the Medical Corps the member is referred to a civilian practitioner or for treatment in a civilian hospital.

- 6.13.2 However, this service is not provided in order to convey a benefit to the individual member of the Defence Forces. Rather, as confirmed by both the Department of Defence and the Department of Health and Children;

“The sole or principal purpose of the arrangements governing officers of the PDF relates to employment and, in particular, to the capacity of the personnel to fulfil their duties and responsibilities.”¹³

- 6.13.3 Any coincidental benefits that individuals may gain from the provision of these services are complemented by requirements to meet stringent medical and fitness standards on an annual basis. Failure to meet these standards may result in discharge from the Defence Forces.

6.14. Lifetime Community Rating Levies

¹³ Letter from Department of Health and Children to RACO, 05 October 2000.

- 6.14.1 Under Health Insurance (Amendment) Act 2001, regulations were introduced so that everybody is charged the same premium for a health insurance plan irrespective of their age, gender and the current or likely future state of their health. This is known as Community Rating.
- 6.14.2 As part of their military service commitment, officers must reach and maintain the required medical and physical fitness test standards, and are graded accordingly. As mentioned, where various standards are not met personnel are liable to lack of advancement or discharge from service.
- 6.14.3 While in service and as part of their employment terms and conditions, commissioned officers have access to full health care. This arrangement is reflected in reduced national pay awards to officers when compared to other public sector workers.
- 6.14.4 In May 2015, new Lifetime Community Rating (LCR) Levy regulations were introduced without consultation or exemptions. The community rating regulations were modified to reflect the age at which a person takes out private health insurance. Late entry loadings are applied to the premiums of those who join the health insurance market at age 35 or over. The Health Insurance Authority (HIA) has confirmed to RACO that the Defence Forces medical provisions are not considered as "health insurance contracts" as the Defence Forces are not registered or regulated by the HIA. The Lifetime Community Rating Regulations (S.I. No 312 of 2014) removed any discretion from Health Insurance Companies from waiving LCR levies by an insurer "irrespective of the circumstances".
- 6.14.5 Consequently, commissioned officers reaching the age of 34 years of age must now purchase private health insurance (at a rising minimum cost of €450.00 per annum) to negate the future impact of the very significant "age" levies imposed by these new regulations when they retire from the Defence Forces. Irrationally, officers are not able to avail of this privately purchased medical cover as it effectively contravenes the requirement of military regulations for them to use the medical services provided, so as an accurate record of their medical state is recorded. RACO, in line with other nations, has sought that commissioned officers in service be exempt from LCR regulations, thereby negating the unnecessary cost to them of a private health cover that they cannot avail of.
- 6.14.6 It is worth noting that the introduction of the LCR levies had no negative impact on private sector workers where employers cover the cost of health insurance. In summary commissioned officers have cover from their employer in order to be operationally effective but also now must pay for private health insurance that they will not utilise.
- 6.16 Uniform Replenishment Allowance.**
- 6.16.1 A Revenue review of allowances paid to officers found that the annual uniform replenishment allowance was taxable. This allowance is set at €860 and was paid to officers for the purchase, upkeep and maintenance of prescribed uniform items.

6.16.2 Given that the allowance was reviewed on several occasions in order to set the appropriate rate, RACO has since 2012, been unable to advance a claim at Conciliation Council in order to maintain the net value of the allowance. In effect, pre-2012 DoD accepted that the appropriate cost of maintaining a large scale of items was set at €860. Whereas post-2012 the same scale of items applies but, each officer is at a loss of approximately €447 (52%, depending on the individual's PAYE, PRSI, Pension and USC deductions). Officers are now paying for the cost of providing and maintaining their own uniform items.

6.17. Officers as Innovators Providing Increased Value for Money.

6.17.1 For over 20 years the Defence Forces has been in a constant state of change, reorganising on average every 3 years. The outcomes and objectives achieved by the Defence Forces was due, in part, to the management and leadership of the officer corps.

6.17.2 The obligations and targets established by the Government in the White Paper on Defence 2015 refers to new strategic and operational objectives for the Defence Sector. The White Paper directs 'Engagement with Irish Enterprise and Research Institutions in support of Defence Forces Capabilities' leads the Defence Forces into the new areas of innovation, research and product development. As with all Government strategic defence documents, it will be the officers of the Defence Forces that will develop, manage, lead and delivers on these new requirements.

6.17.3 The White Paper highlights the need to investigate an 'innovative funding mechanisms' to support not only defence capabilities but to also support wider industry. The purpose of which, aside from its impact to Defence Forces capability is to:

- i. Benefit Irish Enterprise.
- ii. Identify opportunities for cooperative-collaborative engagement between the Defence Forces and Irish-based enterprise and research institutes, including third level colleges.
- iii. Support indigenous industry in product/service development.
- iv. Support innovation, growth and jobs in Irish based industry and thus contribute to Ireland's economic development.
- v. Support the Defence Enterprise Initiative through the evaluation of technology research and innovation, provision of information on military requirements and the DF considered views on trends in specific capability development requirements.
- vi. Support Irish based enterprise and research institutes in securing access to European Defence Agency (EDA) programmes, leading to potential spin-off benefits for the Irish economy.

6.17.4 Additionally, industry support is identified through:

- i. The Irish Maritime and Energy Resource Cluster (IMERC), which is a research and commercial cluster created to realise Ireland's economic potential in the global, maritime and energy markets. The Naval Services involvement with IMERC provides a multitude of capabilities, technology and end use knowledge that has been and will be leveraged to support a variety of initiatives with Enterprise Ireland.
- ii. Energy Policy and the development of renewable energy solution on defence lands

and installations may also require expertise from within the Defence Forces.

- 6.17.5 These undertakings (of which the officer corps is expected to facilitate and deliver), identify a commercial and financial outcome for the benefit of the employer and third parties to any future project. The Defence Forces, and the expertise of its personnel, which has not solely been attained through Defence Forces investment or support (see standard non-pay benefits above) are intended for use in projects which have a direct commercial benefit.
- 6.17.6 In comparison to the private sector, such strategic objectives where an individual has a direct involvement in product or service development and delivery, reward would be provided by way of any of the performance related non-pay benefits list above. RACOs contention would be that as private sector product development tasking's and deliverables are now expected by our employer, remuneration would reflect private sector practices in the same manner.

Section 7

Treatment of Conditions & Benefits of Military Service

7.1 INTRODUCTION

- 7.1.1 The submission demonstrates that an increase in officers' salary levels is warranted and that comparators, as described in the terms of reference, should factor the demands of military service cognisant of the additional demands now placed on officers of the Defence Forces.
- 7.1.2 This section will discuss the treatment in the pay comparison exercise of certain conditions and benefits applying to officers.
- 7.1.3 The manner in which the unique disadvantages of military life should be considered will be discussed, as will the treatment of compensatory allowances.
- 7.1.4 The pension arrangements available to officers and the question of the value of these will be considered. We will demonstrate that the value of the military pension is reduced by the requirement for compulsory early retirement of officers and the significantly reduced career earnings that this results in.
- 7.1.5 The question of whether other items might be considered as benefits and the value, if any, they might have will also be discussed. These include security of tenure, medical and dental care, uniform allowance and living accommodation. Comparison will be made with the benefits generally available to executives in the private sector.

7.2 UNIQUE DISADVANTAGES OF MILITARY LIFE

- 7.2.1 The two essential elements of the remuneration of Defence Forces personnel are regimental pay (basic pay) and Military Service Allowance (MSA). These are paid on a continuous basis to all members of the Forces (with the exception of recruits, cadets and officers of General rank, none of whom receive MSA), regardless of appointment held or duties undertaken. Together these two elements comprise what the Commission on Remuneration and Conditions of Service in the Defence Forces, 1990, (The Gleeson Commission) described as the "Military Salary".
- 7.2.2 There are particular disadvantages associated with military life that are unique to the military and which, consequently, cannot easily be factored into a pay comparison as described in the terms of reference. These unique disadvantages, are currently factored by the payment of Military Service Allowance (see Annex CC Claim for Increase in rate), include the following:
 - (i) Liability for duty 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
 - (ii) Long and unsociable hours of duty.
 - (iii) Requirement to serve a fixed term of engagement.

- (iv) Restrictions on personal liberty as a result of the code of military discipline.
- (v) Risk of personal danger/loss of life.
- (vi) Bad and uncomfortable conditions.
- (vii) Personal responsibility for the use of lethal weapons.
- (viii) Disruption of family life as a result of frequent absences from home.

7.2.3 In its report in 2002, the Public Service Benchmarking Body (PSBB 1) stated that MSA was:

“deemed part of basic pay andtreated as such when the Body considered the recommendations for those sectors of the public service.”

(Report of the Public Service Benchmarking Body 2002, p.62)

7.2.4 However, it is clear that while MSA may be treated as a part of basic pay many of the factors that it relates to cannot be reflected in a Job Evaluation Questionnaire and must, therefore, be considered separately.

7.3 COMPENSATORY ALLOWANCES – OFFICERS

7.3.1 Compensatory allowances are not paid to all officers within the ranks on List “A” and are not paid to any officer on a permanent basis. Consequently, they should not be included in the calculation of “total remuneration” for pay comparison purposes.

7.4 PENSION ARRANGEMENTS

7.4.1 We have seen that the pension scheme for officers who join the Defence Forces after 01 April 2004 is in line with that available elsewhere in the public service, except that immediate pensions will be available at the earlier age of 50. This latter provision is consistent with the recommendation of the Commission of Public Service Pensions (2000) and required because of the physically demanding nature of the job and the earlier compulsory retirement ages for officers. We have also seen that the new scheme presents a deterioration in conditions for these officers relative to those who were in service prior to April 2004.

7.4.2 In respect of pre-2004 officers the Commission on Public Service Pensions calculated that, based on certain assumptions, the notional “new entrant” annual cost of providing a pension under the existing scheme could be up to 30% of basic pay. This compares to 25% for members of An Garda Síochána, 16% for civil servants and 17% for primary teachers.

7.4.3 This high notional cost clearly results primarily from the provisions that allow pre-2004 officers to retire with a gratuity after 5 years and a pension after 12 years. However, a distinction must be made between the notional cost to the State of this scheme and the real or actual value, or benefit, to the individual officer. The early retirement scheme is only of value to those who avail of it. It would be

invidious if the pay of officers who continue to serve to compulsory retirement age was to be abated to take account of the notional cost of a provision they had not availed of.

7.4.4 Officers who joined the Defence Forces before 01 April 1995 are in the PRSI Class C. No State retirement pension is payable to these officers. Officer who joined the Forces after 01 April 1995 are in the full PRSI Class A and their military pension is “integrated” with the State retirement pension. PRSI Class C officers do not have the option of moving to Class A.

7.4.5 The early availability of pension entitlements is generally seen as a benefit to officers. However, this must be viewed in the context of the forced early compulsory retirement ages that apply to the military. The possibility of early retirement is a positive thing when it involves choice by the individual - but this is not the case with officers.

7.4.6 Many people now marry and have children while in their 30’s and the high cost of housing has led to a trend towards mortgages of longer duration. Consequently, because of the compulsory early retirement ages, many officers now face the prospect of retirement at a time when they still have children in full-time education, while they are still paying a mortgage and at an age when it is difficult to find an alternative career.

7.4.7 Military pensions have been correctly described as;

“...unlike that of other organisations, is both a deferred reward for service and a compensation for premature termination of career.” (UK National Board for Prices and Incomes – Standing Reference on Pay of the Armed Forces – 2nd Report, 1969)

7.4.8 We have seen that a Commandant serving to compulsory retirement age has a career that is at least 9 -10 years shorter than that of employees elsewhere in the public service and in the private sector. As the officer in this situation will have a pension of 50% of pay, this early retirement equates to a career earnings loss of 4 ½ years’ pay relative to employees in other organisations. When viewed as a percentage of career earnings at current rates of pay, this results in an effective salary abatement for military officers of 15.93%.

7.4.9 It can be disputed that the existing pension arrangements represent a benefit to officers. However, in putting a value on this benefit, it is suggested that the real cost to the individual of early compulsory retirement must also be considered. The notional “new entrant” net cost for the pre-2004 officer would, therefore, be 14.07% (30% - 15.93%), and significantly lower for post-2004 officers. Clearly any abatement made by the Body to the salary of officers in respect of their pension should take this into account and should be no higher than that made in respect of other public servants and, particularly, civil servants.

7.4.10 The pension benefits of officers must also be compared with those benefits available to private sector executives.

7.5 SECURITY OF TENURE

7.5.1 Officers enjoy security of tenure, subject to medical and related fitness stipulations, although pilots ("Line" officers) are initially commissioned for a period of 12 years.

7.5.2 However, this must be balanced against the fact that, uniquely, officers are not free to transfer their services to other employers as they may wish. They may be compulsorily retained in service and required to serve for any period up to the compulsory retirement age for their rank.

In a High Court judgement in the case of *Egan v Minister for Defence and Others* (1988), the Hon Justice Barr stated, *inter alia*, that an officer's application to the Minister to retire from the Defence Forces is;

".....not the exercise of a right.....but is a request for a concession."

(Barr J., *Egan v Minister for Defence and Others*, 1988, HC)

7.5.3 The value of security of tenure in a full-employment situation, such as exists in Ireland at present, is limited. However, the freedom to change jobs at will, such as exists in other areas of the public service and in the private sector, can be seen as a benefit. Executives in other sectors are in a position to exploit the shortage of supply of experienced managerial professionals and frequently do so for increased salary and benefits.

7.5.4 When taken together, these factors indicate that the "security of tenure" of officers has a relatively low monetary value.

7.6 MEDICAL & DENTAL CARE

7.6.1 The Defence Forces, like every military organisation, must ensure that its personnel are medically fit to carry out their duties. The very physical nature of much of the training and operational work of the Forces exposes PDF personnel to greater risk of injury than applies in normal employments. This, together with the fact that even minor illness or injury can have serious negative career implications, means that there is a requirement for particularly onerous health management in respect of military personnel.

7.6.2 Consequently, all members of the Forces, as part of their conditions of service, are obliged to undergo medical treatment as required. There is no element of choice for the patient, as failure to undergo the treatment prescribed can amount to an offence under the terms of the Defence Act and military regulations.

7.6.3 A full health service, including general medical treatment, surgery, dental, optical, etc., is provided for serving personnel. Where the service/treatment is not

provided in-house, i.e. by the Medical Corps, the member is referred to a civilian practitioner, or for treatment in a civilian hospital.

- 7.6.4 However, this service is not provided in order to convey a benefit to the individual member of the Defence Forces. Rather, as confirmed by both the Department of Defence and the Department of Health and Children;

“.....the sole or principal purpose of the arrangements governing officers of the PDF relates to employment and, in particular, to the capacity of the personnel to fulfil their duties and responsibilities.”

(Letter from Department of Health and Children to RACO, 05 October 2000)

- 7.6.5 Any coincidental benefits that individuals may gain from the provision of these services are complemented by requirements to meet stringent medical and fitness standards on an annual basis. *Failure to meet these standards may result in discharge from the Defence Forces.*
- 7.6.6 The introduction of the Health Insurance (Amendment) Act 2001 means that officers will be required to take out private health insurance policies while in service in order to avoid the imposition of late entry premium loadings of up to 45% upon retirement. Government introduced Lifetime Community Rating Regulations with effect from 30 April 2015 (SI 312 of 2014). This further erodes the beneficial value to the individual officer of the medical services provided. Those >34 years of age must now purchase a redundant domestic health policy to avoid future levies on retirement. This amounts to double and in some instances triple cover that is undoubtedly unnecessary and excessive.
- 7.6.7 The Association is requesting that recognition of the unique circumstances of service be factored or consideration to the vouched reimbursement of the LCR costs now imposed on service members for the purchase of redundant policies. Annex M – Claim for LCR Waiver or Reimbursement refers.

7.7 UNIFORM ALLOWANCE

- 7.7.1 Officers are provided with initial uniform allowances upon commissioning and a replenishment allowance on an annual basis. These are expense related allowances paid to enable officers to provide themselves with certain uniform items that their employer requires them to use, but does not provide. They are based on the actual cost of the uniform items.
- 7.7.2 Uniforms must be purchased from approved military tailors and the allowances are only paid on certification by the officer's Commanding Officer after he has inspected the uniform items concerned.
- 7.7.3 No tax relief is available to officers in respect of expenses incurred in the upkeep of uniforms.

7.7.4 The international norm is that officers are either paid a uniform allowance or expenditure on uniform items is allowable for income tax purposes.

7.7.5 Since 2012, this allowance is now subject to tax. This essentially means that the net value of the uniform does not actually cover the designed cost of replenishment and replacement.

7.8 LIVING ACCOMMODATION

7.8.1 Officially provided living accommodation is not available to all officers and should not, therefore, be taken into account when calculating general pay levels. Any benefit to individuals should, instead, be a factor in the calculation of the charges made for such accommodation. Charges for living-in accommodation are increased in line with general increases in pay.

7.8.2 Married officers' quarters are extremely limited (less than 30 units), are of very poor quality and are being phased out in accordance with the requirement of the White Paper. Accordingly, they cannot be seen as a benefit for calculation purposes.

7.8.3 Officers are posted "by order" to stations, either nationally or internationally, in accordance with the operational requirements. The instance of posting, the uncertainty of posting duration and the personal implications of this facility should be factored when considering this condition of service.

7.9 PERFORMANCE INCENTIVE PAYMENTS

7.9.1 No performance incentive payments are available to military personnel. However, a range of such incentives is available to many private sector executives. Incentives commonly available in the private sector include share option schemes and share purchase schemes, profit share arrangements and bonus schemes.

7.9.2 PRIVATE SECTOR NON PAY BENEFITS

In addition to the performance incentives payments available in the private sector, the Sigmar Recruitment 'Employee Benefits Report' for 2014 identifies standard non-pay benefits provided to employees and they were rated as follows;

Rating	Pay Benefit	% of Employers offering Benefit to Employees	Available to Military Personnel/ Comments
1	Private Health Insurance (Note I)	58%	Yes. Limited to individual officer i.e. no family cover. Officers over the age of 34 years of age are still required to take out own private health insurance in order to avoid LCR levies
2	Pension Contributions	56%	Yes. The majority of Officers now pay PRSI Class 'A'

			contribution which are a higher rate of pension contribution in additions to the pension levy deduction in recognition of accruing a pension over 30 years which in turn recognises enforced early retirement ages (54-60).
3	Paid Sick Days	66%	Yes. Recognising the need to quickly get back to a higher standard of health and fitness.
4	Educational Support (Note II)	37%	Yes. The recognised minimum standard of education for commissioned officers is at degree level. The Director of training also funds a range of education and training courses in line with Defence Forces requirements (Note II). 3 rd level financial undertakings typically apply at twice the standard Public service norm i.e. 2 years undertaking for each year of education.
5	Flexitime	31%	No, not compatible with military operations.
6	Additional Vacation Days	31%	No. All leave is a privilege and subject to the contingencies of the service.
7	Life Assurance Policies	38%	No, despite high risk occupation. A Life Assurance Policy is available to officers through the CAOGA scheme but the cost of the scheme is borne fully by each individual. Military personnel in fact suffer significant loadings for mortgage protection and life policies as a consequence of their military service.
8	Long Term Disability	20%	No, despite high risk occupation.
9	Savings Scheme	14%	No.
10	Subsidised Food	31%	No. Food in messes is at the cost of the individual officer
11	Laptop (Note III)	40%	No.
12	Tax Saver Travel Scheme	24%	At personal cost – not employer
13	Travel Insurance	17%	No.
14	Gym Membership	22%	As part of physical fitness

			requirements, many DF locations have basic gymnasiums but not to commercial standards.
15	Parking	40%	Space generally available within barracks but not dedicated spaces.
16	Paid Parental Leave	16% (Now provided on a statutory basis)	Not transposed to DFR – despite new regulations coming into law on the 01 Sept 2016
17	Employee Stock Options (Note IV)	18%	No.
18	Child Care	6%	No.
19	Company Car	11%	No.
20	On Site Canteen	31%	Yes. Barracks generally operate dining halls which primarily feed personnel on regimental duties who are restricted and confined to barracks on a 24-hrs basis. Additionally, personnel on residential training courses are fed as it is not feasible to release personnel out of barracks while on such duty or training. Personnel are frequently posted away from home and may live in and avail of military accommodation and rations for a limited period. Accommodation and feeding after 9 months are charged for.

Notes on Above Points:

- I. Health Insurance is not available to officers and their dependants.
- II. These are of limited availability to a number of officers on an annual basis. Consequently, executive education costs are incurred by individual officers while their advanced knowledge and skill sets are subsequently used by the Defence Forces. Alternatively, those whom have been successful in attaining financial support incur a service undertaking which is greatly in excess of the Public service norm. No employee discount scheme exists.
- III. No financial support for the provision of either a laptop or mobile phone for either the performance of their jobs or for use on external educational programmes. Officers, through the very nature of their profession are expected to be available 24/7 and as such, the requirement to use personal mobile phones prevails with cost incurred by the individual.
- IV. There are no financial bonus and incentive schemes within the DF.

7.10 SUMMARY

- 7.10.1 The two essential elements of the remuneration of Defence Forces personnel are regimental pay and Military Service Allowance (MSA).
- 7.10.2 MSA is paid in compensation for the unique disadvantages associated with military life. Many of the factors it relates to cannot be reflected in a Job Evaluation comparator and must be considered separately.
- 7.10.3 Compensatory allowances should not be included in the calculation of total remuneration for pay comparison purposes.
- 7.10.4 The pension scheme for officers who join the Defence Forces after 01 January 2016 is in line with that available elsewhere in the public service.
- 7.10.5 The value of pensions is greatly reduced by the requirement for compulsory early retirement of officers and the significantly reduced career earnings relative to other groups that this results in.
- 7.10.6 The benefit of security of employment is considerably offset by the fact that officers may not leave the defence Forces unless given permission to do so by the Minister for Defence.
- 7.10.7 The purpose of the military medical and dental service is to ensure that personnel are medically fit to perform their duties. The benefit of this service hinges on the requirement to meet stringent health and fitness standards. Those >34 years of age must now purchase a redundant domestic health policy to avoid future levies on retirement. This amounts to double and in some instances triple cover that is undoubtedly unnecessary and excessive. The anomalies created by implication of SI 312 in that a review is provided for in the statute to be conducted by 2017.
- 7.10.8 The payment of uniform allowance to officers is common in military forces internationally and is not taken into account for the purpose of pay comparability.
- 7.10.9 Officially provided living accommodation is not available to the majority of officers. Therefore, it should not be considered a benefit for the purpose of pay comparability.
- 7.10.10 In calculating the total remuneration of civilian employees for comparative purposes, a range of benefits that are commonly available should be included in addition to basic pay. These include incentives, fringe benefits and pension schemes.

Section 8

Why Should Officers' Pay Be Increased?

8.1 INTRODUCTION

8.1.1 We have demonstrated that the fundamental changes in the Defence Forces and its environment since the last benchmarking exercise (in 2006) have led to significant increases in the responsibilities of officers and in the complexity and demanding nature of their jobs.

8.1.2 This section will address the specific question of why the Public Service Pay Commission should recommend that officers' pay be increased and retention initiatives be considered as a priority.

8.1.3 We will show that the upward adjustment of officers' pay is now warranted for two principal reasons, as follows;

- (i) The job of the military officer has increased in size and value since the last benchmarking exercise.
- (ii) The demands of the job have significantly increased. We continue to do more with less numbers of officers and at higher levels of efficiency and effectiveness - but to sustain this we must continue to attract and retain high calibre officers.

8.2 INCREASE IN SIZE & VALUE OF JOB

8.2.1 It is considered reasonable to assume that the increases awarded to officers as a result of the last benchmarking exercise were based not only on the analysis of their jobs at that time, but also on the anticipated change in responsibilities due to organisational change predicted for the period ahead.

8.2.2 We have seen that anticipated change was based on the requirement to implement the White Paper on Defence (2000) and that this had the primary aim of ensuring that, over a 10-year timeframe, Ireland developed a "world-class" military organisation to meet the requirements of Government in the changing national and international sphere. This was seen as posing a "demanding management challenge", particularly to the officers of the Forces who, as the managers and leaders of the Defence Forces at every level, had the primary responsibility for creating the new organisation.

8.2.3 However, the White Paper was based on an analysis that concluded that the security environment was "generally benign". While this analysis took account of expected developments in the area of international peace support operations, it did not and could not anticipate the scale and pace of the developments that were to take place in this area and in the wider international security environment.

8.2.4 As we have demonstrated, these developments required the Defence Forces to simultaneously change its operational focus and develop greatly enhanced capabilities in a very short timeframe. This, in turn, required further major change in almost every aspect of the Forces and greatly impacted the nature of the work of its personnel, particularly its officers who were responsible for developing and managing the implementation of the change strategies and programmes.

8.2.5 This White Paper on Defence (2015) sets out the Government's defence policy for the next decade. It provides a framework that will enable a flexible and adaptive response to any adverse changes in a dynamic security environment. It also sets out the security tasks that the Department of Defence and the Defence Forces will undertake in supporting those other departments and agencies which are constituent parts of the State's security architecture. In addition, the White Paper sets out the Government's policy on using defence resources in other non-security roles for the benefit of the State.

The key objectives of the White Paper are:

- I. To provide a medium term policy framework for defence that is flexible and responsive having regard to the dynamic nature of the security environment and the key role that Defence plays in the State's security architecture;
- II. To give appropriate underpinning to Ireland's engagement in international bodies particularly the United Nations and the European Union;
- III. To ensure that the stated roles of the Defence Forces are consistent with requirements;
- IV. Building on recent re-organisation measures for the Permanent Defence Force (PDF) and the Reserve Defence Force (RDF), to guide and underpin decisions relating to the capacity of the Defence Organisation to include: corporate skills, organisation, force composition and equipment acquisition over the next ten years;
- V. To underpin the development of required civil and military capabilities with an appropriate multi-annual resource commitment;
- VI. To sustain and develop the Defence Organisation as one in which people are proud to serve;
- VII. To ensure defence policy contributes in a congruent way with wider social and economic policy.

8.2.6 With over 90 projects now identified by the Joint Implementation Team of the Department of Defence, the officers of the Defence Forces will again be the leaders and implementers of the significant challenges and changes in the defence and security spheres both nationally and internationally. **The officers of the Defence Forces were responsible for developing and implementing the strategies and plans to deliver these capabilities.**

- 8.2.7 This is not simply a subjective judgement. As part of the new international peace support arrangements, the Defence Forces has had to demonstrate its capabilities and pre-deployment unit preparedness and these have been subjected to international verification under NATO/PfP auspices.
- 8.2.8 Objective proof of world-class status is also seen in the organisation's ability to deploy and maintain forces simultaneously in 19 countries on missions led by the UN, EU, NATO/PfP and OSCE, and to take a lead role in emergency planning post-9/11. In particular, the rapid deployment of troops and equipment to Liberia and Chad in 2008 demonstrated exceptional professionalism. Achievement of world-class interoperability standards are evidenced by the successful integration of a Swedish Company within the Irish Battalion in Liberia and the assignment of the Irish units in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina to multinational taskforces.
- 8.2.9 We have also seen that testaments to the capabilities and performance of the Defence forces in recent years by officials of international organisations such as the UN, by international commanders and by the domestic and international media are plentiful.
- 8.2.10 Further evidence of the high levels of efficiency and effectiveness achieved is provided by the Chairman of the Defence Forces Sustaining Progress Review Group, Mr. Frank Murray, who concluded, inter alia, that;
- "....we now have a more efficient, strategically focused and credible Defence Forces which are affordable and sustainable now and in the long-term."
- and that;
- "....this is being achieved while the Defence budget is effectively held at 2000 levels. Few, if any sectors could match this scale of achievement."
(Report of Defence Forces Sustaining Progress Review Group, 5 Nov 2004)
- 8.2.11 With the leadership and management of officers, Government's aim of creating a world-class military organisation has been achieved while the defence budget was effectively held at 2000 levels. While personnel numbers are over 20% less than they were a decade ago, the capabilities of the Forces have been increased significantly and the level and scope of operational activities, at home and overseas, greatly expanded.
- 8.2.12 It is submitted that these increases in efficiency and effectiveness since the last benchmarking exercise are unparalleled in the public service.
- 8.2.13 We have also seen that the new environment in which the Defence Forces operates has resulted in major increases in the demands on all personnel. These demands arise in the areas of overseas peace support operations, counter-terrorism and emergency planning and in on-going capacity building.

- 8.2.14 The nature of peace support operations has become more complex and challenging and this has increased the demands on all personnel. The demands on officers, and particularly "Line" officers, are particularly onerous because, in addition to leading and managing troops at home and overseas, they provide niche capabilities that are made available to the UN, EU, NATO/PfP and OSCE for overseas missions. So, in excess of 50% of the overseas missions on which Defence Forces personnel are currently deployed involve only officers, who are engaged in a range of capacities, including military observers and strategic level headquarters staff.
- 8.2.15 The increase in the number of overseas missions and in training and other activities has also increased the "personal tempo" for officers. They are required to serve overseas with significantly greater frequency than heretofore and their ability to choose the timing of their overseas service has been greatly reduced. Captains ("Line") are subject to mandatory selection for peace enforcement missions and so have no choice in when they serve overseas. In addition, for all officers, short absences from home stations have increased greatly in frequency due to their involvement in training exercises and courses, seminars and project teams, both in Ireland and abroad.
- 8.2.16 There is now an increased "overseas" dimension to every officer's job at home in Ireland, as all efforts are geared towards developing and maintaining the capabilities required to meet our new international commitments. The requirement to meet international standards in all areas has greatly increased the demands on all personnel, but particularly officers, who are responsible for delivering the capabilities.
- 8.2.17 Developing the required capabilities has required major increases in collective training and the acquisition and introduction of new technologically advanced equipment. This has greatly increased the demands on all personnel, but particularly officers, who play a major part in the acquisition of the equipment and who are responsible for designing and delivering the training strategies and programmes.
- 8.2.18 Some of the increased demands on personnel were recognised by the Chairman of the Defence Forces Sustaining Progress Review Group, Mr. Frank Murray, who observed that;

".....the demands on all ranks have increased in terms of the major increase in collective training exercises and the new standards of annual personal fitness and weapons proficiency which must be met. The major investment in new equipment such as new ships, new aircraft, Armoured Personnel Carriers, new communications systems, new weapons and new logistics systems have also increased the demands on personnel. They must learn new doctrine and tactics and work in new command structures which often involve significantly higher levels of responsibility for junior officers" (Report of Defence Forces Sustaining Progress Review Group, May 2005)

- 8.2.19 Through their work on EU Project Teams officers, Lieutenant Colonels ("Line") and Commandants ("Line") in particular, are also now routinely involved in developing the Union's military strategies, standards and programmes.
- 8.2.20 Our new international commitments include a rapid response requirement not previously experienced by the Defence Forces. This means that personnel may be required to deploy overseas at notice ranging from 5 to 30(+) days. The lowest notice (5 days) relates to Special Forces personnel and to officers designated for deployment at higher-level headquarters and we have seen that officers [Lieutenant Colonel ("Line")] have already been required to deploy on 6-month missions with 5 days notice.
- 8.2.21 The awards made after the last benchmarking exercise assumed a certain degree of future change in the Defence Forces, with a consequent increase in the responsibilities of officers. This, together with an analysis of the jobs as they were at the time, resulted in their being assessed as having particular weights or sizes. This, in turn, was used to select the appropriate comparator for pay comparison purposes. However, it is clear that the job of the officer has changed to such an extent and now involves such increased degrees of responsibility that these comparators are no longer valid and that new comparators at a higher level are now appropriate.
- 8.2.22 The extent of the change in the nature of officers' jobs and in their responsibilities since the last benchmarking exercise is reflected in the comments on the Generic Job Profiles, Annex O. These focus on the increased knowledge and skills requirements, the increases in accountability and responsibility, the need for higher level interpersonal/communications skills, and the increase in physical and emotional demands of the job. However, because of the nature of the Defence Forces and its operations, the job of the officer does not lend itself easily to a description using Job Evaluation Questionnaires and the Generic Job Profile format. Consequently, these may not capture the full range of impacts on the job of the massive change that has taken place since the last benchmarking exercise.
- 8.2.23 A benchmarking type evaluation of the degree of change and the increased responsibilities across the ranks of commissioned officers is not included in this submission, but can be submitted if so required.

8.3 Sustaining a "Fit for Purpose" Defence Forces

- 8.3.1 We have now reached a stage where Ireland has a world-class Defence Forces of its size. However, this is not an end-state. We must maintain that position and that can only be achieved by a process of continuous change and improvement in every area. So, the demands on the Defence Forces are set to increase further.
- 8.3.2 The standards the organisation must meet are also constantly increasing. In the area of peace support operations, for example, international organisations to which Ireland has military commitments are setting more demanding targets for themselves and participating nations. For example, implementation of the European Security Strategy and the Headline Goal 2010 requires the capability to

act in five broad peace support scenarios – separation of parties by force, stabilisation, reconstruction and military advice to 3rd countries, conflict prevention, evacuation operations in a non-permissive environment, and assistance to humanitarian operations. It is clear that the capability to operate in such a diversity of scenarios involves a wide range of skills and expertise, in addition to significant degrees of flexibility.

- 8.3.3 Involvement by the Defence Forces in EU Battlegroups involves training and operating as part of a multinational formation with units from a number of countries. This significantly increases the demands on all personnel, but particularly on officers, who are responsible for ensuring the required interoperability and integration.
- 8.3.4 The number, range and complexity of overseas peace support missions is also likely to increase further in the future, increasing the demands on personnel. For example, the Defence Forces has recently increased its commitment to the UNIFIL Mission, from a Company Group to almost a full Battalion, as well as assuming the role of Force Commander, with associated additional Headquarter staff.
- 8.3.5 At home, involvement by the Defence Forces in emergency planning and in the ever-changing area of counter-terrorism will continue to place significant demands on the Defence Forces. In addition, further organisational change required by the White Paper will add to demands on all personnel.
- 8.3.6 The Chairman of the Defence Forces Sustaining Progress Review Group concluded that the world-class Defence Forces we now have are “sustainable now and in the long-term”. However, this sustainability is entirely contingent on the maintenance of a balanced mix of equipment, infrastructure and well-trained, highly motivated personnel. *A key element in this mix is retaining appropriate numbers of high calibre officers to manage and lead the organisation at every level.*
- 8.3.7 The challenge is to maintain world-class standards in the face of increasing demands. We will achieve this by doing more with the same number of officers and at even higher levels of efficiency and effectiveness. But to sustain this we must continue to recruit and retain high calibre officers.
- 8.3.8 The Defence Forces need personnel with particular military skill-sets that are not available on the open market and require considerable investment of time and resources to develop. The organisation must recruit sufficient numbers of high calibre personnel initially, develop them professionally at significant cost, and *retain a high proportion of them for an extended period.*
- 8.3.9 Due to their varied experience, leadership skills, discipline, education and training, Defence Forces middle managers (Captains and Commandants) are attractive targets for recruitment by the private sector, particularly in a full-employment labour market. But mid-career recruitment of officers is not an option for the Defence Forces – we cannot headhunt experienced Captains and Commandants from elsewhere. Therefore, it follows that any of these personnel who leave must be replaced from internal sources, i.e. through the promotion of more junior officers.

- 8.3.10 Consequently, at the officer entry level, the Defence Forces must recruit sufficient candidates who are not only capable of operating at the junior levels, but who have the potential to fill positions at the middle and senior management levels.
- 8.3.11 A key success factor for the Defence Forces is the retention of the optimum levels of experienced personnel. Officers are educated and trained to the highest international standards and amass significant experience during their service. Failure to retain sufficient numbers of these personnel has a direct impact on the organisation's capabilities.
- 8.3.12 The Defence Forces is currently experiencing severe difficulty in retaining sufficient numbers of officers in all professional categories and this has had a serious negative effect on the development and sustainment of operation capabilities of the organisation.

Recruitment

- 8.3.13 The strength figure for Army Officers is at its lowest since at least 1969. The current figure is 841. This figure will continue to decline until larger Cadet Classes are commissioned and trained to staff the wide range of appointments in the Defence Forces.
- 8.3.14 What is also clear is that the shortage of officers at both Captain and Commandant rank will continue for a significant period until larger Cadet Classes are promoted to the rank of Captain. In effect this will NOT be resolvable until at least **2024/5**.
- 8.3.15 The additional demands on training institutions means that greater numbers of staff are required to deliver the training instruction, in order to meet the increased workload, while maintaining training quality and safety.
- 8.3.16 The career impact on such large classes are very significant due to the restrictions in rank hierarchy and the reduced numbers of higher ranks. This will force many to seek external employment when the frustrations of lack of career progression become obvious.
- 8.3.17 The cost of retention over recruitment is a theme of international recognition. The UK Military pay very significant attention to the costs associated with the continual recruitment in lieu of retention.
- 8.3.18 The average time to fully train an officer, dependent on corps speciality, can take from 2 years to 5 years. This training timeline does not factor "experience" which is critical to military decision making and delivery of operational capabilities.

Retention

- 8.3.19 During the period 2006-2016, 657 officers have exited the organisation¹. 401 of these retirements were of a voluntary nature. During the same period the DF has commissioned 442 officers across the Army, Air Corps and Naval Service.
- 8.3.20 Based upon current trends in the Defence Forces, is it probable that the actual strength of officers within the Defence Forces will fall below 1,100 by 31 Dec 2016. This figure is NOT reflective of the operational 'day to day' availability of officers within staffs and units which is now running at 50% and less.
- 8.3.21 The majority of officer exits from the DF over the last 10 year period are from the Army component. The average annual amount of officer exits from the DF over the period 2006-2016 has been 66 while (induction/recruitment) commissioning figures for the same period have averaged 44.
- 8.3.22 The average annual retirement rate over the last 10-year period is 66 officers per year. However when the last three (3) years are analysed this rate increases to 77 officer retirements per year. This significant increase is likely to continue as strongly reflected in the Climate Survey 2016.

Implications

- 8.3.23 Commissioned officer numbers in operational units are running at 50% of actual designed strength. The additional burden of work is being conducted by those serving to a point where risk management, administrative and operational governance and the wellbeing of the commissioned officers is being continually challenged.
- 8.3.24 To maintain operational output, the instance of postings for officers is now 8.8 times in a five-year period (2011-2016). This frequency and duration of posting is alarming, with significant implications on these officers.
- 8.3.25 17.6% of Army Officers are overseas at any one time.
- 8.3.26 Officer numbers will continue to fall over the next number of years even while providing for larger Cadet Classes. The critical shortage of Capts/Lt (NS) and to a lesser extent Comdts/Lt Cdrs will continue for at least the next eight (8) to ten (10) years, until the larger Cadet Classes are promoted – if in fact they actually remain in service.
- 8.3.27 The continued and growing overseas commitments will necessitate continued absences of Lts/Capt from home operational units. Formation Units are currently operating with considerable vacancies.
- 8.3.28 The "manning levels" of commissioned officers are clearly inconsistent with the Department of Defence Human Resource strategy of "timely provision of appropriately qualified personnel".

¹ 503 from the Army (57% turnover), 85 from the Air Corps (51% turnover) & 69 from the Naval Service (38% turnover).

- 8.3.29 Operational capability is inextricably linked to “trained manning levels”. The continued exodus of highly qualified and experienced professionals continues from the Defence Forces. Management have not initiated any retention initiatives.
- 8.3.30 Military skill sets can take considerable time to develop *safely and effectively* and at considerable expense. In the absence of effective and “fit for purpose” HR policies, the organisation and its members are exposed to greater risk, governance challenges and excessive workloads that compromise “well being”.
- 8.3.31 The ‘Wellbeing in the Defence Forces’ Climate Survey 2015 identifies, quantifies and contextualises many of these issues.
- 8.3.32 There is also a very real danger that losing large numbers of experienced officers while increasing demands on officers in all areas lessen the attractiveness of the job. In particular the increase in personal tempo with greater frequency of overseas missions and the robust nature of those missions makes the job of officer even more difficult and unattractive from a domestic point of view. The full and sustained impact of these changes propagates the current retention crisis.
- 8.3.33 The Defence Forces has achieved world-class status. However, the challenge now is to retain that status in an environment that is dynamic and that requires the organisation to constantly change and develop to meet new situations. Positive strategies in areas such as advertising and recruitment incentives have contributed to the improvements in the figures for recruitment of “line” officers and engineers. Equally, there is no doubt that the pay awards from the last benchmarking exercise have contributed to an improvement in retention figures. This needs to be revisited again in order to attract but more importantly retain those highly qualified and experienced professionals.
- 8.3.34 However, the degree of change that the organisation has experienced and the increases in the demands of the officer’s job have far exceeded expectations and even greater levels of change are anticipated in the future. Consequently, officers’ jobs must be aligned for pay purposes with higher level civilian comparators than during the last benchmarking exercise, so that recruitment and retention efforts can be underpinned by salary levels that will allow the Defence Forces to continue to be viewed as an employer of choice for high calibre personnel.
- 8.3.35 In this way we can ensure that we do not return to the high wastage levels of the late 90s and that we have sufficient experienced high calibre officers to ensure that the world-class Defence Forces we now have are indeed sustainable in the long-term.
- 8.4 **Provision of Adequate Support Services to Meet Modern Challenges**
 - 8.4.1 International Best Practice of Armed Forces is to support the “military family” and their personnel by a range of support provisions which include; suitable accommodation on new posting, embracing travel time in the working week, efficient administration of travel and meal costs for those forced to be separated from their families and partners. These are nothing new to Military Organisations intent on supporting their service personnel.

- 8.4.2 Management's failure to identify and adequately provide support policies to reduce the additional hardships of the Defence Forces personnel contradicts the theme recognising that "our people are our greatest asset". In contrast to the support provisions available to other international military personnel in an effort to support the "military family", our Members are currently frustrated by outdated policies. Rather than support personnel who have been forced to continually relocate from home stations, our Members face unnecessary hardships that include;
- 8.4.3 **Indefinite relocation and posting timelines.** Members are being relocated, on occasion with notice as short as 1 week without any consideration of personal circumstances. Our Members do not receive appointment duration or a return date to their home post. They are unable to reasonably plan normal family affairs.
- 8.4.4 **Inadequate Change of Station Allowance Claims.** Members are increasingly subjected to situations where Military Management approve claims and the Civilian Side deny these claims, often based on questionable interpretations of outdated Regulations and Policies that have failed to move with the times. Whilst in dispute, our Members are "out of pocket" while removed from their family homes causing additional financial stress. This regulation requires urgent review and increase to support the rate and instance of postings of officers to meet the organisations demands.
- 8.4.5 **Insurance Loadings/Levies:** Governments in other countries recognise military service and the requirements around occupational health care provision. Where insurance levies are applied by blanket legislation, respective Governments derogate those in Military Service. A subsequent Certificate of Service presented to an Insurance provider negates any levies such as Lifetime Community Rating. The experience of our Members is quite the contrary. The Government introduced the legislation, there was no consultation and no response from Management, forcing the Association to seek information through FOI.
- 8.4.6 The Gleeson Commission and subsequent pay reviews have already factored the DF Health Provisions by reducing pay rates of our Members. Now the Government applies another levy forcing our Members to purchase redundant policies that have no tangible benefit only to avoid future levies on retirement. There is an obvious contradiction where, on one hand, the DF requires personnel to engage in an occupational health plan to which the Director of the Medical Corps has full access to Medical Care & records and, on the other, the statutory requirement forcing personnel to purchase private indemnity health care plans the purchase of which is solely to avoid future levies.
- 8.4.7 **Foreign Service Allowances:** Officers are being posting overseas at such short notice that Financial Support Packages are not provided in a timeframe to facilitate adequate personal or family relocation plans. Unlike other Public Servants, Officers are posted on the majority of Missions with highly restrictive timelines often precluding the sourcing and securing of schools forcing families apart for up to 2 years. This would not happen in other sectors of the Public Service but yet;

management appears indifferent to the contradictions and unique circumstances of our Members.

- 8.4.8 Our Members accept and understand the demands associated with military service. So too they understand that, similar to other nations, appropriate support provisions can and should be provided to facilitate the harsh and unpleasant challenges that are unique to Military Service.

8.5 SUMMARY

- 8.5.1 An increase in officers' pay is now warranted because the job has increased in size and value since the last benchmarking exercise and because it is necessary in order to continue to attract and retain the high calibre officers needed to sustain the world-class status of the Defence Forces.
- 8.5.2 The increases awarded to officers as a result of the last benchmarking exercise were based on the size of the jobs then, but also anticipated changes in responsibilities. The latter were based on the demands of the White Paper to develop a world-class Defence Forces within a 10-year timeframe.
- 8.5.3 The White Paper 2015 has now established similar future objectives in which commissioned officers will play a very large part in the delivery of strategic and operational objectives. Because of these developments, the organisation will be required to simultaneously change its operational focus and develop greatly enhanced capabilities in a very short time.
- 8.5.4 Our continued commitment to the highest professional standards is evidenced by international verification of our capabilities, our ability to deploy and maintain forces simultaneously in 19 countries on missions led by the UN, EU, NATO/PfP, and OSCE, by independent testaments to the capabilities and performance of the Defence Forces, by the reports of the Defence Forces Sustaining Progress Review Group, and by successive Annual Reports.
- 8.5.5 The officers of the Defence Forces have led and managed the development of the Defence Forces into a world-class organisation while the defence budget was effectively held at 2000 levels and with 20% less personnel than we had a decade ago. These increases in efficiency and effectiveness are unparalleled in the public service.
- 8.5.6 The new environment in which the Defence Forces operate has resulted in major increases in the demands on officers. Peace support missions have become more complex and dangerous and the personal tempo for officers has increased significantly. Further demands arise from the requirement to meet international standards in all areas and that performance should be independently assessed and validated.
- 8.5.7 The extent of the change in the nature of officers' jobs and in their responsibilities since the last benchmarking exercise is such that the comparators used for pay comparison purposes during the last exercise are no longer valid and that new

comparators at a higher level are now appropriate. It is estimated that the job content of officers' jobs has increased by up to 9.68%.

- 8.5.8 Involvement in EU Battlegroups will significantly increase the demands on all personnel, as will increases in the number, range and complexity of overseas peace support missions. At home, additional demands arise from involvement in emergency planning and counterterrorism and from further organisational changes required by the White Paper.
- 8.5.9 The challenge now is to maintain our world-class status in the face of these increasing demands. We will achieve this by doing more with the same number of officers and at even higher levels of efficiency and effectiveness - but to sustain this we must continue to recruit and retain high calibre officers.
- 8.5.10 The number of applicants for Army cadetships has increased in the last two years. However, the numbers exiting at younger ages is quite alarming.
- 8.5.11 While the recruitment numbers of engineers are currently satisfactory, recruitment of doctors and dentists remains a significant problem.
- 8.5.12 There is also a real danger that we will continue to lose significant numbers of officers again as the increased demands on individuals, particularly due to increased overseas service, feed through the system.
- 8.5.13 Since the last benchmarking exercise the levels of change and increased demands has far exceeded those anticipated. Further significant change and even heavier demands are expected in the future. We must underpin recruitment and retention efforts with competitive salary rates. This is the only way we can ensure we do not return to the high wastage levels of the late 90's and that we have sufficient experienced high calibre officers to ensure that the world-class Defence Forces we now have are sustainable in the long-term.