


# **RACO**

## **SUBMISSION TO THE**

### **PUBLIC SERVICE**

#### **PAY COMMISSION 2**

##### **(February 2018)**



**Part II- Narrative to support Data Submission**  
**Part III- Response to Terms of Reference.**



*"TO CHAMPION THE WELLBEING OF ALL MEMBERS"*

**RACO Submission  
to the  
Public Service Pay Commission 2**

- Part I- Excel Data- Electronic Submission**
- Part II- Narrative to support Data Submission (Part I)**
- Part III- Response to Terms of Reference**

**15 February 2018**





## Part II- Narrative to support RACO's Data Submission (2018)

15 February 2018



## Introduction

- 1.0 Data without relevant context can prove meaningless. This is particularly true in the context of the Human Resource Model of the Defence Forces and military organisations. *The HR functions of recruitment & retention are inextricably linked.* Where the *retention function* is failing, the pressure on recruitment alone cannot possibly deliver *trained and experienced staff* commensurate with an effective and cost-efficient HR model. With both recruitment and retention policies continuing to fail in addressing the manning level crisis in the Defence Forces, an external comprehensive review, similar in nature and scope to the Gleeson Commission in 1990, should now be considered by Government where Management are unable or unwilling to address the underlying organisational issues.

**Defence Forces Terms and Conditions of Service are simply unfit for the purpose of retaining a highly skilled, experienced and professional workforce.**

***The HR functions of recruitment & retention are inextricably linked.***

- 1.1 RACO's previous submission to the Public Service Pay Commission (30 Nov 2016) provided the context necessary to fully appreciate the Defence Forces as an organisation and holds the same relevance for the PSPC 2 deliberations in 2018. The data provided by both Defence Sector Management and the Representative Associations indisputably demonstrates underlying HR issues which has further deteriorated.
- 2.0 The Excel Data Submission is primarily based on the data provided by Defence Sector Management. A number of data requests submitted by RACO did not receive a response. In support of the data provided, this document provides the necessary context to the Recruitment & Retention functions in response to questions posed by the PSPC. This approach offers the essential context to the data while also making reference to recognised stakeholder observations and commentary on the issues of recruitment and retention in the Defence Forces.
- 3.0 To fully explore and appreciate the data, RACO recommend an oral hearing with all stakeholders. Only by understanding the unique demands of the Defence Forces as an organisation will the PSPC be able to make informed and appropriate observations and recommendations.

**Part I – “Are there currently recruitment issues for this sector? Please indicate which grades are experiencing the most significant difficulties.**

**Recruitment**

- 4.0 Actual numbers applying for cadetships has varied greatly in recent years- lowest in 2008 (1,009) and highest in 2016 with the introduction of online applications. The introduction of a simplified one-stop-shop online process facilitated greater initial applications.
- 4.1 The level of applications dropped off again in 2017 (3,447). Where there is a constant cohort of interested and committed applicants who will continually apply for a cadetship, these figures are quite low comparable to other sectors. For example, in 2016 the number of applicants for the Garda Síochána was 23,000 while the number in 2017 was 17,000. In 2014, the number of applications for Clerical Officers in the Civil Service was 28,000. *These figures demonstrate a “low candidate interest” in the Defence Forces relative to other sectors.*





Fig 1.0. Cadet Applications Comparison

- 4.2 Where cadetships cannot provide for specialist entry, the DF will use a Direct Entry (DE) method bypassing basic officer training by inducting a specialist (typically a medical doctor, engineer) into a vacancy. While DEs fill a particular role and skills set, military training of some degree is a necessary requirement and must be undertaken prior to their initial deployment on operations.
- 4.3 The DF Human Resource Model is quite unique due to the complex nature of military skill sets and the significant cost and extended timelines to develop these competencies within the Defence Force organisation. Section 2 of RACO’s previous submission to the PSPC 1 (Nov 2016) provides context to the multifaceted demand of skill sets and the extended and continual timelines of initial training and professional development required in order to deliver the range of military skill sets.
- 4.4 Figures 1.1, 2.0 and 2.1 below, demonstrate the complex nature of the DF HR Model while providing approximate costs with respect to the professional development and

qualification timelines of a range of military skill sets and professional competencies.



**Fig 1.1 Defence Force HR Model**

- 5.0 Contemporary recruitment campaigns for careers in the DF have consistently emphasised the unique nature of the military profession (e.g. "A life less ordinary"). Without fully comprehending what a career as a military officer involves many potential candidates will express an interest in the military. Based on this life less ordinary concept, candidates submit an application but without fully appreciating the required commitments demanded of a military career.
- 5.1 **Recruitment Stages.** In recent years the application process for cadetships (entry into the DF as a trainee officer) has been simplified and moved entirely online. This easily achievable and relatively straightforward process has succeeded in one of its objectives by increasing the number of applications, but as the application process advances to the next physical stages, large numbers of unsuccessful or unsuitable applicants fall away at the physical stages. There are three main stages in the Cadet recruitment process;
- **Stage 1 – Online Psychometric Testing.** Candidates who have attained the requisite score in the unsupervised online psychometric test move Stage 2.
  - **Stage 2 – The Assessment Phase.** Candidates are required to attend the Curragh Camp for a range of assessments consisting of;
    - **Physical Fitness Test.**

- **Supervised online Psychometric Test**<sup>1</sup>. If a candidate's performance at a supervised test is outside the expected scoring range from their unsupervised test at Stage 1, they may be excluded from subsequent stages of the selection process.
- **Group Assessment:** Candidates will be required to participate in a group assessment.
- **Realistic Job Preview:** This involves a familiarisation visit to the Cadet School and informal interaction with current instructional staff and cadets.
- **Online Personality Questionnaire.** Successful candidates attaining the requisite score at Stage 2 of the competition will be sent an online personality questionnaire to be completed within the time-frame specified prior to attending for final interview.
- **Stage 3 - Final Interview & Medical.** Stage 2 successful candidates are invited to undergo a final competency-based interview. A final panel is formed from successful Candidates. Candidates on this panel will be required to undergo a detailed medical examination. Candidates deemed medically fit are placed in a final order of merit. The number of selected candidates depends on the number of places available.

#### Commentary on DF [General Service Candidate Resilience and Dropout Rates](#)

6.0 Since the introduction of online initial applications, Defence Forces Headquarters Recruitment Section has experienced that approximately *50% of applicants* do not advance to the next stage (or sub-stage for Stage 2) of the process. This low resilience and dropout rate is in part from disinterested or poorly committed applicants who applied at the online stage but fail to turn up for the physical, more demanding selection phases. Alternatively, committed applicants fail psychometric, fitness or medical standards. In the 2017 General Service Recruitment campaign, approximately 5,000 online applications for were received but only 400 suitable recruits were inducted (in many cases, up to 40% of recruits finished basic training). *Fig 2.0 demonstrates the current resilience of the DF's General Service (enlisted Personnel) recruitment effort.*

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<sup>1</sup> **Psychometric Tests** usually use a standardised score system to create an order of merit list. Candidates scoring a minimum score would have been eligible to be called for fitness testing. The standardised score reflects where a candidate sits in relation to a norm group (e.g. school-leaver, graduate, technical graduate etc.)




Fig 2.0- Resilience of General Service Recruitment Efforts (September figures unavailable)

### The Military Recruitment Process

7.0 The military recruitment process is not limited to the process of getting a civilian into a military uniform. Rather it is a much more extended, costly and complex process. To fully train and educate the contemporary military leader may take between 5 to 8 years (accrued over 10-12 years) for a generalist or specialist respectively. As a benchmark a young army officer may be considered to be at the standard required once they deployable overseas; a young Air Corps pilot when they can operate as fully 'rated' co-pilot, or a young Naval Service Officer when they are certified as a watch-keeper 'taking the watch' at sea.

Timeline	Year 1			Year 2				Year 3				Year 4				Year 5				Year 6				Year 7				Year 8			
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10	Q11	Q12	Q13	Q14	Q15	Q16	Q17	Q18	Q19	Q20	Q21	Q22	Q23	Q24	Q25	Q26	Q27	Q28	Q29	Q30	Q31
Army Line Grad	Basic Cdt Trg			OPCC	YOs Corps Trg 6-9Mths				MRE	O/Seas	JC&SC	SC&SC																			
Army Line Non-Grad	Basic Cdt Trg			OPCC	3rd Level Education (Non Grads)								YOs	Corps Trg 6-12Mths				MRE	O/Seas												
Army Engr	Basic Cadet Trg			OPCC	3rd Level Education (Non Grads)												Engr YOs Level 9				MRE	O/Seas									
Army Ord	Basic Cdt Trg			OPCC	3rd Level Education (Non Grads)												Ord YOs Level 9				MRE	O/Seas									
Army CIS	Basic Cdt Trg			OPCC	3rd Level Education (Non Grads)												CIS YOs Level 9				MRE	O/Seas									
AC Pilot	Basic Mil Tr			Basic Flight Sch				Wings Conversatio								CPD					CPD					CPD					
AC ATC	Basic Cdt Trg			3rd Level Education (Non Grads)												ATC Qualification Cses															
AC Aero Engr (Non DE)	Basic Cdt Trg			3rd Level Education (Non Grads)												Aero / Engr YOs															
AC CIS Engr (Non DE)	Basic Cdt Trg			3rd Level Education (Non Grads)												CIS YOs Level 9															
NS Executive	Basic Cdt Trg			Overlap	Watch Keepers Cert																										
NS Marine Engr	Basic Cdt Trg			Overlap	Mech Engr Degree												Marine Eng Professional Training														
NS Elec Engr	Basic Cdt Trg			Overlap	Elec Engr Degree																										

Fig 2.1 above shows that the durations of basic and advanced training / education for commissioned officers can take between 5-8 years depending on varying qualifications, entry methods or Formation of Service Corps requirements.

- 7.1 Any examination of the recruitment process combined with the level and duration of training required to produce the contemporary military leader in the Army, Naval Service or Air Corps demonstrates that recruitment and retention are inextricably linked and co-dependent. As induction and training timelines are generally timely and costly, it is self-evident and good financial practice that once suitable candidates have ultimately reached a level of required training and experience that systems would be put in place to retain skilled and experienced personnel. *Instead we have a lack of such schemes leading to high levels of 'dysfunctional turnover'*<sup>2</sup>

### Specialist Military Training

- 8.0 Proficient and trained military personnel can only be developed by a combination of in-house and external military training, education and on the job experience. Simply put, many of the practical skills or training environments are not available off-the-shelf. For obvious reasons, all induction and initial training into the armed forces can only be completed at the start of military service. Before newly recruited military personnel are deemed competent and safely capable of performing military operations they must undergo a period of basic (induction) and advanced (specialist) military training and education.<sup>3</sup>
- 8.1 There a number of contrasting streams new entrants will move through depending on their Formation (Army, Naval Service and Air Corps) or specialist functional Corps<sup>4</sup>. In some cases, potential recruits must have existing civilian educational qualifications e.g. doctors, pharmacists, dentists, engineers. While it is possible to take in civilians with specialist education, these direct inductees still require extensive military training. Changes to career advancement schemes (removal of Fixed Period Promotion in 2013) has resulted in this method of entry being significantly less attractive to individuals due to the limitations on career span, earning potential and viability of a final superannuation benefit.
- 8.2 All armed forces must convert or 'retool' untrained civilian personnel directly from 2nd or 3rd level education and invest further finance, time, education and training in order to achieve the full spectrum of skilled military personnel to operate in the air, land or marine environments. For military operations to be successful, operational units must be independently deployable, self-sufficient and reliant. The extended lead-in times to train and qualify military personnel means that training / education must be a constant factor of military service to ensure that staff turnover does not compromise operational capability. Where an organisation is unable to replace staff with appropriately trained and experienced staff, risk increases, operational capability is indisputably compromised while the wellbeing of those who serve greatly impacted. *The Defence Forces is case and point.*

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<sup>2</sup> As identified in the studies conducted by the University of Limerick in 2014 and 2017.

<sup>3</sup> "armed forces train for the things we know and educate for the things we don't".

<sup>4</sup> Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, Engineering, Communications Info Services, Transport & Logistics, Ordnance Medical, Legal Services or Military Police.

## Military Training – Timelines V Costs

- 8.3 In order to train and educate personnel to the required military standards, the DF invests significant amounts of time and finances into its leadership. In terms of personnel about 12.5% of the organisation is in fulltime education or training programmes. Figure 2.2 below, shows the cost per student of various course military students undergo in order to reach the required level of proficiency.


<b>Figure 2.2 - Costs Per Student</b>		
<b>Course</b>	<b>Cost Per Student</b>	<b>Comment</b>
Army Cadet Training	€100,000.00	
Air Corps Cadet Training	€500,000.00	Variable Duration / 12-Yr Undertakin
Naval Service Executive Cadet	€200,000.00	Mix classroom & on-the-job trg
Naval Service Mech Engr Cdt	€450,000.00	Mix classroom & on-the-job trg
Naval Service Electrical Engr Cdt	€270,000.00	Mix classroom & on-the-job trg
Overseas PI Comd Cse	€25,000.00	
Infantry Young Offrs Cse	€15,000.00	
Overseas Prep Cses / Exercises	€20,000.00	
Junior Comd & Staff Cse	€65,000.00	Requirement for Capt Promotion
Senior Comd & Staff Cse	€100,000.00	Requirement for Comdt Promotion
3rd Level Degree	€35,000.00	2-Yr Undertaking per Academic Year
Corps Specific Trg	€15-45,000	Corps Dependent
Engr Young Offrs Cse	€250,000.00	2-Yr Level 9 Degree
Ord Young Offrs Cse	€230,000.00	2-Yr Level 9 Degree
CIS Young Offrs Cse	€100,000.00	2-Yr Level 9 Degree
Aeronautical Engr	€135,000.00	
Air Traffic Controller	€145,000.00	

**Fig 2.2- Costs Per Student**

## Context to Defence Forces Staff Turnover – All Ranks

- 9.0 Fig. 3.0 and 4.0 below, ultimately demonstrates the results of failing human resource policies on recruitment and retention. Efforts to effectively provide for trained “manning levels” of the DF have been systematically failing since 2012. Overall numbers continue to decline despite unprecedented efforts at recruitment in the face of the continued exodus of trained professionals. The result of the organisations inability to retain trained professionals is a Defence Force that is failing to maintain functional manning levels. Where Management’s sole focus continues to be on the function of recruitment and initiatives to increase numbers entering the Defence Forces, the deliberate failure to address “retention” is compromising the entire HR function. *“No amount of water will fill a leaky bucket”.*
- 9.1 The Defence Sectors sole attempts has been the introduction of initiatives to increase the numbers of potential recruits entering service. These include initiatives to reduce the established benchmarks of entry standard, training standards and timelines. Removal of

full security clearance measures by the Garda Síochána and the reduction in Recruit and Cadet basic training timelines were introduced with the objective of reducing the timeline in addressing the numbers. **These measures have had no medium or long-term impact other than to potentially expose the organisation to greater operational and organisational risk. “Optics only”.**



**Fig. 3.0 DF - Total Inductions & Discharges**

- 9.2 **Dilution of Psychometric Testing Standards:** Such tests usually use a standardised score system to create an order of merit list. Candidates scoring a minimum score would have been eligible to be called for fitness testing. The standardised score reflects where a candidate sits in relation to a norm group (e.g. school-leaver, graduate, technical graduate etc.). In 2017, the DF changed the normal benchmark of measure, moving to a system of percentile scores instead of standardised scores. This was a further effort in diluting the entry standard to secure greater numbers of recruits. *The Defence Sector policy initiative was to address the optics of numbers only as opposed to the underlying retention of experience.*
- 9.3 This system of percentile scores means that candidates reaching a minimum percentile standard are called for the next phase as opposed to benchmarking against the overall applicants to achieve the best candidates. *The potential result of the current practise is to expose the organisation to greater operational and organisational risk.*
- 9.4 Lowering of entry standards exposes organisations to increased operational and organisational risk. Soldiers are trained to use lethal force. Soldiers operate in a high-risk environment where challenging personal and professional demands are placed on individuals. Soldiers use high-tech weapons and complex equipment platforms.

Management and mitigation of risk becomes more challenging where entry standards are being eroded.

9.5 Defence Sector Management’s policy of lowering the standard of entry is questionable and is viewed by Members as a desperate effort to increase numbers for “optics only” as opposed to a genuine effort to address the medium and long-term sustainment of a professional DF.

9.6 Figure 4.0 demonstrates the result of the organisations failure to “retain” or replace “trained professionals” with qualified staff.




Fig 4.0 Unit Strength in Station of Lt and Captain Ranks







Fig 5.0 Army Specialists Establishment vs. Strength



**Fig 5.1- Naval Service- Establishment vs. Strength**



**Fig 5.2- Air Corps- Establishment vs. Strength**



\* This figure of 1233 does not account for 144 whole time appointments in which officers are posted. See p 12.6.

**Fig 5.3 Defence Force - Commissioned Officer Vacancies**

#### Observations and Recommendations by Defence Stakeholders & Researchers

10.0 The following sections provide observations and commentary on DF recruitment and retention by the Defence Sector and other relevant stakeholders.

##### 10.1 Public Service Pay Commission (PSPC) Report 2017.

In Chapter 6 Para 6.12 and 6.13 of the PSPC Report 2017, the Commission acknowledges the issues of recruitment and retention in the DF.

10.2 In Chapter 9 of the PSPC Report, the Commission notes that where, in general, evidence suggests that there are not significant difficulties with regard to recruitment to the various large scale public service vocational streams, *there are problems* in the case of some specialist groups across the public service including the DF.

#### Department of Defence submission to the PSPC 1

11.0 The Defence Sector Management submission noted the significance of the recruitment and retention functions of the HR model where they note;

“Maintaining defence capacity requires that a satisfactory balance is maintained between exiting personnel and new recruits . . . current trends in recruitment and retention are posing significant challenges to the organisation in this regard” (P 1).

11.1 The Defence Sector Management further note that;

*“the issue for the DF today is that currently they are losing personnel faster than they can recruit them and this is happening both at the officer, but more extensively at the enlisted level” (Page 2).*

11.2 The Department of Defence further notes that;

*“addressing the loss through increased recruitment poses difficulties due to significantly increased demands in terms of training personnel, training facilities and recruitment staff” (Page 2).*

11.3 In summary, The Defence Sector Management submission clearly acknowledges the;

- Issues and challenges as a consequence of failing recruitment and retention policies.
- Consequence of the failure to retain “skilled and experienced” personnel and the consequential impact on operational capability.
- Implications of the retention failure with respect to additional demands on organisation training infrastructure, training instructors and training support staff.

#### The University of Limerick Focus Group Report 2016

11.4 The DF commissioned the University of Limerick to conduct an organisation Climate Survey in 2015 followed up by a more in-depth Focus Group Report in 2016<sup>5</sup>. Where the initial climate survey was based on quantitative data, the Focus Group report was more qualitative in design and product.

11.5 Related references to the DF recruitment function in the Focus Group Report 2017 refers. The authors’ (Dr Juliette McMahon and Dr Sarah Mac Curtain) summary concludes that;

"These specific issues and the effects on individuals are discussed in more detail elsewhere in the report. Serious concerns from an organisational level are presented here. Key concerns as illustrated from the quotes presented here are that the DF is reaching a point of being hollowed out in terms of experienced human capital, that notwithstanding the increased recruitment of cadets it would take 10 plus years to replace the expertise that has been lost".

"Furthermore, concerns were expressed that it will be difficult to get cadets up to the standard required as the mentoring capability is being lost with those that are exiting/retiring. As highlighted in other sections there was widespread frustration at a perception that there is a focus on recruitment and that retention is not a

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<sup>5</sup> The report authors were Dr Juliette McMahon who is a lecturer in HRM and Industrial Relations and Dr Sarah Mac Curtain who is a lecturer in Organisational Behaviour in the University of Limerick. These reports are available on the Department of Defence website.

priority. This in turn is leading to a sense of disconnect/divide between all ranks and Senior Military management/The DoD and a fear for future capability of the DF".

- 11.6 Other notable references to "Recruitment" referenced by the Focus Group Report 2016 include;

*"Contributing to the stress caused by lack of numbers, there is a perception that management are focusing on recruitment rather than retention".*

*"Organisation is in more trouble than management thinks."*

*"Need to retain the right people with pay and conditions."*

*"Stop bringing in new people with lies, no supports and accepting they will be there for two years. People realise- I am giving, giving and there is nothing coming back (ref to recruits). It's a broken boomerang".*

*"Officers have expressed that management's focus on recruitment rather than retention is their primary source of stress. This has led to having higher numbers of inexperienced members while those with significant experience and capability are leaving. The workload is increasing and there are fewer members to do the work, so this has led to an inability to meet demand to the standard required. Members are feeling overworked and Officers fear for the safety of their members and the capability of performing to the best possible standard".*

- 11.7 Since the publication of this report, no new policy initiatives have been introduced by management to address the underlying issues identified.

#### **RACO Submission to PSPC 1 (Nov 2016)**

- 11.8 The RACO submission (2017) makes reference to the Gleeson Commission<sup>6</sup> where the report states (para 3.7.10) that;

*"One factor which must be taken into account is the need to arrive at rates of pay which are sufficient to enable the DF to recruit and retain personnel of the proper quality." (Gleeson Commission).*

- 11.9 Additionally, Para 3.7.11 notes the consequences where management *ignore* the clear evidence of difficulties where the report states that;

*"[T]o ignore identifiable problems of recruitment would be to run the risk that the DF would be unable to secure the services of sufficient numbers of suitable personnel. To ignore clear evidence of difficulties would lead to out-flow of skilled*

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<sup>6</sup> The Commission on Remuneration and Conditions of Service in the Defence Forces (Gleeson Commission) was established on 29 July 1989 to: 'carry out a major review of the remuneration and conditions of service of the Defence Forces having regard to their separate and distinct role and organisation and to make recommendations.' This was the first independent commission in the history of the State to examine pay and conditions in the Defence Forces.

personnel. In either event, the capacity of the DF to carry out the tasks assigned to them could be undermined and the problems would take many years to remedy.” This finding is particularly relevant as the “retention” of commissioned officers continues to be a major challenge for the DF (Gleeson Commission).

11.10 RACO’s submission concludes that;

“Recruitment in the DF is unable to match the outflow or replace the critical capability expertise at a safe and efficient rate. The additional burdens on those remaining pose significant organisational and personal challenges. The key factors are additional risk, governance and the wellbeing of individuals” (Para 27.5, RACO submission to PSPC).

11.11 Section 7 of RACO’s Executive Summary (November 2016, Pages xii to x), discusses the problems with recruitment and especially retention, and the associated implications for the DF. This summary is particularly relevant to understanding the context to these issues.

### Evidence on Recruitment and Retention


12.0 The current establishment for officers in the DF is 1,233 (79 officers were commissioned on 31 January 2018). The current strength is 1,140 (31 Jan 2018). There are currently 94 vacancies based on Establishment V Strength. Prior to the 2012 reorganisation of the DF the establishment for officers was 1,437. The actual strength on 31 Dec 2011 was 1,343. Since 2012, the Employment Control Framework (ECF) has reduced the establishment of officers from 1,437 to 1,233 (a reduction of 14%). The cut to Junior Officer numbers from pre-2012 was as follows;

- **Captain** from 450 to 306 = 144 (32%)
- **Lieutenant** from 222 to 167 = 59 (26%)

**Most alarming is the fact that, even with a continual reduction in the establishment numbers, the Organisation is unable to maintain this reduced strength and continues without a response from Defence Sector management. See Fig. 6.0 below.**

12.1 This reduction in personnel structures has taken place with no associated reduction in tasks or roles assigned by Government. During the period from 2007-2017, a total of 814 officers have exited the organisation. Of these retirements, 525 were of a voluntary nature. During the same period only 452 officers have been commissioned across the Army, Air Corps and Naval Service, a damaging net loss of skilled and experienced managers and leaders.

**See Annex 1 for a more detailed impact assessment using the Naval Service as an exemplar.**



**Fig 6.0 Downward Trend of Commissioned Officer Strength**

### Commissioned Officer Turnover Numbers

12.2 The DF is currently staffed with 86% of its officer strength. Over the last four years, on average, **twice** as many officers left the organisation as were commissioned (inducted). The current turnover rate of officers is minus 10% (see figure 6.1). The current turnover rate of officers is simply unsustainable; see Figures 6.1 and 6.2 for recent commissioned officer turnover numbers.

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>Exits</b>	82	75	80	73	77 <sup>7</sup> avg
<b>Commissioning</b>	35	29	39	41	70
<b>Difference</b>	47	46	41	32	7

**Fig 6.1 Net losses - Annual Officer Exits V's Commissioning**

<sup>7</sup> This figure is based on previous 4 years average




Figure 6.2 Exits and Commissioning

#### Cohort Analysis of Officer Retirements 2010-2017

12.3 446 x Army, 59 x Naval Service and 81 x Air Corps officers retired between 2010 and 2017. **Total = 586**. The vast majority of these retirements were of Captain, Commandant and Lieutenant Colonel rank. Figure 6.3 shows how the number of Captains retiring trebled between 2010 and 2015. No effort was made to retain these officers in service. It costs the State approximately €0.5m to train and qualify each officer. This amount excludes the amount Continuous Professional Development or 'Rating' in aviation terms.





Fig. 6.3 Army Captain Retirements 2007 - 2017



**Fig. 6.4 Corps Departures - Army 2007 - 2017**

12.4 These statistics are, the Association contends, an indication of a combination of factors all of which are supported by multiple stakeholder submissions to the PSPC<sup>8</sup> and informed commentary;

- **Organisational Climate** - Inadequate manning levels is regarded as the root cause with consequential implications such as increased risk in the performance of tasks and operations, employee burnout due to long term unplanned multitasking, personal and professional wellbeing compromised, higher instance of postings resulting in long term separation from family and community, and dysfunctional turnover of staff (Defence Forces Focus Group Report by University of Limerick 2017).
- **Remuneration** - FEMPI Pay Cuts, disproportionate cuts to New Entrant Final Superannuation Benefits and increasing pay differential with other Public and Private Sector employment.
- **ECF/DFR CS4**- Inadequate structures and capacity of manning levels and the failure by management to address the anomalies created by the 2012 Reorganisation is compounding the current exodus of highly skilled and experienced staff.

12.5 In addition to the actual vacancies within the officer numbers, there is also a very significant number of operational and administrative factors that are impacting upon the actual number of officers available for operational duties on a daily basis. The following factors

<sup>8</sup> See RACO Submission to PSC November 2016.

See RACO Trident Report on New Entrant Superannuation Scheme 2017.

See Department of Defence Submission to PSC November 2016.

See Defence Forces Focus Group Report by University of Limerick 2017.

have a significant effect on the availability of officers.

- 12.6 **ECF/DFR CS.4:** These documents provide for the organisational structure and manning levels. Inaccurate recognition of whole time numbers of ranks in the DF organisation structure Employment Control Framework (ECF) and Defence Forces Regulation CS.4 (DFR CS.4) is an ongoing glaring anomaly. The current organisational establishment, as set out in the ECF / DFR CS.4, fails to provide for the following appointments:

	<b>Posting/Course</b>	<b>Commitment</b>
a.	Lieutenants posted overseas	21
b.	Captains posted overseas	35
c.	Officers posted to EU Battlegroup (Commencing 2019)	16
d.	Captains completing Junior Command & Staff Courses	30
e.	Lt Cdrs completing Senior Command Operations Courses	8
f.	Comdts completing Senior Command & Staff Courses	20
g.	Officers on Secondment & SLWPA	26
h.	Officers on Leave of Absence/Unpaid Leave	3
i.	Naval Service and Air Corps Officers posted overseas	6
j.	Maternity Leave	3
	<b>Total</b>	<b>144</b>

**Figure 6.5 Institution Appointments not factored in Organisational Design or ECF**

- **Overseas Establishment.** Junior officers (Second Lieutenant, Lieutenant, Captain) on overseas duty are not provided for in the DFR CS4/ECF. In effect, this means that there are currently 21 appointments vacant in the units that the officers deployed from. This figure will increase to 28 upon the deployment of UNIFIL Nov 2018.
- **Full Time Training Requirements.** Similarly, students on Junior Command and Staff and Senior Command and Staff Courses have not been provided for. Once again, there is no allocation in DFR CS4 structure to take account of the officers undertaking these courses, lasting 6.5 months and 10.5 months in duration respectively. As a result, the home unit will continue to carry those officers on their overall strength for the duration.
- **SLWPA: Special Leave without Pay & Allowances:** There are currently 26 officers on SLWPA for a period of one (1) year or longer. In contrast to other sectors, the Defence Forces is not authorised to promote or induct against these figures and they are carried on the overall strength. Once again, belying the unit strength figures.
- **Secondment.** There are currently three (3) officers on long-term secondment both on and off island. Again, the Defence Forces is not authorised to promote or induct against these figures and they are carried on the overall strength of the organisation.

- 12.7 In January 2018, the effective day-to-day on island operational strength of officer will be 877. This will result in **238** 'real' vacancies within Defence Forces for considerable periods

into the future. **94** are current vacant appointments and **144** is the number of unaccounted appointments in which officers are serving on a fulltime basis. The majority of these vacancies will affect the middle management ranks of Captain/Lieutenant (NS) and Commandant/ Lieutenant Commander. **These commissioned officer numbers, where either vacant or where these appointments are not included in the organisational structure, are essentially removed from operational units leaving long term gaps on an ongoing basis.**

- 12.8 **The organisational structure, as outlined in DFR CS4 and the ECF, needs to be addressed as it is clearly flawed.**

### Recruitment- Implications on Training, Operational Capability and Well Being

- 13.0 As an example, during a Dáil Éireann Debate on Wednesday 17 May 2017 The Minister for Defence stated that the Air Corps is at capacity in cadet training and this will continue in 2018. The initiative of inducting large classes of trainee pilots in an effort to ensure the greatest possible number of pilots can be trained is commendable, but *the Minister accepted that the shortage of pilots will not be fixed in the short term as it take a considerable period of time to train pilots.*
- 13.1 Presently, Air Corps cadets undertake 9 months training in the Cadet School prior to reporting to Air Corps' Fight School for the second phase of their training, which involves ground school study and pilot exams. This study phase lasts anywhere between 9 months and a year and is completed prior to the cadet commencing the third phase, which involves approximately 100 flights in the PC-9M aircraft. There are capacity constraints in training pilots, particularly in respect of providing serviceable aircraft and flying instructors, which entails that larger classes take longer to train. Present forecasts indicate that the Air Corps Cadetship which previously took 2.5 years may take the most recently inducted class a period of between *4.5 and 5 years* to complete. The backlog of training due to increased numbers of cadets will also result in extended periods where cadets having completed their ground school phase will be required to wait for extended periods until aircraft become available, possible in excess of one year.
- 13.2 It was also recognised by the Minister that the conclusion of initial pilot training does not provide an experienced pilot capable of undertaking many of the flying tasks required by the Air Corps, as it is not possible to simply "pick a pilot off the shelf and put him or her flying such and such a plane or helicopter." The experience required to command a multi-crew aeroplane or helicopter can take *many years to develop* and entails a significant amount of financial investment in initial aircraft type training and ongoing recurrence training in simulators. This very significant financial outlay by the State is walking out of the gates of Baldonnell, with a rate of exodus far in excess of the Air Corps' ability to replace it.
- 13.3 **In short, while the induction of large cadet classes in the Air Corps is to be welcomed, *it will not impact on pilot shortages* for some considerable period and cannot, at this juncture, be considered as a solution to the deficit of pilots. It should further be**

recognised that solely relying on the training of new inductee pilots in the Air Corps to replace those retiring will not retain the valuable experience or training outlay accumulated by its serving pilots.


13.4 Where there are currently 27 pilot vacancies in the Air Corps, there can be no question but that operational capacity is compromised but, in addition, the wellbeing of those who perform the additional tasking where vacancies exist. The University of Limerick Researchers took note of the “burnout”, personal and professional impact and what they described as “dysfunctional turnover” of staff as a consequence of the current manning level crisis (**Focus Group Report 2017**).

13.5 Examples of personal wellbeing impact as a consequence of inadequate manning levels include;

- **Loss in Annual Leave**, per man, is increasing in line with shortages of trained staff.



**Figure 7.0. Total Leave Days Lost- Commissioned Officers**



**Figure 7.1. Average number Days Leave Lost Per Commissioned Officer**

- Ordnance Officer Duty:** With the ordnance officer (bomb disposal) panel operating with 30% vacancies, the instance of duty is now one week (7 days continuous<sup>9</sup>) every three weeks. The backdrop to this situation was the exodus of highly trained and experienced ordnance officers in 2013 after Defence Sector management attempted to deny career progression in line with “fixed period promotion” agreements. The Management decision was described by the Defence Sector Adjudicator as “unconscionable”. Misguided decision making based on “public service norms” combined with the absence of any strategic HR policy will undoubtedly delay in the provision of “fit for purpose” solutions. Failure by the Department of Defence to provide for *Military Management’s position in the development of functional HR policies continues to a significant source of frustration to Senior Military Management.*

### Future Manning Level Projections

- 14.0 The majority of officer exits from the DF over the last 10-year period are from the Army component. The average annual amount of officer exits from the DF over the period 2007-2017 has been 74 while (induction/recruitment) commissioning figures for the same period have averaged 44.
- 14.1 The average annual retirement rate over the last 10-year period is 74 officers per year. However, when the last three (3) years are analysed this rate increases to 77 officer retirements per year. This significant increase is likely to continue as strongly indicated in the ‘Have your say’ Climate Survey for the Defence Force published in 2016 and Focus Group Report 2017.
- 14.2 The ECF fails to accurately reflect current manning level requirements. The result is that

<sup>9</sup> Military Management are forced to apply this duration of duty period in order to maintain full operational capability. Inadequate HR policies and inability to retain these specialists is a consequence of a Management failure to address retention. Application of EU WTD and any reasonable approach to “wellbeing” goes without consideration.

operational units are currently operating with less than 50% of the designed strength of officers. Furthermore, the creation of additional overseas units such as EU/Nordic Battle Groups has added 27 officer appointments that are NOT reflected in the Defence Forces ECF numbers.

- 14.3 In summary, the strength figure for Army Officers is at its lowest since at least 1969. The current figure is 788 (down from 841 in our original submission Nov 2016). This figure will continue to decline until retention policies are developed and larger Cadet Classes are commissioned. What is also clear is that the shortage of officers at Lieutenant, Captain and Commandant ranks will continue for a significant period until larger Cadet Classes are promoted to the rank of Captain. In effect this will NOT be resolvable until at least **2024/25 unless timely high impact interventions are made, and functional initiatives are introduced.**

### Implications as a Consequence of Inadequate Manning Levels

- 15.0 Commissioned officer numbers in operational units are running at 50% of actual designed strength. Designed organisational unit structures are clearly inadequate since the 2012 reorganisation. 18 x vacancies exist in the commissioned officer ranks of the Naval Service 29 x vacancies exist in the commissioned officer ranks of the Air Corps and 27 in the Army (94 vacancies in total and 238 where “real” figures are counted). The additional burden of work is being conducted by those serving to a point where risk management, administrative and operational governance and the wellbeing of the commissioned officers is compromised. ***The Climate Survey 2016 and Focus Group Report 2017 provides context to these identified issues.***
- 15.1 To maintain operational output, the average number of postings for officers has increased to 8.82 times in a five-year period (2010-2017). The frequency and duration of these postings is alarming and has significant implications for the officers concerned. The Focus Group Report 2017 researchers describe how these factors have led to a cycle of “dysfunctional turnover<sup>10</sup>”.
- 15.2 Officer numbers will continue to fall over the next number of years even while providing for larger Cadet Classes. The critical shortage of Capts/Lt (NS) and to a lesser extent Comdts/Lt Cdrs will continue for at least the next eight (8) to ten (10) years, until the larger Cadet classes are promoted - if they remain in service.
- 15.3 The “manning levels” of commissioned officers are clearly inconsistent with the Department of Defence Human Resource strategy of “timely provision of appropriately qualified personnel”.
- 15.4 Operational capability is inextricably linked to “trained manning levels”. The continued

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<sup>10</sup> Research has identified dysfunctional turnover as: a situation where a valued employee quits and takes with them their experience and corporate knowledge. From an organisational perspective participants also expressed fears for the capability of the units and the safety of personnel if the situation continues.

exodus of highly qualified and experienced professionals continues from the Defence Forces. *To date no retention initiatives have been introduced.*

15.5 Military skill sets can take considerable time to develop *safely and effectively and at considerable expense* (See Fig.2.1 of this submission). In the absence of effective and “fit for purpose” HR policies, the organisation and its members are exposed to greater risk, governance challenges and excessive workloads that compromise “wellbeing” and add to organisation risk and vulnerability. The ‘Wellbeing in the Defence Forces’ Climate Survey 2016 and Focus Group 2017 report identifies, quantifies and contextualises many of these issues.

### Comparison to other Public Service Sectors

16.0 Since 2008, the introduction of FEMPI legislation, combined with Public Service Pay Agreements, has seen the continual diminution of service pay, pension and conditions of service. During the same period, the workload and magnitude of responsibility has increased across the commissioned ranks. The reduction in Army officer numbers in 2012 essentially resulted in “less doing even more” which has been further compounded by the inadequate manning numbers designed in the Employment Control Framework 2009.

16.1 Section 25.0 of RACO’s previous submission to the PSpC, provided evidence on recruitment and retention within the public service. The rationalisation of the DF took place in a period of expansion in terms of personnel by other Public-Sector groups during the period 2008 to 2016.

Numbers by Vote Group Trend		2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
		Qtr 4	Qtr 4						
Agriculture Group		6,401.68	5,780.41	5,477.88	5,207.58	4,889.26	4,575.56	4,428.49	4,379.1
Arts, Heritage,		1,479.59	1,393.47	1,363.89	1,750.41	1,664.49	1,588.63	1,564.13	1,555.3
Children & Youth					241.31	474.11	464.11	3,857.57	3,844.7
Communications,		1,068.56	1,043.08	1,267.45	1,235.32	1,150.90	1,139.30	1,096.49	1,102.3
Defence Group		11,667.04	11,111.48	10,666.82	10,478.64	10,328.95	10,138.58	10,127.94	9,985.3
Education Group		97,214.82	95,473.48	97,682.00	94,582.74	93,500.50	94,321.65	95,951.53	98,314.1
Finance Group		7,520.98	6,910.89	6,823.19	6,392.44	6,182.84	6,292.93	6,188.51	6,248.5
Foreign Affairs		1,543.95	1,564.55	1,521.85	1,442.70	1,415.50	1,359.30	1,356.72	1,392.3
Health Group		113,218.08	111,951.66	109,898.10	106,199.02	103,294.61	101,794.36	99,611.83	105,747.3
Housing, Planning,		37,230.32	34,093.04	32,729.21	31,121.23	29,824.29	28,988.16	28,184.41	28,031.4
Jobs, Enterprise &		5,550.66	5,094.31	2,981.94	2,821.52	2,661.60	2,519.05	2,376.73	2,158.7
Justice Group		25,914.56	24,900.65	24,063.83	23,629.76	22,642.87	22,350.31	21,954.03	22,119.3
Public Expenditure		2,621.50	2,380.48	2,283.48	2,534.07	2,498.52	2,602.85	2,864.98	3,048.7
Social Protection		4,815.69	5,090.60	5,130.29	6,162.56	6,877.19	6,703.99	6,762.48	6,613.4
Taoiseach's		2,190.96	2,070.37	1,999.39	1,977.94	1,880.69	1,827.45	1,865.32	2,024.8
Transport Group		1,138.81	1,092.18	1,054.91	1,550.00	1,575.55	1,550.76	1,451.71	1,632.6
- Community,		809.95	796.51	1,023.03					
<b>Total</b>		<b>320,387.15</b>	<b>310,747.14</b>	<b>305,967.26</b>	<b>297,327.24</b>	<b>290,861.87</b>	<b>288,216.99</b>	<b>289,642.87</b>	<b>298,198.6</b>

Fig.8.0 - Public Sector Numbers 2008 - 2015

16.2 RACO comments on Fig. 8.0;

- During the period between 2008 and 2016 the Defence Group lost over 1,600 personnel.

- During this period Defence Forces outputs were not reduced. Therefore, while other Sectoral Departments had the benefit of additional personnel during the economic downturn the DF critically rationalised and had to 'do more with less'.
- In 1980, there was nearly 60% more people associated with the Defence Sector than there is in 2016. Comparatively, 75% more personnel now work in the justice sector than worked in the sector in 1980. This suggests that Government's response in times of financial crisis has been to reduce disproportionately the Defence numbers. *Has this reduction in numbers now compromised operational capability? The answer to this is an unequivocal and irrefutable 'Yes'.*

### Conclusions to current recruitment issues for this sector (Q1)

17.0 RACO contends that recruitment issues should *not* be evaluated based on numbers of applicants alone. Narrative from some management commentators and senior officials suggests that *where numbers of applicants are high, there are no issues with recruitment*. These statements demonstrate either an absence of understanding of the demands of normal Human Resource Management in the military or an unwillingness to acknowledge and address the fundamental failures currently being experienced.

17.1 The Gleeson Commission<sup>11</sup> identified the unique requirements of DF manning and cautioned management on the key principles of human resource management where the report cited;

“One factor which must be taken into account is the need to arrive at rates of pay which are sufficient to enable the DF to recruit and retain personnel of the proper quality.”

“[t]o ignore identifiable problems of recruitment would be to run the risk that the Defence Forces would be unable to secure the services of sufficient numbers of suitable personnel. To ignore clear evidence of difficulties would lead to out-flow of skilled personnel. In either event, the capacity of the Defence Forces to carry out the tasks assigned to them could be undermined and the problems would take many years to remedy.” This finding is particularly relevant as the “retention” of commissioned officers continues to be a major challenge for the Defence Forces (Gleeson Commission).

17.2 Using recruitment solely as a means to address the “normal turnover” cycle of human resourcing in a workforce is designed to provide for a planned and scheduled cycle where fully trained and experienced professionals are replaced on a **like for like** basis preventing the possibility of a loss of capability or increase in risk due to lack of expertise and experience. The current “dysfunctional turnover”<sup>12</sup> has forced the DF to **reduce training timelines, increase in number of recruitment campaigns, increase budgets for**

<sup>11</sup> The Commission on Remuneration and Conditions of Service in the Defence Forces (Gleeson Commission) was established on 29 July 1989 to: ‘carry out a major review of the remuneration and conditions of service of the Defence Forces having regard to their separate and distinct role and organisation and to make recommendations.’ This was the first independent commission in the history of the State to examine pay and conditions in the Defence Forces.

<sup>12</sup> Page 35, University of Limerick Focus Group Report 2017.

**advertising, reduce security clearance measures to speed up process of induction** while overburdening training location infrastructure and training staff; which has led to a consequential impact on wellbeing and organisational efficiency. Any cost benefit analysis would indisputably determine the advantages of retention over recruitment particularly when factoring the additional implications of the disruption, increased risk, governance challenges and wellbeing of the Defence Forces personnel.

- 17.3 The overload of recruitment resource demands as a consequence of an ongoing failure of retention is absorbing multiple training assets while diverting resources from other key activities such as operational tasking, unit collective training and individual professional skills development.
- 17.4 Dysfunctional turnover while supporting the excessive and continued recruitment demand has taken over from higher skills development of trained professionals. This is acknowledged by the Department of Defence submission to the PSPC in 2016. Loss of trained expertise that requires 2-8 years to safely develop (timeline of experience not factored) cannot possibly be addressed by the continual recruitment of new entrants alone.
- 17.5 Risk to military personnel on operations or training is now a major concern identified by all Unit Commanders and Defence Force personnel across the service<sup>13</sup>.

## Part 1 Summary

- **Recruitment and Retention are intrinsically linked. Recruitment functions should not be evaluated based on numbers of applicants alone. Excessive and continual recruitment at new entrant level is not a credible or viable response to the DF HR issues.( Gleeson Commission)**
- **Rates of pay in addition to improved conditions of service for military personnel must be sufficient to enable the DF to recruit and, more importantly, *retain* trained professionals of the proper calibre and experience .( Gleeson Commission)**
- **The DF is currently suffering from a *dysfunctional cycle* of turnover. This has consequential implications that Management are ignoring and requires immediate attention.( Focus Group Report 2017)**
- **Extraordinary high levels of new inductee training is diverting resources from other key activities such as operational tasking.(Department of Defence submission to PSPC1)**
- **Loss of trained and qualified leader expertise is increasing risk where it takes a minimum of 2 - 8 years to safely develop.**
- **Training, educating and developing military competencies is primarily an in-house function, common amongst armed forces. Exigencies of military service demands bespoke HR policy. Public service “norms” , where they are inconsistent and incompatible with the “employee status” of Defence Force personnel, will result in the continued failure to adequately and safely staff appointments.**

**Part II – Are there currently retention issues for this sector? Please indicate which grades are experiencing the most significant difficulties.**

- 18.0 The exit of highly trained, qualified and experienced military professionals is an ongoing trend since 2010 *across all services and grades*. Where the organisation is clearly unable to replace those exiting staff with equally qualified and experienced professionals, the result is increased operational risk, ineffective governance and noted impact on the wellbeing of serving personnel.
- 18.1 These issues are clearly identified in the University of Limerick Focus Group Report 2017. Where the timelines of training military professionals can extend from 2-8 years due to the specialist nature of military competencies, the organisations ability to fill consequential vacancies with trained and experienced professionals requires a responsive human resource cycle which must include the critical factor of “retention”. *The cost benefit of retention over continual recruitment is indisputable particularly where the majority of training and qualifications must be developed from within Military Institutions.*
- 18.2 Research, analysis and observations on the issue of Defence Forces “retention” and the associated organisational challenges and failures have been ongoing for an extended period. References to observations by key stakeholders include;
- 18.3 **The White Paper on Defence 2015** makes reference to the objectives of Defence Force Human Resource Management. Section 7.3 of the White Paper notes that;
- “the recruitment, training and development, and retention of suitable military personnel are essential factors in developing the military capabilities required in order to discharge the roles assigned by Government.”
- 18.4 The White Paper also notes that;
- [H]aving regard to the capability and professional competency requirements of the modern Defence Forces, a review of HR policies in relation to recruitment, training and education, performance management, reward systems, and retention and retirement policies alongside age profiles for personnel across the Defence Forces will be conducted in the medium term”. Para 7.3.5 makes reference to retention and retirement.
- Note:** No such review or project has yet commenced in February 2018.
- 18.5 Defence Management’s delay in commencing White Paper Projects to address the ongoing recruitment and retention issues is indicative of an unresponsive approach to HR Management and highlights the consequential failure at attempting to resolve the manning level crisis. This failure to take measurable action is in contradiction of the Gleeson Commission guidance to Defence Forces manning and in contrast to comparators to Armed Forces Human Resourcing such as that applied by the United Kingdom.

- 18.6 **The Armed Forces UK** factor “trained strength” only and link manning levels to effective operational capability. An interesting contrast in effectively achieving functional “manning strength” is the model applied by the UK Military and Defence Committee. Annual reports to the British Defence Committee analyse the effectiveness with which they achieve, or otherwise, the designed manning levels.
- 18.7 The UK Armed Forces provide a guidance manning level threshold of +1% to -2% of “trained personnel strength”. If the manning level falls below this threshold, resources and initiatives are applied accordingly. The Defence Committee analysis focuses on the impact of “voluntary exit” by personnel. While noting the benefits of voluntary exit of personnel to maintain low age profile and career advancement opportunity the UK pays particular attention to the *rate* of exit, highlighting the very obvious “cost benefit” associated with the retention of trained skilled personnel over the high costs of “recruitment & training”. Of particular note is the UK MoD focus on operational “pinch points” where there is a deficit of expertise with insufficient trained strength to perform operational tasks. *Any such deficit in “manning levels” is factored as impacting on the force’s “operational effectiveness”*.
- 18.8 **The Oireachtas Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence**, during a discussion on the Department of Defence's Strategy Statement 2017 - 2020<sup>14</sup> questioned why the Department of Defence has failed to include a Retention Policy for the Defence Forces where it was evident that the continual recruitment campaigns were failing to address the underlying reasons for the continued exit of personnel. The response did not address the question posed. *A retention policy has yet to be published*.
- 18.9 **The Defence Sector Management’s submission to the PSPC 1** clearly noted the negative organisational impact due principally to the failure to retain the organisation’s *qualified and experienced staff*. Unlike other sectors, the majority of military skill sets, competencies, qualifications and experience can only be generated from within the Defence Forces taking significant lead times from 2-8 years.
- 18.10 Defence Sector Management submission noted that “maintaining defence capacity requires that a satisfactory balance is maintained between exiting personnel and new recruits . . . current trends in recruitment and retention are posing significant challenges to the organisation in this regard” (Page 1).
- 18.11 The Department further notes that “the issue for the DF today is that currently they are losing personnel faster than they can recruit them and this is happening both at the officer, but more extensively at the enlisted level” (Page 2).
- 18.12 **Focus Group Report by University of Limerick 2017**. This study, commissioned in 2016 was a qualitative study commissioned to investigate in more depth the results of the 2015 quantitative survey on organisation climate. The aim of the focus groups study was to;
- Drill down into key themes identified as problematic and to get detailed feedback for

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<sup>14</sup> 05 October 2017.

Defence Forces personnel of all ranks and service areas.

- To provide a voice to serving members to express their satisfaction levels and concerns regarding the organisation and its policies.
- To further understand the results of the 2015 Climate Survey assessing Defence Forces members' attitudes and satisfaction levels regarding the Defence Forces and in particular its **Human Resource Management policies and procedures**.
- To further explore issues affecting **the retention of personnel**

18.13 The Focus Group Report<sup>15</sup> summarises the researcher's findings with respect to "Shortages of Personnel and Retention". The Focus Group Report notes;

"It is clear from the data available and from the focus groups that there are significant middle management gaps at barrack/unit level within the Defence Forces. In the focus groups there was widespread criticism of Administration Instruction C.S.4<sup>16</sup>. It was felt that the shortages of personnel were at best masked by the figures in that C.S.4 does not take account of personnel that are on training courses, participating in battlegroups and overseas. All of the focus groups from Private to Senior Officers reported severe shortages of Officers in units. Feedback from the focus groups has indicated that individual consequences of these gaps for Officers are increased workload, decreased job satisfaction, a diminution of mental and physical wellbeing and decreased engagement. This in turn is contributing to turnover among the Officer rank- representing a loss of human capital and expertise and further frustration for remaining Officers and troops.

Thus, there is evidence from the focus groups of a **dysfunctional cycle of turnover** developing. Research has identified dysfunctional turnover as: a situation where a valued employee quits and takes with them their experience and corporate knowledge. From an organisational perspective, participants also expressed fears for the capability of the units and the safety of personnel if the situation continues."

18.14 The researchers, in Section 4 "**Staff Shortages and Retention**"<sup>17</sup> note particular HR factors currently existing in the Defence Forces. The report notes that;

"The issue of 'critical gaps' in personnel emerged as a key theme in all focus groups. Particularly highlighted were gaps in middle management areas mainly among Officers and increasingly among NCOs. A number of serious outcomes and implications for the Defence Forces relating to shortages and turnover were raised in the focus groups. In this section, shortages of Officer personnel are examined as well as the overall issue of retention of officers and other ranks. The implications of this are discussed."

"Contemporary research in the field of HRM indicates that for organisations the critical success factor lies with the quality/availability of talent and human capital

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<sup>15</sup> Page 35

<sup>16</sup> DFR CS.4 is the regulation providing for the organisation unit design and manning levels.

<sup>17</sup> Page 40

(Sparrow and Makram 2015). Talent management has been referred to as the new strategic cornerstone for organisation effectiveness. This is particularly salient in sectors where it is recognised that businesses rely on intangible assets –in particular human capital to achieve successful outcomes. **In an increasingly global competitive market for talent, organisations are being advised to look at ways of 'locking' in their core talented personnel and a key tenet of effective talent management is the avoidance of reactive hiring<sup>18</sup>.**

Furthermore, recent research (Collings 2014) in the area of talent management questions the view that 'lower level employees' (such as Privates in the context of this report) do not meet criteria to be deemed 'talent'. Indeed, such employees should possibly be front and central to talent strategy if they are at the front line of organisation operations (Ton 2011). Aligned with a focus on talent retention is the issue of turnover. **Research on turnover makes a distinction between functional turnover of employees and dysfunctional turnover** (Morin and Reynaud, 2009) Functional turnover refers to an individual who adds little value to the organisation, or for whom the cost of replacement by the organisation does not exceed the cost of retention.

Dysfunctional turnover refers to a valued employee who quits and takes with them their experience and corporate knowledge. (Renaud et al, 2014).

Boxhall (2013) highlights perceptions and assessments of employees of fairness of rewards and other benefits relative to the employee's perceived contribution to the organization as a key contributing factor to the loss or retention of key talent. These assessments traditionally focus on reward, promotion, status, and workload. Collings (2014) refers to this as the 'contribution axis'.

Dysfunctional turnover has been highlighted as having a particularly negative outcome for military organisations due to factors such as a higher cost of replacement because of the specialist nature of the skills and thus the length of time it takes to replace experienced personnel (Dupre and day 2007). Intention to leave can also have negative effects on an organisation as employees who have formed such intentions have been found to distance themselves psychologically from their work, be less focused and less likely to work to full potential (Reynaud et al 2014). Furthermore, in a longitudinal study Huffman et al (2005) found that turnover intentions closely respond to actual turnover of military personnel.

**The advantages of functional retention on the other hand are summed up by the following quote:**

*"High functional retention or a firm's ability to retain a high value-added resource constitutes a key organisational outcome for three reasons: first, by staying with the firm, these key employees contribute to profits (e.g. eliminating replacement costs);*

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<sup>18</sup> Price Waterhouse Cooper 2013, Capella, 2008.

*second, their retention minimises the loss of skills and resources, a loss which can hamper the achievement of objectives (loss of know-how, customer dissatisfaction); third and lastly, their desire to stay reveals their job satisfaction, which carries additional gain (Reynaud et al 2014: 418)*

The issue of 'critical gaps' of management personnel in units emerged as a key theme in all focus groups with Officers and other ranks. Shortages of officers and NCOs in units were identified as problematic. The feedback from the groups was that the gaps were due to two key things. Firstly, there was a palpable frustration among Officers with Defence Forces Regulation CS.4 regarding numerical establishment. Officers who were assigned to units were missing from those units because they were on courses for promotion, serving overseas or on battlegroups and they are not replaced. The reality is that there are much fewer Officers and NCOs manning the units than are reflected in this system of assessing establishment numbers. Secondly Officers who participated in the focus groups were alarmed at the number of Officers with significant experience and expertise who were choosing to exit the organisation. Turnover and rotation of experienced NCOs were also identified by all ranks as growing problems which will have long term effects on organisations capability.

**Also, of note are the particular concerns of serving personnel. Quotes include;**

*"We are losing it already (talent) because the people who are so concerned about risk are the people who can see the risk are saying I am not prepared to accept this anymore I will go elsewhere. But these are the people we need to stay because they can identify the risk in the first place".*

***"Losing 60 people per month, retention is one of the major issues. We spend enormous resources recruiting people, training them, looking after them, doing our best for them and we are losing 10% of them annually".***

*"We will struggle to deal with retention issue and the focus is solely on recruitment".*

***'I think everyone of us have considered leaving . . . (group of 10 senior officers). We do have different terms of service- it might be better for us to leave based on pay we can get in private sector- but we all love the DF but there are inherent issues with the organisation and we don't see a move on it.'***

*"There are currently 4 Commandants . . . who because people are leaving the DF and going overseas- now those 4 are completely uncertain where they will be in 6 months. Nobody is talking to them or telling them and then when they go - I had a Commandant who was sent to XXXXXX from XXXXXX this morning and was told he will be there for 18 months . . . but we both know that could be 36...there seems to be no planning or military management to give Officers certainty. You are supposed to know maybe a month or two before you come home (from overseas) . . . at best you might be told a week before . . . but more often it's when you are on your 4 weeks leave when you get back...a phone call in the 3rd week of Leave".*

***"We need numbers- retention is a big issue. It's a crisis at the moment . . . we don't enjoy it anymore- for the last year – for the first time in my career I worry about what I am going to do the next day because I don't have the resources. And a lot of my peers in the room feel the same- you can't enjoy a job you are doing badly . . . so that's mental well-being but there is also physical wellbeing because of the hours you are working- so if you get an opportunity outside you are going to take it. Your family can see you are stressed you are not a nice person to be around. All comes back to manning levels".***

*"The elephant in the room from the Air Corps- is the retention issue. We did hold on to people before the financial crisis ended- now the door is wide open, and people are leaving- but the cost of those people leaving is exponentially more than just replacing them with trainees.'*

***'In the Air Corps we have seen that with three or four fatal accidents. The reports are there. And in them you see that there are various contributory factors. On occasions are leadership or management at various levels not being there or present. The lads talk about unit commanders needing to be there...an absence of a unit commander may not directly contribute to something, but a culture can build up over time where there will be risks if people are not there keeping their finger on the pulse'.***

*'There is a total lack of recognition for everything- well done? . . . not down here! Most of us are in environments where we put in extra days extra nights.....they see it's done and that's all they care about. What needs to be done won't be done unless we come in at 7.45...and that's down to a lack of officers and they just don't recognise that . . . we won't do it for much longer' (NCO)*

***'At least 10% coming back from the med will apply for discharge...This affects us as we don't have junior staff to do the work . . . Biggest obstacle we have is retention'.***

*'48 new entrants and at the end of this month we will be lucky to have 5% left'.*

**The Focus Group Report suggested recommendations for Staff Shortages. These are referenced on page 176 of the report.**

*"The issue of staff shortages (particularly officers at middle level and now NCOs) across units has been highlighted in all focus groups as a critical factor undermining core areas such as safety, credibility of appraisals, operational effectiveness and giving rise to family instability, stress, perception of organisation as fair, lack of meaningful work and ultimately intention to leave the Defence Forces".*

*"All of the focus groups called for a stronger focus on retention. We recommend that this be **given serious attention**".*

Focus groups highlighted administration instruction C.S.4 as presenting an

unrealistic perspective as no account is taken of people on courses, people overseas, at battlegroup or on long term leave. This in turn gives rise to a sense of frustration and a perception of Leadership being disconnected from realities. Establishment figures need to take account of the real numbers in units”.

18.15 RACO addressed the retention issue in the DF as a major theme of our submission to the PSPC 1 in November 2017. The submission clearly identifies “retention” as a significant organisation issue and additionally the ongoing failure to introduce mitigating policies and initiatives as a failure of management.

18.16 RACO’s submission not only provides the data to support the identification of clear trends but also makes recommendations as to how these issues can be addressed. This submission to PSPC 2 will also identify the issues, supported with management data while again making recommendations on how to address the ongoing failure of the organisations HRM.

18.17 References in RACO’s previous submission are seen below;

“Operational capability is inextricably linked to “trained manning levels”. The continued exodus of highly qualified and experienced professionals continues from the Defence Forces. To date no retention initiatives have been initiated”.

“There is no clearly defined Retention Policy for the Defence Forces. With the Defence Forces continuing to lose significant corporate knowledge through the exodus of its middle managers at an alarming rate, this lack of an effective retention strategy, be it through appropriate terms and conditions of service, or adequate allowances commensurate to professional competence is unsustainable. Officers continue to double and triple-job with no adequate support as a result of a failure by management to effectively manage the significant changes the organisation has undergone since 2006”. (4.21.12 p121)

“The current deficit in unit “manning levels” of formation and service units is compounded by an inadequate organisation Employment Control Framework (ECF) since 2009. The implications of the inadequate manning levels, the Association contends, are inextricably linked to the on-going “retention” issues of highly qualified and experienced professionals. The exit statistics and exit interviews conducted by the Defence Forces in 2016 can assist in confirming this position”. (5.6.1 pg. 126)

18.18 DF personnel numbers are below the numbers identified by Government. The current “trained strength” is below 9,000. The obvious issues surrounding the *retention* of skilled professionals goes unrecognised by management; rather than address the underlying causes. *Organisation turnover is healthy but only when vacancies can be filled efficiently.* The obvious cost benefit of retention policies must be factored to address the continual “brain drain”. (5.6.9 p127)

18.19 The Gleeson Commission findings and guidance regarding pay and retention of skilled professionals has come to the harsh and costly reality.

18.20 The Chairman of the DF Sustaining Progress Review Group concluded that the world-class DF we now have are “sustainable now and in the long-term”. However, this sustainability is entirely contingent on the maintenance of a balanced mix of equipment, infrastructure and well-trained, highly motivated personnel. *A key element in this mix is retaining appropriate numbers of high calibre officers to manage and lead the organisation at every level* (page 172, RACO submission to PSPC).

### Conclusion Part II - Current retention issues for the Defence Sector.

19.0 Manning Level data confirms the inadequacy of both the current DF Structures (DFR CS.4 and ECF) and systematic failure of the HR policies and functions of recruitment and retention.

19.1 Terms & Conditions of Service must be improved if the Defence Forces are to retain experienced skill sets while competing with more favourable pay and pensions of other Public Sector and Private sector employers. RACO’s previous submission to the PSPC 1 in November 2016 and submission on Terms of Reference to PSPC 2 (attached) support the Associations claim in this context.

### Question II Summary.

- **Rates of pay and conditions of service for military personnel must be sufficient to enable the DF to recruit and, more importantly, *retain* personnel of the proper quality and experience (Gleeson Commission)**
- **The DF is currently suffering from a *dysfunctional cycle* of turnover. This has far reaching implications and demands immediate retention initiatives. *Military Management should not be deliberately excluded from HR Policy Decisions.*(UL Focus Group Report 2017)**
- **Cost benefit of retention over forced excessive recruitment is indisputable. Management are failing to acknowledge and adequately provide retention initiatives to stem the outflow of trained professionals.**
- **Retention initiatives , pay and non-pay, are not alien concepts to military organisations. The UK Armed Forces are particularly responsive to ensuring fully trained “manning levels” across the services. Most recently the UK Government signed a bill into law to provide for *flexible working time* (10 February 2018).**
- **Loss of trained and qualified officer expertise is increasing risk where it takes a minimum of 2 - 8 years to safely develop. Cost benefit of retention is obvious.**

### Part III – Q1 – Impact of staff shortages on service provision

- 19.2 Service provision continues, but **sustainment** due to the inadequate capacity of numbers remains a significant challenge. The question remains; Service Provision at what cost?
- 19.3 **The Focus Group Report by the University of Limerick** identifies and contextualises the impact of continuing to deliver services with inadequate manning levels:
- Risk in the performance of tasks as a consequence of inadequate experience and workload.
  - Governance is compromised with officer's treble jobbing due to inadequate manning levels.
  - Instance of postings is unfairly high....no continuity and stability for personnel and their families
  - Overburdening of duty rosters, tasking . . . in contravention of the Working Time Directive (WTD).
  - Prolonged periods away from family and community.
  - No ability to reasonably plan annual or monthly operations, training or career development planning.
  - Air Corps flight operations, pilot and ATC manning level restricting flight operations.
  - Reduced capacity to respond to Aid to Civil Power / Authority operations<sup>19</sup>.
  - Collective operational training severely impacted.
  - Increased Stress and Impact on Wellbeing.
  - Mentoring/Supervision severely affected

### Part III – Q2 – Evidence of labour market pressures

- 19.4 Pilots are being headhunted by airlines, where many former Air Corps Officers occupy Post Holder positions as Chief Pilots and in the areas of pilot training. As more pilots leave to the aviation industry there is a multiplier effect, as their peers are encouraged to follow, attracted by the comparatively more attractive terms and conditions.
- 19.5 Ordnance personnel are leaving for better paid similar jobs in advisor roles. They have been shown to be highly sought after by the private sector and many have left to pursue jobs with increased wages, greater work-life balance and a fixed place of work. Examples of companies Ordnance Officers have left the DF to join include: Diageo, Aldi and the ESB. In addition, several officers have taken up permanent roles with the UN.

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<sup>19</sup> Government assigned tasking to the DF include ATCP / ATCA operations. In effect these are operations to carry out to support An Garda Síochána, Local Authorities and other Government Departments.

- 19.6 HR and Operations staff are leaving to perform the HR function in civilian companies with superior conditions of service and greater work life balance.
- 19.7 Engineer Officers are leaving because the economy is improving so there is a greater level of construction.

### Part III – Q3 – Other information relevant to the submission


- 19.8 **Please see Part 3, RACO's Submission in response to the Terms of Reference to PSPC 2 2018. Causal factors and suggested remedies are considered.**

### Reference Documents


- A. RACO Submission to PSPC 1 (November 2016)
- B. RACO Trident Report on New Entrant Superannuation Scheme 2017
- C. Department of Defence Submission to PSPC (November 2016).
- D. Defence Forces Focus Group Report by University of Limerick 2017
- E. Report of the Commission on Remuneration and Conditions of Service in the Defence Forces (Gleeson Commission) 1990.

**Training Timelines and Associated Costs - Exemplar Naval Service**  
**Why Retention Makes Economic and Operational Sense.**

1.0 The position regarding recruitment and retention of specialist officers is found in all streams and services. As an example, this Annex sets out the position regarding the Naval Service, but is equally true in the Air Corps (Pilots, Air Traffic Control, Aeronautical Engineers) and Army (Doctors, Engineers, Ordnance Officers, IT. The Charts below sets out the Establishment v's the strength of Specialists in the DF.



**Engineer Officer**    **Communications Information Systems**    **Ordnance Officer**    **Legal Officer**    **Defence Force School of Music**    **Medical Officer**    **Dental Officer**




## Naval Service Exemplar

2.0 With larger numbers of Naval Service (NS) officers voluntarily departing before the mandatory retirement ages, there has been a corresponding increase in the number of NS cadets enlisted in the last 18 months. Having to train and qualify new inductees results in a 'lag effect' as the time required to qualify newly inducted personnel into their specialist streams means that its will be four and a half years before they can be in a position to take the appropriate command responsibility on board a Naval Vessel. All NS officers are effectively specialist and the cost of training these specialist streams takes between four and a half (NWC) to eight years (MEO) and a cost of €200k to €450K per student respectively.

3.0 As an alternative to the longer cadet school entry method, direct entry (DE) competitions for specialists were also advertised in recent years. This DE method has resulted in only a small number of new entrants;

- 39 x ELO, 40 x MEO & 132 x NWC applications resulted on an intake of
- 0 x ELO, 3 x MEO & 8 x NWC inducted (2 subsequently resigned).



Key **MEO**: Mechanical Engineer Officer. **ELO**: Electrical Officer. **NWC**: Naval Watch Keeper  
**DO**: Dental Officer. **CIS**: Communications and Information Systems. **CE**: Corps of Engineers

## Falling Numbers?

4.0 Why has the two entry methods (Cadet School & Direct Entry) not resulted in increasing overall numbers? Primarily, merchant shipping officers continue to be offered better pay and conditions than in the NS and hence poor take up from qualified personnel. While previously, formerly merchant officers or UK Royal Navy officers may have been interested

in joining the NS. But it is no longer an attractive proposition as current pension schemes and pay rates available to newly commissioned officers are not attractive.

- 5.0 Newly inducted officers no longer have the former pension milestones to retain them. Added to these newly commissioned officers would find themselves without the supplementary pension on mandatory retirement in their mid-fifties from the NS until the point at which they can draw down the state pension. While it is a disincentive to new entries into the NS, it is also a disincentive to post-2013 officers to continue their service once they qualify professionally.
- 6.0 A further erosion of conditions of service which makes the MEO and ELO streams a less attractive proposition is the loss of fixed term promotion for engineers. This presented a degree of certainty for career progression and remuneration for engineers. Its removal is a serious disincentive to joining or staying in the NS. It is a major disincentive to post 2013 officers to continue their service once they qualify professionally.
- 7.0 **Under-Established - Insufficient Crews for the size of the Fleet.**  
The NS is currently undergoing a ship replacement programme and the 2015 White Paper on Defence is committed to increasing the overall number of ships in the fleet. For seven ships the NS had an establishment of 1,144 all ranks in the mid 1990's. The Service currently operates eight ships on an establishment (not strength) of 1,094; this figure was designed to operate seven ships.
- 8.0 Operating eight ships on the current establishment has placed strain on personnel in that the quality of life of these personnel has negatively affected morale and encouraged personnel to leave the Service. For example, each ship is down a Watch-keeping Officer. This has increased the administrative work load of each of the remaining Watch-keepers by 33%. This is now accepted as the norm by higher Command but potentially has put the entire ship, its operations and crew at greater risk. As the Patrol Duty Allowance (PDA) amounts to €21 per day, all personnel feel that this does not adequately compensate them for the extra burden.
- 9.0 While the numbers of junior officers may appear to be non-critical, a significant number of these junior officers are not yet professionally qualified or experienced at sea as they are under training or mentoring and thus unable to take active command responsibility. Responsibility for their training falls on the reduced number of qualified junior officers, thus increasing their workload further. There is no recognition of the numbers of officers in training institutions or under instruction at sea. Establishment figures should not reflect untrained personnel as trained personnel (19 out of 164 officers are in training).
- 10.0 The extra demand placed on officers presents several increased risks;
- Firstly, the prospect of a vessel not embarking on a sailing order due to lack of personnel is very real.
  - Secondly, there is the risk that while at sea, it may not be in a position to carry out its full operational capability due to personnel shortages.

- Finally, and most alarmingly, a vessel on operations with a reduced crew presents increased Health & Safety risks, both physical and mental, to the personnel on board. For these reasons, officers are increasingly attracted to careers outside the NS.

## Conclusions

11.0 As stated both induction and retention of officers is in a poor state due to the erosion of terms and conditions of service. In order to slow initially, halt and eventually reverse the downward spiral in induction and retention, these term and conditions of service need to be addressed. It is recommended that the following suite of measures are put in place:

- **Patrol Duty Allowance (PDA)** is increased in order to adequately compensate sea going personnel for the increasing work load and reduced quality of life.
- **Military Service Allowance (MSA)** is increased in order to go towards providing all NS personnel with an adequate salary.
- **Fixed Term Promotion** is reintroduced for ELO and MEO streams to incentivise the induction, in the first instance, and subsequent retention of NS engineers.
- **Create an “in training” category** in order to allow the NS to operate at full establishment.

### Naval Service – Establishment vs. Strength

Rank	Est	Str
COMMODORE	1	1
CAPT (NS)	2	2
CDR (NWC)	9	9
CDR (ME)	2	2
CDR (E)	1	1
CDR (NWC\ME\E) (CISO)	1	1
LT CDR (NWC)	33	33
LT CDR (ME)	7	6
LT CDR (E)	2	8
LT CDR (LO)	1	0
LT CDR (NWC\ME\E) (NCC)	1	1
LT CDR (MO)	1	1
LT (NWC)	49	39
LT (ME)	19	13
LT (E)	7	0
LT (NWC\ME\E) (NCC)	2	0
LT (CE) (Comdt)	2	1
LT (MO)	1	0
LT (DO)	1	0
S/LT (NWC)	19	21
S/LT (ME)	2	2
S/LT (E)	1	0
<b>TOTAL TRAINED OFFICERS</b>	<b>164</b>	<b>141</b>
S/LT (OUT NWC)	17	10
S/LT (OUT ME)	2	5
ENS (OUT NWC)		4
ENS (OUT ME)		2
<b>TOTAL OFFICERS UNDER TRAINING</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>21</b>
<b>TOTAL OFFICERS</b>	<b>183</b>	<b>162</b>



**RACO SUBMISSION  
TO THE  
PUBLIC SERVICE  
PAY COMMISSION 2**

**Part III - Response to Terms of Reference**

**15 FEBRUARY 2018**



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## 1.0 Executive Summary

- 1.1 The continual organisation downsizing combined with the diminution in service conditions in the Defence Forces has placed the organisation at a point of crisis with respect to its trained “manning levels”.
- 1.2 A key turning point resulting in this situation was the reorganisation of the Defence Forces in 2012. The loss of a brigade from the organisational structure (which included the loss of numerous barracks and integral units) and the consequential loss of officer and personnel numbers has resulted in the inadequate “manning levels” with significant consequential implications. Troops continue to be tasked from regional units to perform routine security duties in Dublin Barracks while the broader impact on those who serve is forcing an exodus and a rate at which the Defence Forces is unable to sustain. The exodus of trained professionals is directly impacting on “trained” manning levels across all services of the Defence Forces. *Trained manning levels which are inextricably linked to safe operational capability.*
- 1.3 Coupled with the anomalies in the organisational structure, the removal of fit for purpose and proven military HR policies has fuelled the continued exodus of highly qualified and experienced staff. Experience that can take 2-8 years at considerable expense to develop. The high rate of officers exiting the Defence Forces, in advance of mandatory retirement ages, is likely to continue where Defence Management act in contradiction of strategic policy while failing to provide viable solutions to the current issues. In what is a most concerning development, the potential to serve a career in the Defence Forces is no longer financially viable. This is particularly true where other employment Sectors (Private and Public) are offering more favourable terms and conditions of employment supported by higher rates of total remuneration (pay, compensatory allowance and pension). The Defence Forces is currently failing to address these core concerns and, as a result, is incapable of retaining personnel in sufficient numbers across the officer ranks of the Army, Air Corps and Naval Service. The Defence Forces is now a “stop gap” or “stepping stone” to more favourable long-term employment in other sectors.
- 1.4 Where Defence Management and other stakeholders have acknowledged the significant recruitment and retention issues across the ranks of the Defence Forces, no initiative has yet been introduced in an effort to address the outflow. Quick and long term initiatives are now required to address the systematic failures of current recruitment and retention functions of the DF HR model. Where Part II of RACO’s submission identified the issues supported by stakeholder data, observations and commentary, Part III will identify the causes while making recommendations on how to address these issues.
- 1.5 Stemming the current outflow is essential in order to effectively mitigate the increasing risks, to maintain operational effectiveness and to provide a work environment that is conducive to the health and wellbeing of all Defence Forces personnel. The issues discussed in this submission should be read in conjunction with RACO’s initial submission to the PSPC 1 in November 2016.

1.6 **The Gleeson Report made the following key comments which should inform interested parties on potential solutions;**

*“...one factor which must be taken into account is the need to arrive at rates of pay which are sufficient to enable the Defence Forces to recruit and retain personnel of the proper quality.”*

*“...to ignore identifiable problems of recruitment would be to run the risk that the Defence Forces would be unable to secure the services of sufficient numbers of suitable personnel. To ignore clear evidence of difficulties would lead to out-flow of skilled personnel. In either event, the capacity of the Defence Forces to carry out the tasks assigned to them could be undermined and the problems would take many years to remedy.”*

1.7 This section (Part III) of RACO’s submission will, consistent with our previous submission in November 2016, identify the causes while making recommendations on how to address these.

**“Addressing the current inadequacies of military service conditions is essential.”**

## 2.0 Summary of Causal Factors

2.1 The continued excessive increase in professional demands compounded by long term diminution in service conditions has, without question, led to the continued exodus of trained professionals since 2012. In support of Part 1 and Part 2 of this submission, RACO identifies the causal factors as follows;

2.1.1 **Organisational Structure-** the inadequate capacity of trained “manning level” numbers across all services of the Defence Forces is compromising operational output while increasing *risk* and negatively impacting on the *wellbeing* of those who serve.

### 2.1.2 Terms & Conditions of Service

I. **Transfers/Postings/Movements- Personal & Financial Wellbeing:** The current structures and inadequate manning levels are causing the “dysfunctional turnover<sup>20</sup>” of staff. Staff are being forced to relocate and take over multiple staff appointments at a rate and incidence which is compromising professional standards, causing personal well-being issues and placing an unfair financial burden on officers as a consequence of the organisation’s inadequate manning levels. (*University of Limerick Focus Group Report 2017*).

II. **Superannuation Benefits – New Entrants Post 2013:** Where the Single Pension Scheme Act 2012 reduced Public Sector Final Superannuation Benefits, the impact on the Defence Forces New Entrants is a failure to provide a *life sustaining* final benefit on forced retirement at ages in advance of the State Pension Contributory. In contradiction, this Defence Force scheme demands a higher contribution from Defence Force Officers relative to equivalent grade Public Servants.

III. **Fixed Period Promotion- Specialist Streams:** Unlike standard Public Service staff grades and retirement ages, military rank is directly linked to mandatory retirement ages<sup>21</sup> that are significantly lower than Public Servants (68 going to 70). Specialist streams where career advancement is prohibited by rank numbers results in forced retirement at Captain or Commandant. Where specialist officers do not have a career expectation and timeline to at least 58 (rank of Commandant), financial demands will undoubtedly force an exit with a consequential loss of corporate expertise from the Defence Forces. Where the Fixed Period Promotion model of career advancement proved a most cost-effective practise, this proven HR model was removed in 2013 resulting in an increase in early exits from the specialist streams.

2.1.3 **Remuneration-** more favourable remuneration (pay, compensatory allowances and pension benefits) and greater stability in work life balance is strongly influencing the continued exodus from the Defence Forces into other Private and Public-Sector Employment. (*University of Limerick Focus Group Report 2017*).

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<sup>20</sup> Research has identified dysfunctional turnover as: a situation where a valued employee quits and takes with them their experience and corporate knowledge. From an organisational perspective participants also expressed fears for the capability of the units and the safety of personnel if the situation continues.

<sup>21</sup> Retirement Age of PRSI Class A Commandant is 58 years of age.

- 2.1.4 **The following sections will further expand on these key organisational issues. Please also see RACO's observations in our initial submission to the PSC 1 in November 2016.**

### **3.0 Organisational Structure**

#### **3.1 Background**

Section 3 & 4 of RACO's submission to PSC 1 (November 2016) provides context to the Defence Forces Organisational structures.

- 3.1.1 Within the current structure in the Defence Forces, as defined by Defence Force Regulation (DFR) CS4 and the Employment Control framework (ECF) 2009, there is inadequate capacity of *trained manning levels* across all services. This "manning level" crisis is compromising effective and efficient operational output. This situation is prompting an increased exposure to *risk* at all levels and directly impacts on the *wellbeing* of those who serve in *Óglaigh na hÉireann* (Focus Group Report 2017).
- 3.1.2 The 2012 organisational structure (DFR CS4) must be adjusted as it failed to take account of the actual whole time appointments requirement throughout the organisation's various Services. The organisational framework must retain the "capacity" to allow for operational outputs of the Defence Forces in what is a dynamic working environment. Training timelines and competency development across the spectrum of military skill sets has to be factored in all HR policy frameworks and recognised as an essential component in addressing *fit for purpose* HR policies. Defence Force HR policy will need to be *responsive* to exit trends where currently, experienced staff are *not* being replaced in a timely and cost effective manner.

#### **3.2 Structural Framework (DFR CS4/ECF).**

- 3.2.1 The Permanent Defence Force includes the Army, Air Corps and Naval Service. It is a standing force and provides the primary capabilities for joint multi-service military operations at home and combined multi-national military peace support operations and humanitarian missions abroad.
- 3.2.2 The organisational structure is dictated by the framework specified in Defence Force Regulation CS4 (DFR CS4), within the confines of the Employment Control Framework (ECF) introduced in 2009. Section 4 of RACO's submission to PSC 1 describes the Defence Forces structure in detail.
- 3.2.3 This submission to the PSC 2 will identify the ongoing organisational structural anomalies as a consequence of the continual infrastructural reform and downsizing of personnel numbers, in addition to the flawed reorganisation of the Defence Force in 2012.

## *“One step over the cliff”*

### **3.3 Continual Infrastructural Reform and Reduction of Manning Levels.**

- 3.3.1 There has been a continual downsizing and restructuring of the Defence Forces since the 1990’s. In summary, the Forces stood at 11,500 in 1995 prior to the implementation of a reform programme. That was followed by the White Paper on Defence (2000) which reduced the permitted strength to 10,500, with an additional provision for *250 personnel “in training”*. Since 2006, the Defence Forces has undergone even further extensive reorganisation beyond what was envisaged in the White Paper on Defence (2000). The overall establishment has been reduced even further from 10,500 to 9,500 and this has included a 9.52% reduction in the strength of the officer corps (a total of 114 appointments). Furthermore, the provision for 250 personnel in training was also removed, compounding the consequential issues on a daily basis.
- 3.3.2 It is noteworthy that the White Paper (2000) had identified and authorised this “addition to the establishment” of up to 250 personnel “in training”. A provision for a training establishment of personnel was not unique to *Óglaigh na hÉireann*, but rather is a recognised norm in military organisations. *This requirement stems from the need to train and develop military skills from within and sets military organisations apart from other employers in that regard.* This is in part due to the high risk nature of military forces, hence skills gaps cannot be easily filled from external sources. *Timelines for training military professionals are extensive and associated costs are significant.*
- 3.3.3 The authority for the Defence Forces to hold a “training establishment” was withdrawn by Government in 2003 as part of efforts to reduce overall Public Service numbers. This decision imposed further constraints on the Defence Forces. Maintaining the manning levels has proven unmanageable as a result. Considering there can be up to 600 personnel in full time training at any one time, the “trained manning level” of the Forces is now operating substantially below the designed trained strength of 9,500. The current strength is 9,173 which includes 472<sup>22</sup> in full time training. This leaves 8,701 available for duty. When overseas commitments are taken into account, the organisation’s operational capability falls closer to 8,000 trained personnel. The organisational structure and establishment figures are now compromising the effective operational capability of the Defence Forces. The current retention crisis further complicates this issue as the internal training requirements are increasing year on year. It is concerning that officer cadet intake has increased fourfold from 2015 to 2018 in a struggle to maintain overall strength in officer numbers.
- 3.3.4 Interestingly, the UK Armed Forces refer to “trained strength” only when discussing and referencing manning level data. Those in training are not referenced to demonstrate “strength”. This is a prudent approach and is in direct contrast to the policy applied to the Defence Forces currently.
- 3.3.5 The continual downsizing of personnel and radical restructuring of units and barracks have had a very significant impact on both the Defence Forces and those who serve. As stated, the reorganisation in 2012 saw the loss of 1 Army Brigade (out of 3) and the removal of 114 officer appointments from the overall strength of the Forces. This has had a lasting effect.

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<sup>22</sup> Recruits=143, Cadets=137, Pilots=20, 172=Corps Career Courses

The Climate Survey (2016) and Focus Group Report (2017) by the University of Limerick qualifies and quantifies this fact. A considered reflection on recruitment and retention trends would reinforce the extent of the current manning crisis and the growing challenge of maintaining expertise across all streams (but particularly so in the specialist streams - PSPC Report 2017).

3.3.6 The Defence Forces has invested heavily (time & cost) in developing the skills of its personnel and, as such, needs to retain essential experience in sufficient numbers to avoid the current “dysfunctional turnover” and exodus of trained professionals.

### 3.4 Noted Deficiencies in the Current Framework.

3.4.1 The day-to-day manning levels in operational units are significantly impeded by the failure to account for officers serving in overseas appointments, availing of a form of unpaid leave, attending specialist courses of long term nature, or on secondment. These appointments cannot be filled for the duration and as a result there are numerous and continuous vacancies throughout the organisation.


3.4.2 The current organisational establishment, as set out in Defence Force Regulation CS4 and the Employment Control Framework (2009), fails to provide for the following appointments:

**Figure 3.1: List of Officers on Postings and Courses**

	Posting/Course	Commitment
a.	Lieutenants posted overseas	21
b.	Captains posted overseas	35
c.	Officers posted to EU Battlegroup	2019 due
d.	Officers completing Junior Command & Staff Courses	30 (Captain)
e.	Officers completing Senior Command Operations Courses	8 (Lieutenant NS) Oct'18
f.	Officers completing Senior Command & Staff Courses	20 (Commandant)
g.	Officers on Secondment & SLWPA	26
h.	Officers on Leave of Absence/Unpaid Leave	3
i.	Naval Service and Air Corps Officers posted overseas	6
j.	Maternity Leave	3
	<b>Total ECF &amp; DFR CS4 unaccounted whole time appointments</b>	<b>144</b>

➤ **Overseas Establishment.** Junior officers (Second Lieutenant, Lieutenant, Captain) on overseas duty are not provided for in the DFR CS4/ECF. In effect, this means that there are currently 21 appointments vacant in the units that the officers deployed from. This figure will increase to 28 upon the forthcoming augmentation of the UNIFIL (Lebanon) deployment in November 2018.

- **Full Time Training Requirements.** Similarly, students on Junior Command and Staff and Senior Command and Staff Courses have not been provided for. Once again, there is no allocation in the DFR CS4 structure to take account of the officers undertaking these courses, lasting 6.5 months and 10.5 months in duration respectively. As a result, the home unit will continue to carry those officers on their overall strength for the duration.
- **SLWPA: Special Leave without Pay & Allowances:** There are currently 26 officers on SLWPA for a period of one (1) year or longer. In contrast to other sectors, the Defence Forces is not authorised to promote or induct against these figures and they are carried on the overall strength. Once again, this belies the unit strength figures.
- **Secondment.** There are currently three (3) officers on long-term secondment both on and off island. Again, the Defence Forces is not authorised to promote or induct against these figures and they are carried on the overall strength of the organisation.



\* This DF Establishment figure of 1233 does not account for 144 whole time appointments in which officers are posted.

**Fig 3.2. Flawed ECF & DFR CS4**

3.4.3 In January 2018, the effective day-to-day on island operational strength of officer will be 877. This will result in **237** 'real' vacancies within the Defence Forces for considerable periods into the future. **93** are current vacant appointments and **144** is the number of unaccounted appointments in which officers are serving on a fulltime basis. The majority of these vacancies will affect the ranks of Captain/Lieutenant (NS) and Commandant/ Lieutenant Commander.

3.4.4 **These officer numbers, where either vacant or where these appointments are not included in the organisational structure, are essentially removed from operational units leaving long term gaps on an ongoing basis. The organisational structure, as outlined in DFR CS4 and the ECF, needs to be addressed as it is clearly flawed.**

## 4.0 Consequences of the Current Structural Framework

### 4.1 Insufficient Human Resource Planning & Manning.

4.1.1 According to the White Paper on Defence (2015), “the recruitment, training and development, and retention of suitable military personnel are essential factors in developing the military capabilities required in order to discharge the roles assigned by Government”. While this document is clear and prescriptive on the recruitment policy, there is no clearly defined vision for the retention requirements of the Defence Forces. With the Defence Forces continuing to lose corporate knowledge at an alarming rate, through the exodus of its middle managers, this absence of a clear retention strategy becomes apparent.

4.1.2 Retention must be addressed in the short term, be it through improvement of the terms and conditions of service or through adequate allowances commensurate to professional military competencies. The Defence Forces cannot continue to replace highly skilled leaders with inductees, while maintaining the required operational capabilities and effectiveness.

4.1.3 International best practice in military organisations is to support the “military family” through a range of support provisions, which include suitable accommodation at the location of a new posting and efficient administration of travel and meal costs for those forced to be separated from their families and partners for protracted periods. The continued failure to identify and adequately provide support policies to reduce the additional hardships of the Defence Forces personnel contradicts the proffered theme that “our people are our greatest asset”. In contrast, the support provisions available are outdated or absent entirely.

### 4.2 Multiple Appointments “in addition”.

4.2.1 Officers are currently tasked to operate on a multi-role basis. The current number of vacancies across all dimensions of the organisation has seen an obvious increase in the burden of responsibility on officers as commanders. With this trend due to continue to rise based on current trends, the frequency of officers holding multiple appointments will continue to intensify.

4.2.2 As stated, the current organisational structure fails to provide for the large number of officers that are serving overseas, at sea or engaged on full-time career courses. Therefore, the resultant appointment gaps cannot be filled for the duration of the absence. As a result, the officers that remain in the units, particularly junior officers, must routinely operate in a multi-appointment situation. This means that while they nominally have one appointment/post, they are required to also fulfil the functions of other appointment holders, often involving significant additional command responsibilities or additional accounts, resulting in associated additional stress. This is coupled with the fact that there has been a significant drive from within the organisation to prevent junior ranks taking up these responsibilities in order to minimise the cost of acting up or substitution allowance.

4.2.3 The implications of these issues were evident in the DF Climate Survey, conducted by the University of Limerick, where officers felt that they were being put in the impossible

position of having to do the work of many. This has resulted in very significant implications on the internal management of risk, governance (administrative and operational) and wellbeing (personal and professional).

#### 4.3 **Risk Management.**

4.3.1 Military operations and training exercises at home, whether on land, at sea, or in the air, by their very nature involve a high degree of risk to the personal safety of Defence Forces personnel. Officers are charged with the planning, control and exercise of all of these potentially hazardous activities. Furthermore, the officers, in their capacity as commanders, will carry out the command function throughout the operation, remaining actively involved throughout.

4.3.2 The risk of death or injury is most pronounced in the course of military operations, particularly in a conflict situation. Increasingly overseas peace support missions undertaken by the Defence Forces have involved 'Peace Enforcement' roles on foot of a stronger UN Mandate, rather than the more traditional 'Peacekeeping' mission. While all overseas missions carry a significant risk, peace enforcement missions are, by definition, more robust and dangerous. 85 members of the Defence Forces have died on overseas service since Ireland first undertook peacekeeping duties in 1958. Two of these fatalities have sadly occurred since 2001.

4.3.3 The daily tasking's of Defence Forces personnel require the use of weapons and often activities of an extreme physical nature. In addition, specialist training activities that are inherently risky include, flying, naval boarding operations, parachuting, Special Forces (Army Ranger Wing) training and Live Fire Tactical Training (LFTT).

*"LFTT is as close to combat as any soldier will get, involving all the chaos of a live fire while aiming to create a safe environment for troops to learn."*

(www.military.ie, 2016)

4.3.4 An appreciation of the risks in the military environment is essential in order to convey the extreme consequences associated with the increased risks that officers are currently managing in the Defence Forces. These risks are further compounded by the increased levels of training throughout the organisation, and particularly where the "experience pool" is continually being depleted.

#### 4.4 **Comments/Recommendations.**

4.4.1 Addressing these structural anomalies and manning level figures will strengthen unit operational effectiveness while improving the work life balance and personal wellbeing of staff. Capacity and flexibility are essential to supporting a dynamic workforce where continual professional development, skills training and operational deployment is mandatory, often in high-risk and isolated environments. Effective retention measures must be implemented as a priority and in the short-term if the Defence Forces are to stem the current rate of exodus from the officer ranks.

4.4.2 In addition, the failure to review the implications of the 2012 Defence Force Reorganisation is an ongoing failure of management policy. The continued reluctance to recognise full time

essential appointments, such as those identified by RACO and Military Management, will indisputably continue to amplify the ongoing dysfunction of manning levels, across all ranks and grades. The organisational structure must be fit for purpose in line with the operational requirement as stated by Government in the White Paper on Defence (2015).

## **5.0 Diminution of Terms and Conditions of Service**

### **5.1 Background.**

5.1.1 The continued diminution of terms and conditions of service of currently serving officers, and particularly new entrant cadets, will see the continued early exit of officer cohorts from the Defence Forces. Failure of the Defence Forces to offer a viable financial future equivalent to that of other Public Sector and private sector employees is forcing individuals to reconsider any potential long-term commitment to a military career.

5.1.2 The decision factors for officers are consistent with any form of professional engagement. These include remuneration, career advancement, professional development, family stability and retirement benefits.

5.1.3 RACO's submission to PSPC 1 and the Focus Group Report by the University of Limerick in 2017 provide clear context to the alarming levels of discontent with the conditions of service across all ranks and grades.

### **5.2 The Nature of Service in the Defence Force.**

5.2.1 In examining military service, it is imperative to reflect both on the employment status of military personnel and also on the terms and conditions of that service. It is important to state that the prevailing service conditions applied in the past proved successful in retaining qualified and experienced personnel. The removal of these proven HR policies by the Department of Defence has resulted in the short, medium and expected long-term retention failures.

5.2.2 Normal Public Service employment conditions do not apply to those in the Defence Forces. Serving Defence Forces personnel forfeit "normal employee status" while remaining subject to the following conditions of service at all times:

- Subject to military law at all times;
- The provisions of EU Working Time Directive do not apply to the Defence Forces;
- Duty Obligation 24/7/365 – both at home and overseas;
- Posting "by order" anywhere/anytime/for any duration;
- Subject to mandatory early retirement (at 54 for captain and 56/58 for commandant);
- Subject to annual (military standard) medical and fitness testing;
- Membership of a Trade Union is "prohibited";
- ...by extension Affiliation to ICTU is "prohibited";
- Industrial Action is "prohibited";
- Any form of protest on pay or conditions is "prohibited".

5.2.3 Defence Management's obligation to military personnel, in recognition of these service

restrictions and IR limitations, should be to advocate on behalf of Defence Forces personnel. What our Members see is an ongoing failure on the part of the Department of Defence to protect our weakened employee status, and in doing so ensure that the Defence Forces are not disadvantaged, relative to other Public Service employees, in the industrial relations arena (particularly concerning pay and conditions).

- 5.2.4 In stark contrast to the Irish Government's approach, the UK Government have acknowledged the fact that their Armed Forces forgo normal employee rights. The UK Government commit to what is termed a "Military Covenant", ensuring that service personnel and their families are not disadvantaged. They have confirmed that commitment by providing for these espoused values in national legislation. The principle is that:

*"In putting the needs of the Nation, the Army and others before their own, they forgo some of the rights enjoyed by those outside the Armed Forces. So, at the very least, British soldiers should always expect the Nation and their commanders to treat them fairly, to value and respect them as individuals, and to sustain and reward them and their families."*

(Ministry of Defence and UK Veterans)

- 5.2.5 What our members witness, as Defence Force employees, is a 2<sup>nd</sup> division industrial relations status and an employer who takes advantage of our weakened "employee status". The 2015 Lansdowne Road Agreement and 2017 Lansdowne Road Agreement negotiations saw the publication of a range and quantum of *side deals* made between Government Department of Public Expenditure and Reform (DPER) and unions affiliated to ICTU. These deals, in addition to a range of deals secured by those unions/associations who either took industrial action, threatened industrial action or whose sectoral management negotiated added benefits to accept the Lansdowne Road Agreement, has unquestionably secured greater pay advantages relative to those serving and represented by the Defence Forces Representative Associations. ***The continued loyalty of those who serve Óglaigh na hÉireann has been seen to result in nothing more than a litany of empty soundbites and platitudes.***

### 5.3 Transfers/Postings/Movements.

- 5.3.1 Due to the exigencies of military service, officers are compelled "by order" to relocate nationally and internationally to fill organisational appointments. This requirement of military service, unlike the norm in the Public Service, is not restricted to 45 kms and has no defined duration or frequency. Postings invariably require the officer to move away from where his/her family home is based in order to take up a new appointment.
- 5.3.2 Officers can generally expect to be posted to a variety of appointments in different locations over the course of a career. The instances of movements are now increasing to a point where it is unmanageable. This is evidenced by the present retention issues. The HR policy in this regard is inadequate and the increase in frequency is proportionate to the reduction in personnel capacity. Currently the average number of postings is 8.82 times over a 5-year period. This movement rate places considerable demands not only on individual officers but also their families. The additional financial burden on the officer, the cost implication for his/her family, coupled with the personal impact of long term

separation from family on personal wellbeing, are now major factors of the alarmingly high rate of early exits from the Forces.

5.3.3 The inadequacy of the organisational structure to reflect the actual full-time number of appointments and operational duties (as discussed in Section 3.3) has placed an unmanageable workload on the officer body, particularly those holding middle and senior management responsibility. An unplanned and ad hoc policy is insufficient to deal with this high frequency of movement (the rates of which are intensified by inadequate manning capacity, again exacerbated by the 2012 reorganisation).

5.4 **Comments/Recommendations.**

5.4.1 The failure to review the obvious and negative consequences of the Defence Forces reorganisation in 2012 is compromising efficient and cost effective operational output. The continued failure to recognise whole time organisational appointments, as continually identified by both RACO and Military Management, will continue to exacerbate the ongoing dysfunction of manning levels across all ranks unless remedied.

5.4.2 Addressing the organisational structure will also assist in addressing the staffing level issues at unit level. Effective unit strength will, without question, reinforce unit operational effectiveness and mitigate the serious risk concerns of Unit Commanders, while improving the work life balance and personal wellbeing of all ranks.

5.4.3 A review of Military Service Allowance (MSA) and Change of Station Allowance (COSA) is essential to address the unique demands associated with military service. RACO's previous submission to the PSPC 1 included a case to review and increase allowances to compensate for the amplified relocation requirement of officers in this context.

5.4.4 The current MSA and COSA policies are no longer sufficient to provide for the harsh demands of the modern military lifestyle. MSA and COSA no longer meet the actual and personal implications of service and should be adjusted accordingly. Addressing these issues would assist in efforts to address the retention challenges of qualified and experienced personnel where compensation is more favourable in other Private and Public Sector organisations.

## 6.0 Inadequate Superannuation Benefits

### 6.1 Background.

6.1.1 RACO's initial submission to the PSC 1 and additional actuarial reports (from Trident Consulting, 2016) on superannuation clearly identified both the reduced benefit of Defence Forces pre-2013 schemes and, in addition, the flawed nature of new entrant (post 01 Jan 2013) Superannuation Schemes relative to equivalent grade Public Servants.

### 6.2 Trident Report on Defence Forces Superannuation Schemes.

6.2.1 The historic structure of Public Sector pensions was and continues to be in the case of pre-2013 public servants, a key component of overall remuneration. However, the value of participation in the Single Scheme provides a significantly lower proportion of overall benefit.

6.2.2 When Defence Forces officers are compared to equivalent grade public servants, it is noted that:

- Career pay is lower;
- Career total remuneration (pay plus pension) is lower;
- The projected final benefit deficit is significant.

6.2.3 It remains the policy of Government that members of the security services are forced to retire earlier than other public servants. However, the extent of career pay and the value of the associated pensions for these cohorts has not been appropriately taken into account in this regard.

6.2.4 The accelerated accrual under the pre-2013 final salary scheme achieves the objective of enabling Defence Force officers, in accordance with Government's mandatory retirement policy, to retire without financial penalty or disadvantage relative to equivalent grade Public Servants.

6.2.5 However, for post-2013 single pension scheme officers, the accelerated accrual arrangements have been diluted by the career average earnings model and do not provide what could be regarded as a viable retirement income. It is indisputable that the retirement benefit for post-2013 entrants from mandatory retirement age (58 or 60) up until the age of payment of the State Pension Contributory (68/70) will not amount to a sustainable income. This is despite the fact that this cohort is obliged to pay higher contributions (when compared to standard accrual public servants).

6.2.6 The total value of remuneration (i.e. pay *plus* pension *less* pension contributions) for an officer with accelerated accrual is significantly less than other public servants (as highlighted in figure 6.1 below). This arises where officers are forced to retire at the age of 58/60, as compared to the equivalent public servants who are permitted to remain in employment until 68. Furthermore, the net effect of this anomaly will be further compounded when the retirement is extended out to 70.

**Figure 6.1: Comparison of Standard and Fast Accrual Schemes**

Pre-2013 Officer Entrant		Post -2013 Officer Entrant (Single Scheme)	
Excl. supplementary pension	Incl. supplementary pension	Excl. supplementary pension	Incl. supplementary pension
<b>13% LESS</b>	<b>10% LESS</b>	<b>19% LESS</b>	<b>15% LESS</b>

6.2.7 As demonstrated, the relative value of the pension arrangements for officers was diluted with the introduction of the Single Scheme (i.e. the career average earning model) relative to the historic practice of equivalence with similar grades in the Public Service. The failure to provide for the integrated element of the SPC has essentially resulted in a superannuation benefit that is *unfit for purpose and in contradiction of its original design*. This situation is clearly flawed and discriminatory.

### 6.3 Single Pension Scheme - Post 01 January 2013 Entrants.

6.3.1 As stated, the Single Pension Scheme fails to adequately sustain Single Scheme officers to a viable or life sustaining standard on retirement. This is despite the reality that mandatory early retirement for Defence Forces personnel is a condition of service, enforced by Government Policy (and has been previously acknowledged as such by the Public Service Pay Commission in their report 2017).

6.3.2 The Defence Forces has an existing arrangement, for officers that were commissioned prior to 2013, for the payment of a “supplementary pension”, in recognition of the unique demands of forced early retirement, in advance of the payment of the State Pension (Contributory). This scheme, provided for under the Defence Forces Conciliation and Arbitration Scheme in 2009, is known as Conciliation Council Resolution (CCR) 421. *CCR 421 includes the Department of Defence’s acknowledgement that this compulsory early retirement regime sets the military profession apart from occupations in other areas of the Public Service.*

6.3.3 The Department of Defence failed to inform the parties to the Single Pension Scheme negotiations (RACO & PDFORRA) of their intent to deny the payment of the Supplementary Pension arrangement in accordance with the current agreement (CCR421). The failure to disclose these material facts at the time of the negotiations can only signal the intent by the Department of Defence to undermine the equivalent benefit and viability of Defence Forces superannuation schemes relative to equivalent integrated superannuation schemes for grades of public servant.

6.3.4 In contrast to how the Defence Sector is addressing this anomaly for post-2013 entrants, Government recently approved the increase in mandatory retirement ages (65-68/70) for other Public Servants in order to provide a solution to the similar scenario impacting on those public servants originally due retirement at 65.

6.3.5 The Minister for Defence position, established by RACO in February 2017, is that the 2012 Single Pension Scheme Act (Section 7) does not provide for pre-existing superannuation arrangements and therefore the terms of Annex C to CCR 421 no longer apply to new

entrants after 01 January 2013.

6.3.6 The implication of this position is that these officers, mandatorily retired at 58 or 60, will have a final benefit pension less the value of the State Pension Contributory (SPC). New entrant officers will therefore be at a loss to the value of the SPC (currently €12,390) until they reach the age at which the SPC becomes payable (68 in 2028 and extending outwards). This is despite the fact that Defence Force officers pay *higher contributions* (by means of the Additional Superannuation Contribution) than that paid by standard accrual public servants.

**Figure 6.2: Comparison of Single Scheme Standard vs. Fast Accrual Income**





Figure 6.3: Monthly Income Comparison




6.3.7 It follows that the published terms and conditions of officer cadetships since 2013 are a misrepresentation of the actual benefits afforded by the Single Pension Scheme. The Department of Defence, as the trustees of the Defence Forces Superannuation Scheme, has failed to fully disclose the material facts during the Single Pension Scheme Act 2012 negotiations and since. This includes the details on the denial of a “supplementary pension” to those who are forced to retire in advance of the State Pension Contributory payment. **This situation, if allowed to continue without rectification, will undoubtedly guide officers towards seeking improved conditions of employment elsewhere.**

#### 6.4 Summary of New Entrant Superannuation Anomaly.

6.4.1 Superannuation arrangements for new entrant officers, inducted since 01 January 2013, are unfit for purpose. The final benefits fail to provide a sustainable living income until the age of payment of the State Pension Contributory (potentially a 10-year gap). Government and DPER have clearly acknowledged an anomaly exists with respect to mandatory retirement at ages in advance of the State Pension Contributory.

6.4.2 The Minister for Finance and Public Expenditure and Reform, Paschal Donohoe T.D. (5<sup>th</sup> December 2017), secured Government approval for an increase in the compulsory retirement age from 65 to 70 for public servants recruited before 1st April 2004 to provide for an analogous anomaly for other Public Servants. In announcing the decision, Minister Donohoe pointed to ***the difficulties being experienced by this group of public servants who are obliged to retire at age 65 but are not eligible for the State Pension (Contributory) until their 66<sup>th</sup> birthday.***

**Figure 6.4: Income as % of Pay: DF vs. Other Public Service**



- 6.4.3 Minister Donohoe also highlighted that “some people want to continue to work beyond the age of 65 because they are fit and healthy and feel they have more to contribute. By extending the compulsory retirement age to 70, I am addressing both of these issues, while at the same time bringing the compulsory retirement age of this group into line with that of new recruits since January 2013 who are members of the Single Pension Scheme”. However, the Minister went on to state that the “uniformed pension fast accrual group (Gardaí, Permanent Defence Forces, Firefighters and Prison Officers), who are currently required to retire early due to the nature of their work, will not be covered by the new arrangements”.
- 6.4.4 RACO Members note DPER’s position as a contradiction and discrimination against those who commit to military service. Where Government are acknowledging the “difficulties being experienced by this group of public servants who are obliged to retire at age 65 but are not eligible for the State Pension (Contributory)” on one hand, how can Government and the Minister for Defence fail to acknowledge the significantly greater anomaly for those forced to retire as early as 54/58/60 in the Defence Forces?
- 6.4.5 Where Government saw it appropriate to introduce measures to provide for other public servants, the Department of Defence has yet to engage in any credible initiative to address the flawed Defence Forces Superannuation Scheme for new entrant officers. *This anomaly will, without question, influence the continued exodus of officers who are disproportionately disadvantaged relative to other Public Sector employees.*

## 6.5 **Comments/Recommendations.**

6.5.1 RACO's initial submission to the PSPC 1 and additional Actuary Reports (Trident Consulting) on the Defence Forces superannuation benefits clearly identify both the reduced benefit of Pre-2013 Defence Forces Schemes and, in addition, the flawed nature of New Entrant (post 01 Jan 2013) Superannuation Schemes relative to equivalent grade public servants.

6.5.2 Trident Consulting clearly demonstrate the total loss to an individual with accelerated accrual, who is forced to retire at age 58, when compared to a person who works to age 68 (please also note figure 5.1 above). The conclusions drawn by Trident Consulting include:

- The relative value of the pension arrangements for Defence Forces officers was significantly diluted as part of the Single Scheme design (relative to the historic practice);
- This reduced value of Defence Force pensions was not identified or commented on by DPER or the PSPC;
- The failure of the Defence Sector to provide for previously agreed arrangements in the form of a supplementary pension (where forced to retire in advance of the State Pension Contributory) is seen as punitive, contradictory and flawed;
- The failure to provide a viable superannuation scheme, where new entrants are paying a higher contribution relative to standard accrual public servants, is contradictory and flawed;
- The material reduction in total career earnings due to forced early retirement must be considered, in order to facilitate a fair comparison across the Public Sector.

6.5.3 RACO Members request that the PSPC support our request in seeking a review by an independent statutory authority of the Defence Forces Superannuation Schemes and the functions and duties of the Trustee Administration.

6.5.4 RACO Members request that the agreed provisions of CCR 421 should extend and apply to new entrant officers recognising the integrated model of superannuation and the mandatory retirement age of those serving in the Defence Forces. This would provide, where an officer qualifies, for the payment of a supplementary pension where officers are forced to retire from the workforce in advance of the payment of the State Pension (Contributory) and ensure that employee contributions and benefits are factored in overall and final benefit.

6.5.5 In determining benefits, RACO Members request that the PSPC factor career earnings in totality (i.e. pay and pension pay), rather than choosing to isolate pension accrual costs solely from the employer's perspective. This is particularly relevant where mandatory early retirement for Defence Forces personnel is underpinned by Government policy and noted by the PSPC in their report (May 2017).

6.5.6 **Fast Accrual Category ASC:** Government introduced a loading on the Fast Accrual Category of ASC since 2018. This, RACO members contend, is a contradiction where;

- Government Policy enforces early mandatory retirement in Defence Forces (PSPC Report May 2017).
- Total superannuation benefits are significantly less than equivalent grade Public Servants where Defence Forces are paying a higher contribution

- Final superannuation benefit is not life sustaining or reflective of employee contributions.

**RACO requests that the PSPC consider the removal of the Fast Accrual additional charge on ASC in recognition of the inferior benefits.**

## **7.0 Fixed Period Promotion - Specialist Streams**

### **7.1 Background.**

- 7.1.1 RACO's submission to the PSPC 1 noted the Association's position on the provision of viable career progression timelines in specialist streams through the recognised and proven mechanism of Fixed Period Promotion (FPP).
- 7.1.2 Promotion in the Defence Forces must not be solely judged relative to the context of grade advancement in the Public Service. The need for rank structure and adequate promotions within the military has two important dimensions. The first dimension establishes and supports the command and functional hierarchy that is the foundation of military service. Rank reflects the command authority vested in the individual while recognising the competencies and associated qualifications dependent on the respective corps, function, etc. involved. The second dimension of rank and promotion, unlike the Public Service, is directly related to service retirement ages with consequential pension implications. The career timeline (and resultant retirement age) of officers in the Defence Forces is determined by rank progression. This is not the norm in the Public Service where the majority of grades can remain in employment out to 65. As previously mentioned, forced retirement ages in the Defence Forces are significantly lower.
- 7.1.3 The military career management process dictates the relationship between rank and retirement age. The mechanism of Fixed Period Promotion is utilised by military organisations as a means of providing a reasonable career period for those who qualify, subject to meeting explicit qualifying criteria. For Special Service Officers (SSOs) of the Defence Forces, the attraction, commitment and retention is secured by the contractual framework (explicit in DFRs, Industrial Relations Agreements and their service T&Cs). The intent of FPP is to provide a reasonable career timeline with retirement ages of 56 or 58 for those at Commandant rank. The direct relationship between retirement age and rank facilitates commitment to career service, attraction and retention of the required calibre of experienced corps specialists, while in addition optimising the return on combined corporate experience of these specialists.
- 7.1.4 In considering replacement policies for SSOs, comparisons must be drawn from the standards/requirements of qualified and experienced specialists in the private sector. This would highlight the significant investment made by the Defence Forces in military training and development of these officers. The replacement costs associated with continual induction, retraining and pension/gratuity (coupled with the loss of corporate knowledge) are significant challenges relative to the benefits provided by the FPP process.
- 7.1.5 FPP to the rank of Commandant is a proven international military model and it optimises the return to the organisation. It also provides the necessary personal and professional career timeline necessary to attract and retain military specialists. It should be noted that the retirement age for SSOs was reduced from 65 to the current age ceiling in 1998.

- 7.1.6 The current FPP procedure requires a Corps Suitability Board to determine if the officer concerned is suitable for promotion based on a number of criteria, including performance on career course professional development, review of annual performance appraisals supported by commanding officer recommendations and ultimately a recommendation by the Chief of Staff. Where the term “fixed” is used, this term is associated with “time” only. The officer must meet the relevant qualifying criteria.
- 7.1.7 It is important to note that FPP requires sufficient flexibility in the organisational structure and ECF to facilitate supernumerary promotions. Supernumerary promotions suppress the lower rank and, as such, the cost is solely the difference between the two rates of pay. This cost is insignificant when weighted against the education and training costs associated with replacement and the deleterious effect on corporate knowledge management within the Defence Forces.
- 7.2 **Cost Benefit Analysis of Fixed Period Promotion (FPP).**
- 7.2.1 **Background.** Currently there are 66 Special Service Officers (SSOs) serving in the Defence Forces. SSOs include officers serving within Ordnance, Engineer, Medical, CIS, Legal, and School of Music specialist streams. The terms and conditions for these officers are captured by Defence Force Regulations (DFRs), industrial relations agreements (CCRs), and in some instances an individual contract personal to the officer. SSOs are promoted from Lieutenant to Captain after 3 years of service in the respective specialist corps, and from Captain to Commandant after a further 9 years (12 years total). Similar to all other officers, they can serve until the age of 56/58 (which is the mandatory retirement age for the rank of Commandant).
- 7.2.2 **Cost Benefit Analysis.** The average cost of promotion from Captain to Commandant is €5k (pre-tax subject to USC, ASC etc.) per individual per annum. This figure does not factor the recruitment costs, induction costs or the investment costs and time burden associated with training new entrants, in what is currently an over-burdened training environment. It is worth noting that the replacement costs are significant. The Ordnance Young Officers Course alone amounts to €200k per student.
- 7.2.3 **Organisational Benefits.** FPP was designed to attract, retain and maintain military capabilities. It is a proven international military model that acknowledges the need to retain expertise and corporate skill sets. In the absence of any other viable model of career strategy for SSOs, the proven FPP model is, without doubt, the optimal solution for the Defence Forces and the individual.
- 7.2.4 **Ineffective Employment Control Framework.** The convergence of personnel from 10,500 to 9,500 failed to embrace the flexibility required to provide FPP for SSOs. Organisational structures must retain the ability to factor capability demands (supported by a responsive HR strategy). FPP was withdrawn for reasons that remain unapparent. The removal of FPP, to facilitate the blind enforcement of a policy and without due consideration of the consequences, was a misguided and cost ineffective measure.

### 7.3 **Comments/Recommendations.**

7.3.1 Fixed Period Promotion offers a viable career profile within the limitations of specialist career streams. The removal of this successful HR model in 2013 had the following impact:

- Rise in serving SSOs voluntary exiting, e.g. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD; bomb disposal);
- Significant rise in cost implications;
- Loss of experience and significant risk implications;
- Impact on operational capability and capacity to sustain operations;
- Loss of career commitment by newly inducted SSOs (as highlighted in the 'Climate Survey' and 'Focus Group' reports by the University of Limerick).

7.3.2 Restoration of this proven military HR model is essential to provide reasonable career progression for specialist streams. Unless there is an immediate reinstatement of FPP, the Defence Forces will see a continued and expanding trend towards exodus in these streams.

## 8.0 **Pay and Compensatory Allowances**

### 8.1 **Background.**

8.1.1 RACO's initial submission to the PSPC 1 and additional Actuary Reports (Trident Consulting) on the Defence Forces superannuation benefits clearly identify and support our claim for consideration by the PSPC.

8.1.2 The previous submission focused on four key pillars, supporting a claim for an increase in pay, in the context of the very significant and additional demands of military service. The submission sought a:

- **Restoration of pay** to the 2008 pay scales (per FEMPI).
- **Claim for an increase in pay** based on the additional demands of service and additional productivity delivered in line with the Towards 2016 Public Service Collective Agreement.
- **Restoration and increase in allowances** in consideration of significant productivity delivered by officers across a number of key competencies.
- **Review of the Defence Forces' organisational structure** – Employment Control Framework.

### 8.2 **The Public Service Stability Agreement 2018-2020.**

8.2.1 The Public Service Stability Agreement provides for further pay restoration with the removal of the FEMPI legislation. This restoration to pre FEMPI pay scales is acknowledged as genuine progress.

8.2.2 However, notwithstanding the terms of the PSSA/LRA 2, there was a clear inconsistency where other sectors secured a significant range and quantum of "side deals", particularly since these deals were established in fora (Labour Court and WRC) parallel to the national pay talks, to which Defence Forces Representative Associations are *denied access*. The IR status of the DF Representative Bodies was clearly taken advantage of in this regard.

Section 4.2 of this submission notes the employee status of Defence Forces members in this context.

8.2.3 It is evident that sectors represented by trade unions, supported by the powerful influence of ICTU, and those unions/associations who either threatened or conducted industrial action secured significant monetary advantage. As a result, Defence Forces personnel are at a disadvantage relative to other sectors with respect to total remuneration. Section 6 of RACO’s submissions (and accompanying Trident Reports) to PSPC 1 refers.

Figure 8.1: Average Public Sector Earnings by Sector





Figure 8.2: Public Sector Average Weekly Earnings by sub-sector



- 8.2.4 In the context of remuneration, it is worth highlighting the significant side deals approved by Government to other sectors. For example, the Labour Court and Government approved a significant settlement to the benefit of an Garda Síochána in late 2016. RACO were excluded from the subsequent Garda Anomaly talks at which the PSC of the ICTU accepted a deal with DPER.
- 8.2.5 The Government subsequently approved an equivalent increase in rent allowance for Firefighters and Prison Officers as part of PSSA talks in June 2017. These awards were approved by deals made between DPER and the respective unions under the auspices of the WRC. RACO are denied access to the WRC.
- 8.2.6 Government has approved particular Health Sector allowance restoration and sanctioned the introduction of additional compensatory allowances. Similarly, Government also approved restoration of particular compensatory allowances for the Education Sector, namely the Specialist Post Allowance.
- 8.2.7 In contrast to how settlements are negotiated and approved by Government for other Sectors of the Public Service, the Department of Defence continues to:
- Deny the restoration of the 10% cut to allowances and Security Duty Rates imposed for the term of the Haddington Road Agreement;
  - Denies allowance restoration claims, equivalent in nature to that approved by Government to other sectors;
  - Failure to address new entrant superannuation anomalies, along similar lines to that provided by DPER to other Public Servants impacted by mandatory retirement (DPER Report on Mandatory Retirement Ages in the Public Service November 2017)

### 8.3 **Military Service Allowance.**

- 8.3.1 Military Service Allowance (MSA) was introduced in 1979 to compensate Defence Forces personnel for the unique conditions and special disadvantages associated with military life. It is paid on a continuous basis to all personnel up to and including the rank of Colonel and is analogous to the UK Armed Forces' 'X' Factor and the Canadian Forces' 'Military' Factor.
- 8.3.2 The current annual rate for officer's ranges from €4,124 to €4,627 (both Class C PRSI contributors) and those for enlisted personnel from €2,061 to €6,039.
- 8.3.3 Both the Gleeson Commission (1990) and the earlier Inter-Departmental Committee on Defence Forces Pay, Allowances and Conditions (The Brady Committee - 1988) concluded that the unique conditions and special disadvantages of military life for which MSA is intended to compensate included the following:
- Liability for duty 24 hours a day, 7 days a week;
  - Long and unsocial hours of duty;
  - Requirement to serve for a fixed term of engagement;
  - Restrictions on personal liberty as a result of the code of military discipline;
  - Early retirement on age grounds;
  - Risk of personal danger and loss of life;
  - Bad and uncomfortable conditions;

- Personal responsibility for use of lethal weapons;
- Disruption of family life as a result of frequent absences from the home.

8.4 However, MSA does not aim to cover the net differences between the non-pay elements of the respective total remuneration packages of military personnel and that of civilian workers. MSA is intended to rather compensate only for the particular disadvantages that are unique to military service, such as those listed above. *The Gleeson Commission stated that, in considering this issue and in determining the appropriate levels of this allowance, it was careful to avoid “double counting” to ensure that Military Service Allowance only reflected those factors not taken into account in arriving at basic, or “regimental”, rates of pay.*

8.5 The cost benefit analysis of MSA must also be considered. The Department of Defence submission on allowances, as part of the Haddington Road review of allowances, highlighted that MSA is paid as "overtime, shift allowance or other such premium payments are not available to members of the Defence Forces" and if these "overtime or shift payments were to be paid it would cost significantly more to implement, which has been the experience of foreign military operations".

*The Taoiseach’s intervention, November 2017, to secure Cabinet approval for an additional supplementary “overtime” budget for the Garda Síochána of €42m is case and point. In contrast, the cost to settle the equivalent rent allowance increase, awarded by Government to other uniformed sectors, would be €4.2m for the Defence Forces.*

## 8.6 **Comments/Recommendations.**

8.6.1 The review of the Defence Forces Conciliation and Arbitration Scheme is due to commence shortly. Any future agreed scheme must take cognisance of the fact that the Representative Bodies of the Defence Forces do not have Trade Union Status. RACO members contend that an equivalent forum must be provided to ensure that Defence Forces personnel are not disadvantaged relative to other Public Sector employees and that their unique “employee status” is factored in any new agreement.

8.6.2 RACO Members request the immediate restoration of the 10% cut to compensatory allowances and cuts to Saturday/Sunday Duty Rates of Pay (implemented during the Haddington Road Agreement).

8.6.3 RACO Members request the restoration and increase to compensatory allowances in recognition of the current demands of military service and cost of living increases. In support of specific pay and compensatory allowance claims, please see the following claims providing context and service details:

- Restoration of 10% cut to allowances and duty pay rates for Saturday/Sunday imposed by Haddington Road (Annex- A);
- Payment of Rent Allowance Increase of €500 equivalent to that approved by Government for Gardaí, Prison Officers and Firefighters (Annex- B);
- Increase in Military Service Allowance (Annex- C);
- Air Corps (Annex- D);
  - Reintroduction of Pilot Service Commitment Scheme (Annex D1);

- AEO (Annex D2);
- CIS (Annex D3);
- Air Traffic Service (Annex D4)
- Naval Service Patrol Duty Allowance Increase (Annex- E);
- Ordnance Duty Allowance Increase (Annex- F);
- Restoration of Specialised Instructor Allowance – Officers (Annex- G);
- Increase in Change of Station Allowance (Annex- H);
- Restoration of Single Force Concept Allowance (Annex- I).

8.6.4 **Commissioned officers forgo many of the employment rights that other private and public sector employees enjoy. Furthermore, they are uniquely subjected to the additional command and service responsibilities of the military environment. The rate of Military Service Allowance payable to members of the Defence Forces should be appropriately adjusted to take account of the increasing demands of a military career.**

## 9.0 Conclusion

9.1 As the first independent body to examine pay and conditions in the Defence Forces, the findings of the Gleeson Commission effectively established the basis and structure of Defence Forces remuneration and conditions. The findings of the Commission have shaped the relevant structures going forward. The Gleeson Report made the following key comments:

*“...one factor which must be taken into account is the need to arrive at rates of pay which are sufficient to enable the Defence Forces to recruit and retain personnel of the proper quality.”*

*“...to ignore identifiable problems of recruitment would be to run the risk that the Defence Forces would be unable to secure the services of sufficient numbers of suitable personnel. To ignore clear evidence of difficulties would lead to out-flow of skilled personnel. In either event, the capacity of the Defence Forces to carry out the tasks assigned to them could be undermined and the problems would take many years to remedy.”*

9.2 These statements are particularly relevant and reflective of the current crisis where the retention of commissioned officers across all ranks and service continues. To date, there has been an absence and systematic failure to introduce a credible management response to stem the outflow of experience and expertise.

9.3 The cost benefit of retention is indisputable. The unique demands of Defence Force service require unique specialist “in house” military training and the development of military specialist skills. Unlike other Public Service sectors, the Defence Forces cannot draw on externally trained professionals to immediately fill organisation vacancies. For example, a direct entry civil engineer would have to undergo 20-24 months military indoctrination and professional development in military engineering competencies before being available for operational tasking. Similarly, the costs associated with developing the range of military competencies can amount to €1.54m for an Ordnance Bomb Disposal Officer at Captain rank, or €1.72m for a Captain Pilot in the Air Corps. As stated previously, these figures

merely capture the training costs and do not take account of experience that is essential to ensuring safe operational output and risk mitigation (for both the individual and for the military unit with which they are employed). It is not sustainable to continue recruiting to fill the voids. The cost of training one officer cadet is estimated at over €100,000 per student. At what point of dysfunction will management factor “retention” over the continual failing demands of “recruitment”.

- 9.4 The "risk" to capability delivery, as a consequence of loss of experience, continues to be highlighted as a key concern by Unit Commanders (most recently in a Special Report to the General Staff, February 2018) and is evidenced in the Defence Forces Risk Register. Similarly, researchers from the University of Limerick, Dr Juliette McMahon (HRM and Industrial Relations) and Dr Sarah Mac Curtain (Organisational Behaviour), note these dangers and the growing “risk” to personnel in their Focus Group Report (2016). Additionally, a report currently being drafted by Military Management also notes the serious concerns of Unit Commanders in this regard. The report is examining “manning levels” in the operational units of the Defence Forces (all services) and is due for completion in February 2018.
- 9.5 **Oireachtas Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence:** During a hearing discussion on the ‘Department of Defence Strategy Statement 2017-2020 (05 October 2017)’, the Committee members questioned the Secretary General as to why the Department of Defence has failed to provide a retention policy for the Defence Forces where it was evident that the continual recruitment campaigns were failing to address the continued reduction in overall strength, particularly where the underlying reasons for the continued exit of personnel also remain unresolved. The Chairman of the Committee questioned the Secretary General of the Department of Defence as to why, when the Department of Defence saved €27.5m in 2016, did they not see fit to introduce retention initiatives.
- 9.6 **The White Paper on Defence 2015** makes reference to the objectives of Defence Forces Human Resource Management. It notes at Section 7.3 that the recruitment, training and development, and retention of suitable military personnel are essential factors in developing the military capabilities required in order to discharge the roles assigned by Government. The White Paper notes that:

*“...having regard to the capability and professional competency requirements of the modern Defence Forces, a review of HR policies in relation to recruitment, training and education, performance management, reward systems, and retention and retirement policies alongside age profiles for personnel across the Defence Forces will be conducted in the medium term.”*

The section concerned also references retention and retirement. Despite this presentiment, no initiative or review has been initiated to address these issues. The delay in commencing White Paper Projects concerning the ongoing recruitment and retention issues is indicative of the current approach to HR Policy in the Defence Forces. The consequence to the organisation is the present “manning level crisis” and loss of corporate memory and military expertise on an alarming scale. Meanwhile the Department of Defence Management appear *indifferent* to the clear presentation of facts expressed by all Formation and Service Commanders.

9.7 In contrast to the approach of Defence Sector Management, a useful comparator to military Human Resource management is that applied to the Armed Forces in the United Kingdom. As stated, the UK Armed Forces factor “trained strength” only, and link manning levels to effective operational capability. Annual reports to the British Defence Committee analyse the effectiveness with which they achieve, or otherwise, the designed manning levels of the Forces. The UK Military provide a guidance manning level threshold of +1% to -2% of “trained personnel strength”. If the manning levels fall below this threshold, resources and initiatives are applied accordingly. A similar mechanism to address key areas of concern in the Defence Forces is required in the short term.

## List of Annexes

Annex A	Restoration of 10% cut to allowances and duty pay rates for Saturday/Sunday imposed by Haddington Road
Annex B	Payment of Rent Allowance Increase of €500 equivalent to that approved by Government for Gardaí, Prison Officers and Firefighters
Annex C	Increase in Military Service Allowance
Annex D	Air Corps <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Reintroduction of Pilot Service Commitment Scheme (Annex D1);</li><li>▪ AEO (Annex D2);</li><li>▪ CIS (Annex D3);</li><li>▪ Air Traffic Service (Annex D4)</li></ul>
Annex E	Naval Service Patrol Duty Allowance Increase
Annex F	Ordnance Duty Allowance Increase
Annex G	Restoration of Specialised Instructor Allowance – Officers
Annex H	Increase in Change of Station Allowance



Representative Association of Commissioned Officers  
Cromhlachas Ionadaitheach na nOifigeach Coimisiúnta



Annex 'A'

Sec DF C&A Scheme  
Department of Defence,  
Station Road,  
Newbridge.

05 February 2018

### Claim for Restoration of Haddington Road Cuts to Allowances

1. Under the PSSA Haddington Road Agreement in 2013, Defence Sector cuts included;
  - The **rate of all allowances** payable to members of the Defence Forces will be permanently reduced by 10 % (a schedule of these allowances is attached at Annex 1). This provision is without prejudice to the outcome of the review of SDA currently ongoing under the provisions of the current Public Service Agreement.
  - The **Saturday and Sunday rates for Security Duty** and related allowances as per items (a), (b) and (c) in Annex 1 to this agreement, will be flat rated - i.e. the standard Monday to Friday daily rate for the allowance will be payable for such duties carried out on a Saturday or Sunday. In the case of a member of the Permanent Defence Force performing a 24 hour duty on a Sunday only, a day in lieu will be provided, excluding the following rest off day. This day may be taken within a fixed period subject to local arrangements and the approval of local management.
2. RACO hereby claims for;
  - a. the restoration of the 10% cut to allowances and
  - b. restoration of rates to Saturday and Sunday Security Duties.
3. RACO claims for these restorations, equivalent in nature to those both restored and increased to other Public Sector Employees such as Garda Síochána, Firefighters, Prison Officers, Health and Education.
4. RACO are denied access to WRC and Labour Court which are the state institutions through which these sectors secured restorations and increase awards as "side deals" to the current LRA 1 and 2. RACO claim for equivalent treatment of compensatory allowances for Members of the Defence Forces.

Your sincerely,

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(Earnán Naughton)  
Lieutenant Colonel



Representative Association of Commissioned Officers  
Cromhlachas Ionadaitheach na nOifigeach Coimisiúnta



## Annex 'B'

Sec DF C&A Scheme  
Department of Defence,  
Station Road,  
Newbridge.

21 June 2017

### Claim – Equivalent Allowance Increase to Garda Síochána & other Public Service Unions

1. RACO claim for the increase in allowances equivalent to that approved by Government to other Public Service Unions/Associations.
2. In support of this claim, RACO cite the following examples as reason for the restoration of allowances for our Members as follows;
  - a. The Government decision to accept Labour Court Ad Hoc Recommendation CD/16321 3 November 2016 as being within the terms of the Lansdowne Road Agreement. *Equivalent alignment with these restoration and allowance increase to our Members is hereby claimed by RACO.*
  - b. RACO Members are being asked to accept a higher Additional Superannuation Contribution (ASC) towards their fast accrual pensions as part of LRA 2 - as are the Garda, Prison Officers and Fire Fighters. Significantly, uniformed bodies represented by the ICTU will receive a rent allowance increase of €500 per annum per individual. *Equivalence allowance increase to offset the additional ACS costs for our Members is hereby claimed by RACO.*
  - c. D PER has sanctioned the widespread restoration of allowances to ICTU PSC unions conditional on such unions signing up to the new public service agreement and agreeing that such measures satisfy their claims for comparability with the Government acceptance of the Labour Court Recommendation CD/16/321. *Equivalent alignment with these restorations and increase in allowances to our Members is claimed by RACO ensuring our Representative Status is not denying our members equivalence of treatment in the Public Service.*
  - d. LRA 1 “side agreement” examples which were approved by Government includes the restoration and increase in allowances to ;
    - i. Firefighters- 2016 - €4,500 Rent Allowance restored to New Entrants
    - ii. Garda Deal - 2017 (€8k pension deal, €4k Rent Allowance New Entrants, Overtime Deal and access to IR Structures)
    - iii. Teachers - TUI Supervision & Substitution Allowance €800 (Sept 2016)
    - iv. Junior Doctors (€3,182 Living Out Allowance = €16m)

- v. 1000 Clerical Staff to be placed on Higher Pay Scale- €1,000 (LRA 2 2017)
- vi. Prison Officers and Firefighters to receive €500 additional rent allowance (Fast Accrual Cat LRA 2 2017)

*The Government “commitments” were secured through Industrial Relations Forums to which RACO are denied. Equivalent alignment with these restorations and increase in allowances to our Members is claimed by RACO under the auspices of the current LRA.*

- 3. RACO claim for analogous alignment of allowance increases with the Garda Association Members and other Public Service Unions to the sum of €4,500 per Member by or combination of either;
  - a. Increase in Military Service Allowance.
  - b. Restoration of the 10% reduction in allowances cut in Haddington Road.
  - c. Restoration of Special Instructors Allowance removed in Haddington Road.
  - d. Increase in duration of Change of Station Allowance from 9 to 18 months.

The exclusion by DPER of RACO from consultation and negotiation on the Garda Anomaly Talks Deal essentially confirms the deliberate isolation of RACO from influencing any negotiated outcome to Public Service Pay Talks.

- 4. RACO claim for the continued application of CCR 421 Annex C providing for “supplementary pension” to new entrants post 2013 in recognition of the Defence Forces continuing policy on mandatory retirement ages in advance of the payment age for the State Pension Contributory.
- 5. RACO claims for the equivalent collective bargaining rights on these issues as were afforded to the constituent trade unions comprising the ICTU PSC. Accordingly, RACO request a special meeting of the Conciliation Council to consider RACO’s claim is in light of the newly proposed Public Service Agreement and associated Government approved side deals afforded to those unions and associations affiliated to the ICTU.

Yours sincerely,

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(Earnán Naughton)  
Lieutenant Colonel  
General Secretary RACO



### Claim for Increase in Military Service Allowance (MSA)

1. Military Service Allowance (MSA) is a pensionable allowance and is factored as part of basic pay (Gleeson Commission Report, 1990). This section of the submission clarifies the value and cost of MSA making a strong case for a substantial increase.
2. There are eight (8) elements to the MSA Framework; two additional elements were introduced by the Department of Defence in the review of allowances as part of the Haddington Road discussions; however, these are not yet included in the formal MSA Framework (see Figure 1.2) The Department of Defence submission on allowances (Haddington Road),-states that MSA is paid because, "overtime, shift allowance, or other such premium payments are not available to members of the Defence Forces" and if these "overtime or shift payments were to be paid it would cost significantly more to implement, which has been the experience of foreign military operations".
3. These statements confirm that Defence Forces Officers provide significant non-remunerated value to the State; value that is delivered in the absence of value-for-money metrics. Officers' identification with organisational and national values and commitment to the State is in effect taken for granted. Personal needs and freedoms are limited, impacting also at the community and political levels of freedoms, without commensurate mitigation of such loss.

MSA is paid monthly to all personnel, while the rates of MSA can be seen in Table 1.1 below:

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Yearly</u>	<u>Monthly</u>	<u>Gross Weekly</u>	<u>Net weekly</u>
Lt/Captain	€4,495	€374	€95.50	€76.40
2 L T (after 2013)	€4, 257	€355	€88	€60

Table 1.1

#### 4. What does MSA compensate Military Personnel For?

Both the *Gleeson Commission Report* (1990) and the earlier *Inter-Departmental Committee on Defence Forces Pay, Allowances and Conditions* (The Brady Committee - 1988) concluded that the unique conditions and special disadvantages of military life for which MSA is intended to compensate are based on the eight factors listed below in figure 1.2 (for illustration purposes each component part carries similar weighting in terms of the current allowance rate.) The Haddington Road elements introduced by the Department of Defence have been added at the bottom of Figure 1.2, for consistency.

	<u>Component parts of MSA (from 2006)</u>	<u>Gross Yearly</u> €	<u>Gross</u> <u>Weekly €</u>
MSA.1	Long and unsocial hours of duty.	562	12

MSA.2	Liability for duty 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.	562	12
MSA.3	Requirement to serve for a fixed term of engagement.	562	12
MSA.4	Restrictions on personal liberty as a result of the code of military discipline.	562	12
MSA.5	Risk of personal danger / loss of life.	562	12
MSA.6	Bad and uncomfortable conditions.	562	12
MSA.7	Personal responsibility for use of lethal weapons	562	12
MSA.8	Disruption of family life as a result of frequent absences from the home.	562	12
		<b>€4,495</b>	<b>€96</b>
MSA.9	Restrictions on Right to engage in industrial action. <sup>23</sup>	=	=
MSA.10	Act as back-up workforce for Government*	=	=

**Figure 1.2**

## Analysis of MSA and Financial Breakdown

### 5. MSA.1 - Long and Unsocial Hours - current weekly rate €12

The rate paid for this element of MSA no longer bears any relation to associated work demands made of officers. The Defence Act, DFRs, Standing Orders and Unit SOPs confirm that officers must always be prepared to report for work/duty (365 days). It is very evident that management, and by consequence the Central Statistics Office, do not capture the extensive hours worked by our personnel. It is known, and accepted, that all officers are required to work long and unsocial hours. This occurs in the *Routine* environment (ensuring compliance with ever-expanding administrative requirements) and conduct of Field Training and Operations (both ATCP and ATCA; events are recorded; however, the exact hours worked are not electronically recorded). Civil Servants and Gardaí earn overtime when required to function outside framework hours in any or all of the foregoing settings. During 2015, an individual Garda earned over €60,000 in overtime payments; the MSA *long-and-unsocial-hours* component compensated any individual Defence Forces officer with €600 for the same annual period (€12 per week).

<sup>23</sup> In the Business Case submitted by the Dept of Defence as part of the Haddington Road discussions, a number of additional factors have been introduced. These include; "restriction on right to engage in industrial action", which in turns "allows the Government a backup workforce to be put in position when other sectors withdraw their labour".

6. **MSA.2 - Liability for duty 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. – current weekly rate €12**

Officers can be called for military duty without notice and are required to report. The nature and character of the range of such *military duty* varies to great degrees. On occasion the duty is warned well in advance and has defined character. On other occasions it is warned at very short notice, and can have well- or ill-defined character. No other State Service members provide an equivalent degree of availability for such low level of remuneration. The liability for duty 24 hours a day, seven days a week, has a major impact on an individual officer's personal freedom, and freedom to engage with their community.

Officers can be detailed for duties at any time as required on a 24-hour basis, 7 days per week. These duties include armed operations in ATCP and other duties such as flood protection operations as part of ATCA. All Officers are required to be available at all times, with leave only granted at the discretion of each individual Officers Unit and Brigade Commander.

The weekly compensation paid to Officers of €12 does not meet the requirement of a professional Defence Forces. The nature of each duty and the liability for duties of members of the Defence Forces is similar to that of An Garda Síochána or the Prison Service. Personnel in these services are paid as part of annualised hours shift system (Prison Service) or receive payments when working longer than their normal shift pattern as for An Garda Síochána.

*An Officer who is available to undertake duties on a weekly basis, is paid an additional €12. This payment does not take into account the onerous nature of the duties undertaken by members of the Defence Forces, and the long periods of time for which Officers are deployed on or available to undertake duties.*

7. **MSA 3 & 4 Requirement to serve for a fixed term of engagement/Restrictions on personal liberty as a result of the code of military discipline - current weekly rate €24**

These elements have been grouped together as they are both a curtailment of an Officers personal liberty and rights. The Military discipline code involves a restriction on personal liberty that has no counterpart in civilian employment. It is clear that placing an appropriate value on liberty is difficult. However, in the absence of a market price, academic professionals point to "willingness to pay" as the appropriate tool to place a value on what used to be called an "unmeasurable".

If one considers military service as a reduction in liberty, then the price paid by Government to the individual should reflect this curtailment. In this instance, we believe that the cost of accommodating a prisoner should be used as a comparative benchmark. The prison service noted that it costs over €100 a night to accommodate a prisoner, in which case a person's liberty is removed. While the nature of Military Service is not comparable to that of a prisoner, the removal of liberties is enshrined in Military Law, to which an Officer is subject on a daily basis. Compensating an individual by €24 a week for this loss of liberty is not

acceptable, as can be seen by the comparable cost of detaining prisoners as can be seen above.

**8. *MSA 5 - Risk of personal danger / loss of life. - current weekly rate €12***

On any given day an officer may be killed or injured while in service. This is a fact that is known to all Officers when they are commissioned, and is the price members are willing to pay in service to their country. The government pays Officers an additional €12 each week for assuming that risk. Since the foundation of the state, Officers have been killed in service in all aspects of their work, with many wounded or injured. If we use the example of Overseas Service, which is expected of all members throughout their careers, then we can see this threat to members, where a total of 85 personnel has lost their life on these missions. Militaries must engage in dangerous activities in order to maintain capability, and these dangers are a factor of robust training at home and operational service overseas. Personnel who volunteer to take that risk on behalf of the state should be paid more than the current €12 a week for doing so.

**9. *MSA 6 - Bad and uncomfortable conditions. - current weekly rate €12***

Officers deploy to locations where they are needed as and when required, and often for a prolonged period of time. If we look at examples at home, Officers can be deployed to a shell scrape in the Glen of Imaal as part of an operation or exercise, to a flooded housing estate in Athlone as part of an ATCA response, or to Portlaoise Prison as part of the security element based there at any stage during their career. As can be seen, these deployments do not take account of the conditions to which the Officer is subjected and are often uncomfortable and uncertain. Similarly overseas, an officer can be deployed in small outposts in Syria, on a long range patrol in Chad or Liberia, or based in Kosovo on a checkpoint during winter. Once again, these examples show the nature of the officers environment at any stage during their career. These examples demonstrate the inadequacy that a payment of €12 per week recompense for acceptance of the nature of service.

**10. *MSA 7 - Personal responsibility for use of lethal weapons - current weekly rate €12;***

Officers, whether based at home or overseas, are entrusted with their own lives and the lives of the troops who they command. However, these troops are also entrusted with the responsibility to use lethal weapons, either in an ATCP operation at home such as service in Portlaoise Prison or in the conduct of their duties on Overseas Service. This places a large level of responsibilities on individuals, but in particular Officers in command appointments.

Officers are required to brief the troops under their command on the correct procedures, use of force and the application of force prior to commencing duty. This command authority may also require the application of "lethal force". The nature of these responsibilities is not common to any other workforce, and is an inherent part of being an Officer in the Defence Forces. A payment of €12 weekly to take account of this responsibility and decision making is not sufficient and is not an indication of the level and nature of work undertaken by Officers in these situations.

11. **MSA 8- *Disruption of family life as a result of frequent absences from the home - current weekly rate €12.***

It is a known fact that members of the Defence Forces spend a prolonged period of time away from their family and home each year. This is by virtue of operations and exercises undertaken, duties, service in ATCP and ATCA. However, this does not take into account the other areas of service that affect an Officers life at home, and in particular their absence from the family home for prolonged periods.

Since the re-organisation of the Defence Forces in 2012, the number of barracks has been drastically reduced, and as a result a large volume of Officers are now forced to commute long distances to their place of employment. Officers can now expect to fill an appointment for no longer than a three (3) year period before being transferred to another location. Often times Officers are given inadequate notice of this transfer, which can be less than one (1) week in certain circumstances, which leads to great uncertainty.

Often times it is not possible for Officers to commute on a daily basis to these barrack locations and they are forced to live away from home from Mon-Fri, causing stress and strain on their personal and familial relationships. In the majority of these cases, it is not possible for Officers to move their families with them due to a combination of the cost of housing/house values in negative equity, the age and school requirements of their children, the employment of their partners and the lack of suitable married quarter accommodation.

In order for Officers to progress their careers after Commissioning there is a requirement for them to undertake a series of Career Courses including but not limited to Young Officers Courses (up to 24 months duration), Junior Command and Staff Courses (6 months duration) and Senior Command and Staff Courses (9 months duration). These courses are residential in nature due to their workload and it is not possible for Officers to commute while a student on these courses. As before, there is insufficient Married Quarters accommodation and the cost to families to move for these periods is too great, so Officers are required to remain away from home from Mon - Fri throughout these periods. This again causes strain to relationships, impacting on wellbeing while placing added stress on the Officers themselves.

Officers are required to undergo multiple tours of duty overseas, throughout service in all ranks, often on a two yearly basis. The nature and duration of these deployments varies, but Officers can expect to spend a minimum of six (6) months overseas every 24-36 months. In the majority of cases Officers are not permitted for their families to accompany them unlike other Public Servants

All of these instances show the increased frequency and durations that Officers are away from their families, on top of the normal day to day requirements of their employment. These periods place an undue disruption on familial life, and lead to additional stresses and strains on both the Officers themselves and their partners. The payment of €12 weekly to Officers does not adequately reflect the disruption to family life due to the prolonged time periods they are forced to spend away from home throughout their careers.

12. ***Restriction on the right to engage in Industrial Action/Back up workforce in the event of labour withdrawal - current weekly rate €0.***

This parameter is not listed as one of the core elements examined by the Gleeson Commission Report in 1990, but was introduced by the Dept of Defence in their submission on MSA as part of the Haddington Road discussions. In light of recent industrial actions by other groups and the comments by An Taoiseach in the Dáil that he did not envisage Defence Forces Representative Associations having access to the industrial relations process, this is a very relevant element of future discussions on Defence Forces core pay which include MSA.

Based on the recent threats of strike by other public servants, the Defence Forces are now in a heightened state of preparation to be drafted in in the event of labour withdrawal. Units and barracks were on standby to have all available personnel available in the event that a strike had gone ahead.

Members of the Defence Forces should be recompensed adequately due to this denial of an essential workers right, which is listed in the European Social Chapter.

13. The Association hereby submits this claim to the Commission for an increase in MSA Allowance factoring the addition duties and magnitude of commitment factored by MSA relative to when the allowance was initially configured.

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(Earnán Naughton)  
LT COL  
General Secretary RACO



Representative Association of Commissioned Officers  
Cromhlachas Ionadaitheach na nOifigeach Coimisiúnta



## Annex 'D1'

### **Claim for Air Corps Review of Flying Pay and the Reintroduction of a Service Commitment Scheme (SCS)**

#### **1. Reorganisation and Reduction in Officer Numbers**

The Air Corps (AC) and Naval Service (NS) had previously undertaken a significant reorganisation pre-the 2006 PSBB exercise. The Air Corps witnessed a further reduction of 7 Officers (4%) as part of a broader Defence Forces reorganisation in 2013. This reduction in numbers occurred over a period when the operational tasking from Government have increased with the introduction of the Emergency Aeromedical Service (EAS), increased Garda Air Support Unit (GASU) Operations and the extension to 24-hour operations in Baldonnell.

#### **2. Domestic Security stabilisation vs International security challenges and threats**

The Peace Process has seen significant normalisation of activity in relation to the border with Northern Ireland. However, this trend has begun to reverse in relation to international events. The recent decision surrounding the United Kingdom's decision to depart the European Union and the ongoing migrant crisis will pose challenges for the AC in relation to potentially strengthening border surveillance, the guarding of national approaches and the continued provision of air services to the national police force.

#### **3. Continuing Reduction in Air Corps Officers since 2009 was largely due to;**

- a. Alteration to Pension Schemes for new entrants (since 1995 and shortly 2004).
- b. Absent or slow rate recruitment over protracted period.
- c. Unprecedented high rate of premature voluntary retirements, which now appears to be accelerating due to an upturn in the aviation industry.

4. As of now 30% of Air Corps Pilot posts remain unfilled. The inability to fully staff post due to the absence of qualified and experienced replacements is requiring the continuing practice of double and triple jobbing, combined with the blurring of regulatory and operational functions, which is contrary to best practice in an aviation environment. Senior management are now required to undertake operational flying at weekends and in the evening time to maintain critical operational tasking.

5. Premature voluntary retirements had previously occurred at the level of Capt, with a small number leaving at the rank of Comdt. Over the past number of years this trend has shifted, and now

premature voluntary retirements are increasingly occurring at the ranks of Comdt and Lt Col. The average time in current appointment for senior management at Lt Col and Col is now less than 18 months due to the exodus of officers at all levels. This trend is confirmed by the figures for retirements on age grounds, which saw only 3 Officers retire having reached mandatory retirement age in the past 8 years.

6. Since 2006 the AC entered into 10 Service Level Agreements (SLAs) with other Governmental Departments and state bodies. These demand very specific levels of output and require careful management. The supply of such military aviation services to Irish society and state bodies is a unique trait of the Defence Forces. The most notable of these SLAs is with the Departments of Health (HSE) and Justice (An Garda Síochána).
7. A Service Commitment Scheme (SCS) in respect of AC Pilots was in operation at the time of the 2006 PSBB review and continued in effect until 2010. Since that time and in no small part fueled by the 'FEMPI' pay cuts what can only be described as an exodus ensued. The following table indicates the trend regarding pilot retirements;

2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2018	TOTAL
2	10	3	8	9	6	10	8*	56**

\* In January 2018 four pilots indicated their intention to leave for employment in the civilian aviation sector.

\*\* This represents over 50% of the total allowed AC pilot strength.

- *In the five-year period between 2005 and 2009, there were 11 Pilot Officer retirements. This period coincided with the second service commitment scheme, which ended in 2010. This scheme was assessed by Air Corps management as having successfully regulated pilot numbers during the period of its lifetime.*
- *From 2010 to 2017, a combined flight time over 200,000 hours, equating to over 900 years, of military flight experience has been lost, much of it through the loss of experienced Flying Instructors and Type Rating Examiners.*
- *Within the coming year the first of the post 2004 AC pilots will emerge from their contractual obligations that is likely to see an increase in the rate of retirements.*

8. Consequently, when newly qualified pilot classes are considered the current downward trend in respect of the **AC pilot cadre** is:

Year	2010	2014	2015	2016	2017
<b>Establishment</b>	107	107	107	107	107
<b>Effective Strength</b>	104	88	81	81	79
<b>Vacancies</b>	3	19	26	27	29
<b>% Vacant</b>	<b>-3%</b>	<b>-18%</b>	<b>-24%</b>	<b>-24%</b>	<b>-26%</b>

*\*Almost half of the existing pilot cadre is now outside of their 12-year contractual obligations.*

9. A safety review of the Air Corps was conducted by an independent external body in 2013 and since that time the number of key personnel has further diminished.

*‘Irish Air Corps Safety Management System Review’, dated 16-20 September 2013 stated:*

*“Unfortunately as this report has identified the Corps and its SMT currently face major obstacles with all units being over tasked, fatigued and under strength”.*

*“The personnel policy is severely affecting the IAC operational capability. The hiring freeze, reduced manning, promotion of individuals with minimal technical requirements, void of supervisory personnel at the senior captain/ Commandant level and reduced benefits coupled to increased tasks creates the perfect storm and poses one of the greatest threats facing the organisation;”*

10. **Conclusion**

- a. In the medium to long term the restoration of deductions made in respect of ‘FEMPI’ coupled with an increase in AC Officer Flying Pay may effectively resolve the chronic personnel deficits in key grades. A comparison of AC salaries to those for which AC Officers are receiving upon retirement is indicated in Annex F-1. While it is acknowledged that public service remunerations will never equal that on offer in the commercial sector an upward revision of Flying Pay for all grades would serve to close the differential and retain key skills and experience on a permanent basis.
- b. The commission is also asked to examine the anomaly whereby when an Officer reaches a certain senior grade the respective Flying Pay actual begins to reduce as this was traditionally associated with more time spent in a managerial function however the simple reality is that Senior Officers are as involved in flying operations today as when they were a decade earlier in their career. In summary, and to better reflect reality, an AC Officer’s Flying Pay should not be reduced simply because they have reached a given military rank.
- c. In the interim the retention of the remaining experienced pilot officers is a cornerstone of safe operations. It also allows the AC to be **self-sustaining**; retaining the ability to train less experienced pilot officers using the cadre of senior experienced personnel that remain in service. The Air Corps are close to reducing below minimum experience levels where external assistance, at a premium cost well beyond that of a SCS, will be required to sustain and re-train the organisation.
- d. On two separate occasions in the past the introduction of a SCS proved successful in retaining key personnel in the medium term, an illustrative SCS consistent with previous initiatives is also contained in Annex F-2. This should be reintroduced in respect of Pilot & ATS Officer grades as a short to medium term measure while reversing ‘FEMPI’ cuts and revising Flying Pay and associated anomalies would serve to address both experience deficits and key staffing shortages in the long term.

11. RACO submit this claim for the Review of Flying Pay and the Reintroduction of a SCS.

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(Earnán Naughton) LT COL  
General Secretary RACO



## 1. Recruitment of Aeronautical Engineers


As is the case in both the ATS (Air Traffic Service) and Pilot streams within the Air Corps, recruiting the right calibre of suitably qualified officer into the Aeronautical Engineering stream has proven difficult in recent years. Specifically in the case of the AEO's, the impasse over the FPP (Fixed Period Promotion) system led to a situation where the strength at Junior Officer grade fell as low as 25% in 2015. It is the corporate duty and responsibility of the GOC Air Corps to ensure that engineering and technical services are maintained to the highest standards and this is consistently reflected in Defence Forces strategy statements. This policy is expanded upon in the Maintenance Management Organisation Exposition (Ref A) and Air Regulation Manual (Ref B) which are the formal aeronautical regulatory provisions issued by the GOC Air Corps. These high standards are predicated on attaining, retaining and sustaining a motivated, effective and disciplined body of professional Engineer Officers to meet the demands of the Air Corps from an engineering perspective. A key pre-requisite for entry into the aeronautical engineering stream is the educational qualification of a B.Eng (Hons) degree in an engineering discipline recognised by Engineers Ireland.

In recent history, failure to fill vacancies in the Aeronautical Engineering stream of AC officers resulted in an acute situation where vital technical expertise in key managerial appointments fell gravely below minimum safe levels, with significant unfilled vacancies at Capt and Comdt Level. The attrition rate among Aeronautical Engineers averages one engineer a year since 2007, which has had a detrimental impact on what is a relative small cohort as shown in **Fig. 1.0**

## 2. Retention Issues - Flying Pay Disparity

In order to properly discharge the duties assigned in the MMOE, while certifying relevant technical documentation relating to airworthiness, Aeronautical Engineering Officers (AEOs) may be required to partake in test flights. Such flights are undertaken on delivery of new aircraft, after maintenance or modification. Flying Pay is awarded to personnel who are required to undertake flying duties as part of their job description. Pilot officers are awarded a flying pay allowance ranging from €2,386 to €12,747 p.a. which increases incrementally on a two yearly basis to the maximum point on the scale. An Aeronautical Engineering officer receives flying pay of €1,271 which is less even than a trainee cadet pilot who receives €2,158. Furthermore, it should be noted that NCOs receive flying pay at the rate of either €2,151 or €2,234. It is incongruous that AEOs perform professional flying related duties yet receive an allowance which is less than the NCO for whom they are responsible. It should also be noted that such flights are regarded as a high risk undertaking as they are used to determine airworthiness when there are question marks over the integrity of aircraft. With the exception of Ordnance Officers on EOD duties, no other Rate 2 officer is similarly required to discharge such dangerous duties. The current rate is a derisory reflection of this important role. It is submitted that as a retention mechanism for AEOs, the Flying Pay allowance payable should be increased and placed on a similar incremental scale as that of Pilot flying officers.

Presently, there are 22 members of An Garda Síochána up to Inspector grade who are in receipt of flying pay within the Garda Air Support Unit (GASU) and are paid for their flying duties at the rate of €5,039 which is drastically more than AEOs. It should be noted that, unlike AEOs, Garda observers perform no flight or technical function on board the aircraft. **Fig 2.0** is a graphical representation of the disparity of flying pay that exists in respect of state registered aircraft.




**Figure 2.0:** Comparison of Flying Pay Allowances

### 3. Military Aeronautical Retention – International Context

Internationally, the starting salary scales of Air Corps AEOs compare quite favourably with that of other countries. **Fig 3.0** depicts the starting salary scales for AEO’s at the rank of Captain (OF-2). As shown in the graph, IAC AEO’s starting increment at Captain is higher than that of the other countries shown; however, as the level of experience of the AEO increases, the pay scales of other countries diverge dramatically from that of Ireland. This is largely due to the retention initiatives employed by other militaries of increasing the salary increments to match the experience levels of the AEO. This initiative is a tangible attempt to match the salary scales in the private sectors of these countries in a competitive way such as to incentivise the officer to remain in the organisation therefore retaining the vital experience in key appointments. Other military organisations, such as the UK’s RAF also employ course bonuses to incentivise AEO’s to stay in their respective organisations. Experience has shown that such initiatives are critical in retaining personnel with the necessary experience to effectively ensure the airworthiness of state registered aircraft.

In order to retain AEOs in the IAC, lessons may be learned from other jurisdictions in respect of retention payments. To this end, it is submitted that the salary increment scales of that of Captain, Comdt and Lt Col AEO should be revised upwards to incentivise AEO’s to remain in the organisation.



**Figure 3.0:** Comparison of International salary scales at the rank of Captain

#### 4. Domestic Retention Pressures

##### **Case Study – Irish Air Corps Airworthiness Staff Officer vis-a-vis Irish Aviation Authority (IAA) & Air Accident Investigation Unit (AAIU) Counterpart**

Some Irish Air Corps staff officer’s responsibilities include certification of airworthiness, acceptance and registration of new aircraft, research and development, formulation of technical policy, accident and incident investigation and various other duties in the technical management of the Air Corps fleet. Employees of the Irish Aviation Authority (IAA) perform directly similar duties in the management of civil aircraft on the Irish register but without the extra command responsibilities associated with leading subordinates. The current pay scale for a Comdt is between €65,109 - €82,972 which is up to 50% less than that of his/her IAA counterparts who are amongst the best paid semi-state employees in the country. (The average pay in 2015 for the IAA’s 655 employees was €91,600).

A similar disparity exists in the case of the AAIU and the Department of Transport, Tourism and Sport. AAIU Aeronautical Engineering Investigators are paid at the rate of Principle Officer on the civil service pay scale (€81,767 - €100,333). As is the case with the IAA, the AEO is required to perform the same responsibilities as his/her AAIU counterpart but is paid significantly less. There is a glaring disparity of pay between Defence Forces AE Officers and those employed to perform the same duties in the IAA & AAIU. In terms of retention, it is unrealistic to suggest that AEO pay could match that of industries such as Aircraft Leasing which attract starting salaries of €100,000+ however it is reasonable to expect that salaries should be broadly in line with those in the semi-state sector.

#### 5. Organisational Structure

The structure of the AEO stream as depicted in **Fig. 1.0** is largely based upon legacy maintenance requirements and no longer adequately reflects the complex nature of modern aircraft and the modern aviation safety culture. The independent Bureau Veritas

Report (REF. C) is unambiguous in its recommendation that an independent MAA (Military Airworthiness Authority) be established, with a full Colonel acting as director. The report is less specific in respect of the organisational framework of the proposed new authority, however it is RACO's submission that the organisation be populated by suitably qualified personnel with a strong AEO presence on any MAA Working Group (Recommendation #13).

**6. Conclusion**

- a) The international evidence is clear and un-ambiguous; in order to retain experienced AEOs at key grades, the salary scales need to be revised upwards to better match the remuneration packages in other public, semi-state and commercial entities.
  - b) The current rate of flying pay for AEOs is in no way reflective of the onerous duties and responsibilities undertaken as part of the job description and should be reviewed as a key retention tool. The comparison between AEOs and other flying personnel clearly demonstrate the disparity of payments in this regard.
  - c) As has been demonstrated in the preceding paragraphs, AEO salaries are not in line with public and semi-state bodies and therefore the continued exodus of experienced personnel is set to continue in the medium to long term.
  - d) The introduction of a Service Commitment Scheme (SCS), similar in scope and nature to that which was historically introduced for pilots should be considered as an elegant solution to retain key experience in the AEO stream.
  - e) There should be a strong AEO representation on any MAA Working Group to ensure robust representation in any future MAA body.
7. RACO submit this claim for a review of flying pay, review of salary increments and the introduction of a SCS scheme for consideration.

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(Earnán Naughton) Lt Col  
General Secretary RACO



**Communications Information Systems (CIS) Officers– Air Corps  
Claim for Review of Pay and the  
Reintroduction of a Fixed Period Promotion (FPP)**

**1. Recognising and retaining specialist CIS Technical Officers.**

The nature of the work CIS Engineers are drawn into in the modern day Defence Forces reflect the bringing into sharp focus the necessity to retain this cohort possessing the skill sets that are central to the delivery of the PID Projects list arising from DF White Paper 2015. In order to deliver the ambitious projects as reflected in Defence Forces White Paper 2015 and with Ireland's recent joining of PESCO, these are exactly the cohort of technical expertise the organisation must take active involvement in retaining.

CIS Engineer Officers are and have to be multi-talented, problem solving subject matter experts with on the most part, considerable levels of post graduate qualifications in the IT / ICT and Cyber Security areas. Engineer Officers have dealt and compensated for through increased output with the hollowing out of the skills base traditionally available within the CIS field due to the departure of well trained technicians who leave with their corporate knowledge and experience for more favorable conditions of employment in the Private and Public Sector.

**2. Induction of CIS Engineer Officers – Air Corps**

Induction to an Air Corps CIS Engineer (Tech) appointment is through one of two possible channels; via a direct-entry competition, or following a cadetship involving time spent in the Military College, DFTC. The last DE competition was in 2003, the one previous to that was held in 1979. Regardless of the induction route, CIS Engineer Officers are required to hold a B.Eng Hons Degree in a suitable Engineering discipline which is recognised by Engineers Ireland. The engineering degree will be nominally of four years duration. By the time CIS Engineer Officers attain the rank of Comdt, many will also have completed a Master's degree and numerous other engineering related courses financed, in whole or in part by the DF, some individuals are though unfinanced in this endeavor.

3. Entrants are required to undergo a mandatory CIS Young Officers (YO's) course which generally modularized and carried out over a full year duration at CIS School, DFTC.

4. Following successful completion of this course, Air Corps CIS Engineers are generally posted to CIS Squadron, Air Corps. Air Corps CIS Engineer Officers will generally be promoted to the rank of Captain after three years as a Lieutenant.

**5. Attractions to leave Military service for public and private sector is largely due to;**

- a. Rapid improvement in the condition of employment prospects for experienced Engineers who will have ICT (and lately, Cyber Security) qualifications.
- b. Increase in salaries for experienced personnel available as researched.
- c. Removal of Fixed Period Promotion scheme.
- d. Failure to remunerate relative to equivalent grades with forced retirement at early

ages.

6. **Advancement Opportunities**

In order to progress to the rank of Lt Col, Comdt CIS Engineer Officers are required to successfully undertake the Senior Command and Staff course (SCSC) which takes approximately 1 year of full-time study in the Mil Col, DFTC. JCSC is also mandatory for promotion to Comdt.

At present there is 1 Lt Col position in AC CIS. This gives only a 1 in 3 chances of advancement to Lt Col behind the 2IC which is a disincentive for personnel staying beyond reaching the rank of Comdt.

Although reaching the rank of Col is possible, this has historically been achieved by a very limited number of Engineer Officers (AEO or CIS). It is not anticipated that the reasonable expectation of attaining the rank of Colonel will be a likely factor positively effecting decision to remain.

7. **AC CIS Engineers (Tech) cadre is:**

Rank	Appointment	Numbers
LT Col	OC	1
Comdt	2/IC	1
Capt	Flight Commanders	2 (Filled by Comdts)

*\*All Tech Officers are pre April 2004 from a pension perspective.*

8. **Flying Pay:**

Flying Pay is awarded to personnel who are required to undertake flying duties as part of their job description. Pilot officers are awarded a flying pay allowance ranging from €2,386 to €12,747 p.a. which increases incrementally on a two yearly basis to the maximum point on the scale.

A CIS Officer receives flying pay of €1,271 which is less even than a trainee cadet pilot who receives €2,158. It should be noted that NCOs receive flying pay at the rate of either €2,151 or €2,234. Newly commissioned programs such as PC12 and MPA replacement will call upon CIS Engineers to fly further in in the testing cycles to come. CIS Engineers should not receive a lesser flying pay amount and this should be increased.

9. **White Paper projects necessitating the retention of experienced CIS Engineer Officers (Tech):**

12	43	Develop an SLA with DCENR with regard to supporting CSIRT-IE
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CSIRT-IE has been staffed traditionally by CIS Engineers drawn from commissioned and non-commissioned ranks.

25	62	Fuse information from land, air and maritime domains into a Joint Common Operational Picture (JCOP)
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This ongoing program requires the experienced CIS Engineers concerned to work and manage this program for the expansion of the JCOP.

29	66	Incorporate the following into HLPPG's work agenda and in due course a new equipment plan, which will form a sub-set of a broader capability development plan.
	B	Replace the existing 5 Cessna's, with three larger aircraft suitably equipped for ISTAR tasks.
	C	Replace the existing CASA 235's with consideration being given to larger more capable aircraft.

10. **Example:** In 2016, the Office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement (ODCE) posted a role for a Forensic Investigator. The salary scale for this position is as follows:

**Principal Officer PPC [Personal Pension Contribution] Scale:**

€79,401 - €82,587 - €85,750 - €88,936 - €91,624 - €94,110 - €97,194

Long service increments may be payable after three (LSI-1) and six (LSI-2) years' satisfactory service at the maximum of the scale.

**Principal Officer Non-PPC Scale:**

€75,647 - €78,670 - €81,676 - €84,706 - €87,258 - €89,906 - €92,550

The skills and experience of Cyber Security qualified personnel sees their skills matching them to positions as Head of Data Governance and up to Chief Information Security Officer attracting the typical salaries (with benefits packages) as indicated below.

## IT governance

Title		€ Range	€ Typical
IT Audit	Junior	45,000-60,000	55,000
	Senior	60,000-75,000	65,000
Data Governance Manager		75,000-90,000	80,000
Head of Data Governance		90,000-120,000	100,000
Chief Information Security Officer		90,000-120,000	110,000

11. **Conclusion**

The Irish economy is expected to see an increase in employment by as much as 80,000 jobs by years end. We are moving towards full employment in 2018. Shortages as recorded above continue to generate a considerable draw outward from the Defence Forces at the very time when personnel critical to the delivery of many White Paper projects including the recently ordered PC12-NG aircraft are more necessary than ever. Steps need to be taken to address the disparity in available salaries and moves to improve the working conditions of Engineer Officers are also needed.

12. **Increases in basic Pay for Engineer Officers (CIS).**

An across the board increase in Defence Forces pay while well overdue and warranted will not address the retention of key skills such as Pilots, ATS Officers and Engineer Officers (CIS and Aeronautical).

Organisation value, where specialist skill sets are required and developed from within, needs to be placed on “experience” and “corporate knowledge” and moves taken to assure its continued availability to the Defence Forces. Failing to do so will lead to mediocrity in corporate knowledge, in experience and delivery of CIS services into the future until such time as suitable re-stocking takes place and knowledge again builds up.

13. **Re-instatement of Fixed Period Promotion to the rank of Commandant.**

A recognition that the removal of FPP within Technical disciplines was a retrograde decision and this should be reversed with reintroduction of the scheme. This measure was heavily endorsed unanimously at BDC 2017 and now forms part of official RACO policy.

14. **Review forced early retirement for Specialist Officers.**

As of today, Commandants have to retire on age grounds at the age of 58. Unless reaching Lt Col at which point they can serve until 60. This further adds to the loss of corporate knowledge at the very time that management should be seeking to retain it. This is not intended to impact the overall DF age profile but would serve to help the organisation to survive while continuing to deliver high quality technical output and meet White Paper PID targets while it consolidates.

15. **Increase in Flying Pay.**

“Non-Pilots rate (Officers)” - Increase in Flying Pay (NCOS earn more than Officers).

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(Earnán Naughton) Lt Col  
General Secretary RACO



## **Claim for Air Corps Review of Air Traffic Services (ATS) Allowances and the Introduction of a Service Commitment Scheme**

### **1. Background**

- a. The most basic operational role of Military Air Traffic Services (ATS) is the prevention of collision between aircraft, and the oversight, management and provision of safe air traffic services to both civilian and military aircraft operating within Military airspace in Ireland. ATS operates from Casement Aerodrome and the Dublin Air Traffic Control Centre. Military ATS also provides functions that go beyond air traffic control. It is a key enabler for air operations and is critical to the provision of security for major events. In addition, ATS manages the Air Corps' interaction with civil aviation authorities at National, European and International level.
- b. As of February 2018, there are five officer vacancies in ATS out of an establishment of eight appointments. Due to maternity leave only two officers are available within the function. As a result induction of new controllers has been halted and all training other than On the Job Training has ceased due to lack of officers to manage training activities. A number of infrastructure and airspace projects have been postponed until there are additional officers available to manage these projects. These projects include redesignation of runways, updating aeronautical charts and upgrading facilities that are in excess of 60 years old. While radical solutions are being applied to bring new officers online, these will not be successful if officers and their experience is not retained. Since 1987 only two ATC officers who retired did not do so to take up alternative employment. Whereas previously officers retired with in excess of ten years ATC experience, the current tendency is that retirements are occurring with half that service in a controller. Given that it takes some six years for an officer to qualify and become a supervisor, loss of experience at this rate is unsustainable.
- c. As a result of key staff retirements, in December 2016 GOC AC limited Military ATC services to, initially a ten hour (H10) service and later a H16 service, Monday to Friday. Before that they were provided on a twenty four hour (H24) basis, 7 days per week. At present, the ATS stream is 37% understrength with 11 fully qualified and 3 partially qualified air traffic controllers, out of an establishment of 22. There are also 8 student controllers in training. The consistent understaffing of ATS exposes the Defence Forces to significant command and control, safety and regulatory and operational risk.

### **2. ATS Training**

- a. Military controllers, undergo a rigorous and lengthy training period. It takes approximately 1 year to train an Aerodrome Controller. A Radar Controller takes an additional 12 to 24 months to train.
- b. Both NCOs and Officers are trained as Aerodrome and Radar air traffic controllers. Officers are required to qualify as Watch Supervisors prior to posting into an ATS appointment which takes a further 12 months. In total, ATC training can take up to 4-5 years, including periods of experiential consolidation and training. This lengthy training period significantly exacerbates the Air Corps' ability to replace experienced controllers who retire.

- c. It costs the State between €90,000 and €140,000 to fully train an air traffic controller. This includes the cost of selection testing, external training, equipment depreciation and pay & allowances. A breakdown of the cost of training is included as Annex X-1.

### 3. Reason for retirements and poor ATS retention

#### a. Remuneration levels

(1) Current remuneration levels are not commensurate with the responsibilities, qualifications and skill-set and are significantly below that which is paid to similarly qualified personnel in other sectors. As long as this sizable gap remains - retention of ATS personnel will remain difficult, if not impossible.

(2) In addition to their controlling duties, appropriately qualified ATS On-the-Job Training Instructors (OJTI) are required to provide live instruction to ATS students. They receive no extra pay or allowances for this vital role, despite the considerable extra responsibilities and risk involved in training students on live aircraft. The DF commit substantial resources to the training of OJTIs, including sending personnel on specialist courses abroad, and the payment of appropriate remuneration for this important role would help attract and retain personnel and ensure continuity of knowledge and experience.

#### b. Opportunities in the private sector.

Due to the transferability of the ATS skill-set, controllers are in high demand for both operational and management positions within the semi-state and private sector aviation environment.

#### c. Pension related reasons

Of the remaining ATS staff, a number of controllers have sufficient service to retire with a full pension. Of the remaining staff, the majority are post-2004 entrants to the Defence Forces and are not compelled by a military service undertaking to remain in the DF. The nature of the post-2004 pension is such that, unless a controller intends to serve for the full 30 years, the incentive is to seek alternate employment sooner rather than later in order to build up sufficient pension contributions in the new employment. This is a problem that will worsen in the coming years as the numbers of post-2004 controllers increases.

#### d. Career progression and lack of promotion opportunities for Officers.

(1) In the 2013 DF re-organisation, the "SO ATS Training (Capt)" appointment was deleted and the "SO ATS Licensing and Regulations (Comdt)" appointment was reduced to a Capt appointment. This downgrading of the ATS Regulator appointment came at a time where the regulatory components of other Military ATS providers were being expanded rapidly to meet the increasingly complex EU aviation regulatory environment. Aside from the potential safety and regulatory implications, the ATS Officer Stream now has only 1 x Comdt and 1 x Lt Col appointment with 3 x Lt and 3 x Capt appointments at junior officer level. This has long term consequences in terms of ATS Officer Retention due to the lack of available career progression and promotion opportunities.

(2) In addition, the officer establishment leaves an undesirable situation whereby the current ATS Comdt is the only Officer available for promotion to the sole ATS Lt Col rank should this vacancy arise. The ATS stream is unique in the DF in this regard with such a limited potential progression for Junior Officers and the fact that a Capt-Comdt promotion competition is effectively a competition for Lt Col promotion at a future date.

e. Unsuitable ATS establishment

- (1) The current establishment of Military ATS is based on flawed methodology resulting from the ECF review in 2011 which reduced the ATS establishment on the basis that it would be some time before vacancies due to recent retirements could be filled. This establishment was developed without consideration of the personnel requirements of Military ATS. At present, even if full, ATS is close to the minimum personnel required for sustainable ATC operations with management and other tasks suffering from their part time nature. Therefore personnel losses escalate rapidly to serious impact on operations.
- (2) Since the ATS establishment has been based on actual routine operational needs, it has always been under-resourced for non-routine tasks. The lack of fat means also that the ability to let personnel partake of activities or opportunities offered by the DF are limited. This demotivates personnel who are subject to the rigours of military life but not its benefits.
- (3) The unsuitable establishment regularly leads to situations where qualified personnel cannot carry out their controlling duties as they are unable to access an appropriate appointment. A current example is a Sgt radar controller (Group 6 technical pay), after promotion into a Flight Sgt (Group 4) appointment, is no longer able to work as a radar controller as he no longer receives the relevant technical pay. This has negative implications for both the individual and the organisation.
- (4) There are too few officer appointments for the number of functional areas. Filling officer appointments is challenging given failure rates in training, especially if trying to fill 'the last' vacancy. Even at close to full strength officers have difficulty building and maintaining control experience necessary for the execution of their duties and non-controlling and urgent tasks being neglected.

f. Unreasonable workload due to shortage of ATS personnel.

The lack of ATS personnel has invariably led to a situation whereby qualified staff are taking on the responsibilities of a variety of different post-holders due to the operational, administrative and regulatory responsibilities of ensuring the maintenance of a compliant ATC service and regulatory structure, while concurrently training and assessing personnel to the required standard.

4. **Conclusion**

- a. The retention of the remaining experienced air traffic controllers is essential for the maintenance of safe air operations. It will also allow the AC to be self-sustaining; retaining the ability to train less experienced controllers using the cohort of experience that remains in service. In the medium to long term the restoration of deductions made in respect of 'FEMPI' coupled with an increase in AC ATS Pay and Allowances may effectively resolve the chronic personnel deficits in key grades. A comparison of AC ATS Officer salaries to those for which AC ATS Officers and NCOs are receiving upon retirement is indicated in Annex X-2. While it is acknowledged that public service remunerations will never equal that on offer in the commercial sector, the introduction of a Service Commitment Scheme (SCS) in respect of ATS personnel would serve to close the differential and retain key skills and experience on a permanent basis
- b. The commission is also asked to examine the establishment anomaly whereby qualified personnel cannot carry out their controlling duties as they are unable to access an appropriate appointment. A current example is a paragraph 3, d, (3). This situation has extremely negative implications for both the individual and the organisation as, apart from demotivating the individual and his colleagues, by needlessly restricting a qualified individual from carrying out controlling duties at a time of severe staff shortages, it also places the organisation at severe risk of organisational and reputational damage.

## COST OF ATS TRAINING

### Assumptions:

- ATC Class - Aerodrome (ADI) consists of 2 x Ptes, 2 x Cpls and 1 x F/Sgt (instructor).
- ATC Class Approach Radar (APS) consists of 2 x Cpls, 2 x Sgts and 1 x F/Sgt (instructor).
- Training may be conducted in two ways:
  1. All training conducted in-house i.e. in Casement Aerodrome by Air Corps instructors
  2. Certain elements of training are conducted at external institutions with the remaining elements conducted in Casement Aerodrome. Externally run courses usually include Basic ATC training and the APS rating course.
- ADI training takes approximately 18 months. APS training takes a further 12 months.
- Cost of training includes student pay & allowances over the duration of training, instructor pay & allowances, selection costs, equipment depreciation and external training costs (including sub & allowances), if relevant.
- Selection testing costs were accurate in 2015.
- External training costs were accurate in 2011 (ADI) and 2013 (APS).
- Equipment depreciation refers to the Radar Simulator which depreciates at approx. €7,000 per annum.

### Cost of Internal ATC Training (All training conducted in-house):

TOTAL COST OF ATC TRAINING	Selection Testing	Pay & Allowances	Equipment Depreciation	TOTAL
Basic & Aerodrome (ADI)	€9,026	€185,361	N/A	€194,386
Approach Radar (APS)	N/A	€138,540	€7,000	€168,947
<b>TOTAL COST PER ATC COURSE</b>				<b>€363,333</b>

AVERAGE COST PER STUDENT	Selection Testing	Pay & Allowances	Equipment Depreciation	TOTAL
Basic & ADI	€2,256	€46,340	N/A	€48,596
APS	N/A	€34,634	€1,750	€42,236
<b>TOTAL COST PER STUDENT</b>				<b>€90,832</b>

### Cost of combined internal & external ATC Training

(Basic ATC training and APS Rating courses conducted externally. All other training conducted in-house):

TOTAL COST OF ATC TRAINING	Selection Testing	External Training Cost	Pay & Allowances	Equipment Depreciation	TOTAL
Basic & ADI	€9,026	€44,309	€185,361	N/A	€238,695
APS	N/A	€62,090	€138,540	€7,000	€231,037
<b>TOTAL COST PER ATC COURSE</b>					<b>€469,732</b>
AVERAGE COST PER STUDENT	Selection Testing	External Training Cost	Pay & Allowances	Equipment Depreciation	TOTAL
Basic & ADI	€2,256	€11,077	€46,340	N/A	€59,673
APS	N/A	€15,522	€34,634	€1,750	€57,759
<b>TOTAL COST PER STUDENT</b>					<b>€117,432</b>

**AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER SALARY COMPARISON (2016)**

<b>Service post 1<sup>st</sup> ATC qualification</b>	<b>Irish Air Corps<sup>24</sup></b>	<b>Irish Civilian ATC<sup>25</sup></b>	<b>UK Civilian ATC<sup>26</sup></b>
Year 1(Lt)	€38,000	€52,500	€39,000
Year 3 (Lt)	€46,000	€67,000	€58,000
Year 10 (Capt)	€65,000	€96,500	
Year 15 (Comdt)	€74,000	€109,000	€100,000

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<sup>24</sup> Although the equivalent military salary is taken for an officer, it should be noted that air traffic controllers comprise both NCOs and Officers in the Irish Air Corps.

<sup>25</sup> These figures include a 27% shift allowance. Military air traffic controllers do not receive a shift allowance.

<sup>26</sup> This figure figures are from a large UK ATS provider and include a shift allowance.



## Claim for Review and Increase in Patrol Duty Allowance

### Patrol Duty Allowance (PDA)

- History.** The Gleeson Commission (1990) produced findings that were based on a Naval Service (NS) that is very different from today's modern and multi-role NS that has evolved considerably over the last 26 years. The NS now operates an eight-ship fleet but has an establishment based on seven ships. The organisation restructuring carried out between 2000 and 2003 has been extended during the DF Reorganisation carried out in 2013 and the NS has had its establishment further reduced from 1,144 to 1,094, a further reduction of 4.37%, while all responsibilities, domestic and international tasks remained essentially unchanged by Government. The reduction of 50 personnel of all ranks is the operational equivalent of losing a ships complement and has had a detrimental impact on the sea to shore rotation policy for NS personnel. Under the auspice of the Gleeson Commission NS ships spent an average of 165 days at sea and the patrol cycle used was based on three-week sea-going periods with two ships at sea at any one time. Table 1 below illustrates how the operational tempo and operational output of the NS has changed over the last 26 years.

	2000	2005	2009	2012	2016
Patrol Days	1285	1680	1683	1520	1480
Boarding's per annum	1262	2058	1841	1329	1233
Ships on Patrol at any one time	2	2	3	3	3
Patrol Cycle	3 weeks	3 weeks	3 weeks	4 weeks	4 weeks

Table 1 – NS Output Analysis

- As outlined in the Gleeson Commission Report (1990) the purpose of Patrol Duty Allowance (PDA) was to attract recruits to the NS and encourage personnel to remain in the service, a sea-going allowance for NS personnel was introduced in 1963 and the PDA allowance was created to replace the sea-going allowance. The primary purpose of the allowance was to reflect the fact that service on-board sea-going units is more onerous and arduous than routine shore-based duty.
- There is also a social element that must be acknowledged and the significant disruption to family life caused by two years of continuous routine deployments to sea has an adverse impact on the individual and the greater family unit. The new six-week patrol cycle implemented in 2012 requires ships to spend prolonged periods of time at sea and while ships operate to the Commanders Intent there is no such thing as a typical patrol, as stated by NS Command, and the typical patrol cycle has organically evolved to meet the operational requirements of the State and the exigencies of the service. Empirical evidence based on the results of the DF Climate Survey 2014 and feedback received from sea-going personnel would suggest that many personnel felt worn down by the high tempo, change and uncertainty that sea-going life brings.

4. Since the publication of the Gleeson Commission Report (1990) the maritime environment within which the NS operates has changed dramatically both operationally and environmentally. The Atlantic Ocean is considered by maritime and climatologists to be one of the most inhospitable oceans in the world and as such requires dedicated and motivated personnel to work within it. Observed research from academic and meteorological researchers demonstrates this intensification in the weather conditions experienced and the fact that the newly acquired P60 class vessels have been built to larger specifications supports and acknowledges that there has been an exacerbating of these environmental conditions.
5. Since the publication of Gleeson (1990) and the PSBB (2006) the Irish State has increased its claim on its maritime jurisdiction from 342,000 sq. km by another 658,000 sq. km, which represents a 92% increase in size. In effect Ireland now has a claim on 1,000,000 sq. km of the maritime domain the State now has a significant sea area which is almost 10 times the size of the nation's land mass<sup>27</sup>. In order to effectively patrol this increased area ships will now have to spend longer periods at sea. The recent decision surrounding the United Kingdom's decision to depart the European Union and the ongoing migrant crisis will pose challenges for the NS in relation to potentially strengthening border/EEZ surveillance, the patrolling of national maritime approaches and the continued provision of maritime services to An Garda Síochána. Ireland, an island nation, relies on the maritime industry for 97% of its imports and as such there is a national interest to ensure that these channels remain safe and operational.
6. The PDA allowance has not witnessed any significant increase since the PSBB (2006) and more noticeably the rate now offered in 2016 has had a 10% decrease over a three-year period and is now below the rate as agreed at the last PSBB and this is displayed in Table 2 below.

	2006	2010	2013
Allowance - Daily	€53.32	€55.91	€50.32

**Table 2 – PDA Allowance**

7. The rate currently offered is not reflective of the work that personnel complete and is only exacerbated by the increases in other taxes such as PRSI, USC, etc. that has taken place over the last decade and completely contradicts the purpose of this allowance as espoused under the Gleeson Commission (1990). The DF is currently expending significant capital on recruitment and training when it could spend a fraction of that amount on the retention of personnel who are already trained and want to serve at sea. Recent study and analysis for the EU Work Time Directive statistically demonstrated that NS personnel at sea work extended working days and increased hours. The 'down time' that is provided when operating at sea is often consumed by the requirement to conduct routine and emergency maintenance on machinery, deck equipment, communications equipment, weapons system and hardware.
8. It is universally accepted and acknowledged within the wider international military community that personnel 'at sea' or on 'overseas operations' typically work longer hours than their 'shore-based' colleagues. Based on routine watch systems used on-board NS ships it can be calculated that NS

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<sup>27</sup> Department of An Taoiseach. (February 2012). Our Ocean Wealth: Seeking Your Views: New Ways; New Approaches; New Thinking Towards an Integrated Plan for Ireland, Consultation Paper.

personnel averaged 65-70<sup>28</sup> hours per week when at sea. Data provided by MOD for 2013–14 showed the Royal Navy averaged 63.1 hours per week when at sea. When deployed at sea personnel do work unsociable hours<sup>29</sup> and are frequently on-call<sup>30</sup> in addition to their normal routine working hours.

9. An increase in the PDA allowance could be used as an incentive mechanism for the retention of highly trained and highly skilled Officers and it must be noted that the typical training period for an Operations Officer is 4-5 years and 5-6 years for a Marine Engineering Officer. **The current training process used for training both Operations Branch and Engineering Branch Officers essentially qualifies them to leave the DF as the sea-going allowances currently offered by the DF are not comparable to external companies/organisations and this is likely to see an increase in the rate of retirements.**
10. Exit interviews have indicated that the majority of personnel leaving the NS are doing so because there is no incentive to remain at sea and the allowance at its current level does not provide adequate compensation for the conditions endured when deployed. As stated previously, the overriding concerns raised by Officers were focused on the current workload and tempo that is experienced at sea as many appointments at sea are not filled due to vacancies currently being experienced as Officers retire and seek employment in the private sector. These serious concerns clearly have a considerable impact on morale and motivation and are therefore relevant to any deliberations that should take place with the intent of reviewing the current PDA rate. It is concerning to note the extent to which many personnel, both ashore and at sea, appear to be overstretched and this legitimately raises concerns about the ability of the NS to respond to a significant future event.
11. As an example, the successful detention using Maritime Interdiction Operations (tactical armed boarding's) of the yacht 'Makayabella' in 2013 and the yacht 'Dances with Waves' in 2008 in arduous and gale-force conditions demonstrates the need for Ireland to have its naval assets deployed at sea so that surveillance and intelligence can be gathered. The combined detentions amounted to almost €1 billion of contraband that was destined for Ireland and the wider EU.

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<sup>28</sup> Personnel work 2 4-hour watches and also work on deck or in the machinery spaces in addition for prolonged periods. It would not be uncommon to work a 12-hour day at sea.

<sup>29</sup> Unsociable hours are defined as any hours worked between 00:00 and 06:00 Monday to Friday; between 18:00 and 24:00 Monday to Friday and any hours worked on Sat or Sun.

<sup>30</sup> Time spent working, on-call and on meal breaks.

## Considerations for the Reintroduction of PDA

<p><b>Background:</b> The number of NS personnel currently serving at sea is approximately 320. These personnel serve across the NS Fleet and the accommodation and recreations spaces provided in each class of vessel differs substantially. Each individual is posted to a sea-going unit for two years and will remain on that ship until posted ashore. When the ship is alongside the Naval Base there is no prolonged leave period granted and personnel must conduct general ship maintenance or complete professional courses during their time alongside and any 'downtime'<sup>31</sup> from the operational tempo of NS ships is minimal.</p>	
<p><b>Advantages</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Attract Personnel to rotate to sea</li> <li>✓ Maintain DF Capabilities</li> <li>✓ Retain &amp; Motivate Specialists</li> <li>✓ Retain Future Corporate Expertise</li> <li>✓ Retain in-house training capability</li> </ul>	<p><b>Disadvantages</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓</li> </ul>
<p><b>Cost Benefit Analysis:</b>            At present a person at sea will earn €9,309.20 per annum gross when posted to a ship (based on ship spending 185 days at sea).            Personnel at sea are available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.            98% of Irelands trade is brought into the country via maritime sector and these critical maritime highways must be protected and patrolled. Maritime traffic continues to grow in all sectors.</p>	
<p><b>Organisation Benefits:</b> Greater retention of personnel as the PDA is designed to incentivise personnel for going to sea. The provision of PDA is a proven international military model and is widely used in the UK, Australia and New Zealand. Because military specialties require organisation and occupational courses of training developed through competency application, the retention of this expertise and corporate skill set should not be taken for granted. In the absence of any other financial retention model for sea-going personnel, the proven PDA model is, without doubt, the optimal solution for the organisation and the individual.</p>	
<p><b>ECF Management:</b> The second reorganisation of the NS since 2000 that occurred in 2013 has had a detrimental impact on the numbers of personnel within the NS. The reduction of an additional 50 personnel, which equates to a ships complement, has caused significant issues as the current ECF for the NS is primarily based on the NS having a seven-ship fleet and not the eight ships that it currently has. The ECF configured in 2013 is no longer fit for purpose in this respect.</p>	

12. The Association hereby claims to the Commission to review and increase this traditional provision of military service in order to secure key personnel who positively contribute to the on-going operational capability, long term experience and expertise and reduce the cost of continual recruitment into the NS.

(Earnán Naughton)  
 Lt Col  
 General Secretary RACO

<sup>31</sup> For example, personnel in the merchant navy are contracted to work 168.5 days per Calendar year, 12-hour days amounting to 2,022 hours per year. Personnel receive the 28 days in addition to duty leave.



## **Claim for Increase in the Rate of Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Duty Allowance**

### **1. Background**

In 1990 the Gleeson Commission recommended that Ordnance Corps Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers be paid an allowance of £35 per day in respect of days (24 hr duty on immediate call to respond in Aid to the Civil Power (ATCP) for a range of explosive threats) spent on EOD duty following a submission on behalf of the Ordnance Corps. In 2008 the EOD daily duty allowance was €99.15, in 2010 it was €94.19.

### **2. Current Status**

In 2013 the allowance was decreased to €84.77 which remains the current payment before the full range tax is applied. Significantly there has been a considerable increase in the hazardous nature of EOD duties as a consequence of teams being deployed to a wider range of incidents type. Additionally, with poor retention rates, EOD officers are being deployed for upwards of 12 – 15 24hrs duties per month, resulting in less time to perform their actual appointments and time away from home.

### **3. Increase in the Range and Hazardous Nature of EOD Duty**

The Ordnance Corps submission of 1990 referred to the hazardous nature of the duty, the physical and mental skills demanded and the high incidence of EOD duty. Since the terrorist attacks in the United States of America (Sept 2001), the nature of EOD has substantially changed. EOD Officers have adapted and evolved to render safe and manage a hybrid spectrum of EOD tasking's, including what known as 'Substance of Concern' (SOC) or "White powder" incidents, Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear Explosive (CBRNE)<sup>32</sup> tasking's, Hazardous Material tasking's and highly sensitive homemade explosive tasking's such as triacetone triperoxide (TATP). This in effect means that the EOD Officer now has more frequent hazardous tasking's of diverse natures with greater interagency co-ordination and therefore more responsibility than previously.

### **4. Requirement to be Forensic Criminally Aware**

Additionally, many of the tasking's EOD Officer are responding to, have an element of criminality or organised crime. Accordingly, EOD officers are often the first and single point in the technical exploitation or investigation process and so must conduct the Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (IEDD) procedure in a forensically aware and evidential manner.

### **5. Expert Witness in Criminal Trials**

EOD officers are the only qualified and capable group of specialists in the State who can dispose of such devices. Consequently, they are summoned as expert witnesses (not just on the device but critically providing chain of custody evidence to the Garda) in criminal

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<sup>32</sup> CBRNE: Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive. Often referred to as CCBRN: Conventional explosives, chemical substances, biological agents, radiological and nuclear material.

trials. As key witnesses in organised crime prosecutions they must accept additional risk from another indeterminate source.

6. **Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear & Explosive**

From the initial description in Gleeson, EOD officer are now trained and educated to respond to a range of incidents more correctly referred to as Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear and Explosive. The UK Government publication 'Operations in the UK: The Defence Contribution to Resilience' stresses that CBRNE incidents are unique because they add the following extra dimensions to a conventional incident. It presents additional hazards to both responders and potential victims and the use of detection, monitoring and identification of the material used is necessary.

The nature of EOD duties is now considerably more arduous as operators must conduct drills in personal protection equipment with the additional requirement of decontamination of responders, equipment and the public. Media interests will be further heightened. The response will be multi-agency, as always, but potentially with different agencies and specialists. International, government and political interest will increase and the emergency services themselves could be the target.

7. The Office of Emergency Planning document 'Framework for Major Emergency Management' states that:

[W]hen the DF deploys an EOD team in ATCP the Officer in Charge of the team, upon arrival at the scene will assume responsibility for the EOD task and inform the On-Site Co-ordinator of the boundaries of the Danger Area and advice on Cordon(s)<sup>33</sup>...

8. **Changing Threats**

In essence, EOD duty allowance was introduced to attract, retain and compensate specialist technical officers for certain hazardous, demanding and technical jobs. Since the 9/11 attacks and the increase in asymmetrical terrorist threats on top of a more sinister criminal activity the Ordnance Corps has rightly evolved to mitigate this risk.

9. **Ordnance Young Officers Course**

In order to become an Ordnance EOD officer candidates as required to have an engineering or science degree. Selected candidates undergo the Ordnance Young Officer Course Technical Officers of the Ordnance Corps (24 mths). In collaboration with IT Carlow (ITC), a Masters of Engineering Programme has recently being introduced resulting in the award of a Masters of Engineering in Weapons, Ordnance, Munitions and Explosives (WOME).

10. The enhanced course qualifies new entrant Ordnance Corps technical officers with the required knowledge and skills that will provide them with the necessary competencies to manage the assets and lead the personnel involved in the complete life cycle management of all weapon systems, ordnance equipment, munitions and explosives in use with Defence Forces. It also qualify them as

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<sup>33</sup> A Framework for Major Emergency Management Appendices (2006). Appendices to the framework are intended to support the Framework text and to provide extra detail in a number of key areas.

competent EOD No.1 Operators, ensuring that the highest levels of care and safety are adhered in relation to these, thus qualifying them as Ordnance Corps Technical Officers.

11. With the additional of three new modules (highlighted in bold below) the course now consists of 12 modules;
  - a. **CBRN EOD First Responder Module**
  - b. **Optical, Electro-optical and Mechatronic Systems Engineering**
  - c. **Chemical, Biological and Radiological Device Defeat Course**
  - d. Ordnance Corps Technical Officer Preliminary Studies Induction Course
  - e. Tentage Erector & Field Repair Course for Ordnance Corps Technical Officers
  - f. Research Methodology & Ethics
  - g. Energetic Materials
  - h. Ammunition Systems Engineering and Management
  - i. Conventional Munitions Clearance
  - j. Conventional Munitions Disposal
  - k. Improvised Explosive Device Disposal No.1 Operator Induction Course
  - l. Light Weapons Systems Engineering
  - m. Heavy Weapons Systems Engineering
  
12. **New Modules - CBRN First Responder Course**

This two (2) week course teaches how to undertake a task appreciation and perform safely and effectively as a member of a CBRN EOD First Response Team for the conduct of various CBRN EOD/SOC tasks representative of those that may be encountered at an ATCP First Response/SOC incident.
  
13. **CBR Device Defeat Course**

This four (4) teaches student how to undertake a task appreciation and perform safely and effectively as a member of a BCMD and National CBRN Team for the conduct of various CBR Device Defeat tasks representative of those that may be encountered when deployed overseas or in an ATCP/A incident.
  
14. **Optical Electro Optical and Mechatronic Systems Engineering Course**

This four (4) week course focusing optical, electro-optical, laser and mechatronic systems teaches students the skills to develop competencies to supervise and manage the technicians and workshops who are charged with the complete life cycle management of all optical, electro-optical, laser and mechatronic systems in service in Defence Forces Ireland.
  
15. **Pipe Bomb Opening Machine PBOM**
  - a. The range of equipment and new additions such as the PBOM and the Improvised Detonator Dismantler all contribute to safety, reliability of evidence and prevent contamination that no other nation offers. This was all done in-house by the Ordnance Corps.
  - b. The ability of EOD/CBRN teams to reassure and deliver sound solutions to complex, large scale emergency events is always present. There is a huge network of advice providers available to the Corps and through other channels. The national CBRN team and their availability have to be considered in this new proposal as well.

16. **Manual Neutralisation Technique (MNT)**

The Ordnance Corps have a highest threat capability through Manual Neutralisation Techniques MNT and must be considered as a massive enabler to the security of the state

17. RACO formally submits a claim to increase the flat rate of Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Duty Allowance to €144.03 This allowance is paid to Officers of the Ordnance Corps for performing a 24-hour duty in response to and increase treat and hazardous nature of duties in responding to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive threats.

The increase will;

- a. Compensate EOD qualified officers for the increased technical and education requirements now required to undergo and successfully complete the Masters Programme of Engineering in Weapons, Ordnance, Munitions and Explosives Course.
- b. Compensate for increased workload in the range of tasks now being performed by EOD officers since the introduction of the EOD allowance.
- c. Compensate EOD officers for the increase in risk now associated with these additional tasking's.
- d. To increase the attractiveness of a career in the Ord Corps.
- e. To improve the rates of retention of EOD qualified officers in the Ord Corps.
- f. To ameliorate for the loss of Fixed Period Promotion and the career limitations imposed on new entrants to the Corps.

18. For consideration by the PSPC.

**Claim- for the Reinstatement of Special Instructors Allowance for Officers**

*“The Defence Forces instructor trains personnel to be self-confident, disciplined, physically fit, well-motivated. They equip the soldier with the skills to survive on operations and perform effectively as a member of a team or weapons system crew. The instructor influences a soldier’s whole life development including Professional and Personal development.”* (<http://www.per.gov.ie/wp-content/uploads/Instructors-Allowance1.pdf>)

1. Specialised Instructors Allowance was introduced in 2005 as a result of recommendations from findings of the Independent Monitoring Group (IMG) (Doyle Report) which recommended the creation of a newly defined Defence Force Instructor. The IMG recommended that to qualify for an instructors appointment in any of the institutions in question, personnel would have to successfully complete a “Specialised `Instructors Course” and should serve in such appointment for a limited period.
2. The Allowance was discontinued for officers since 2014 following the Haddington Road Agreement. The allowance continues to be paid to Non-Commissioned Officers.
3. Commissioned Officers working in training establishments do not receive any instructor’s pay for the personal and professional commitment they give towards the development of Defence Forces personnel. Officers in these institutions have either gone through a selection/interview process, e.g. Cadet School, or have completed an appropriate career course, e.g. Senior or Junior Command and Staff Course, to the required standard, as outlined in course reports, in order to be considered to be in a position to instruct on such courses. The training and education of cadets, recruits, Ptes, NCOs and officers is an integral part of the personal and professional development of personnel in the Defence Forces and therefore the personnel in institutions tasked with facilitating this education and development should be awarded appropriately.
4. Given that the same conditions exist that saw the merits of the recognition and introduction of this allowance in the first instance, the fact that the allowance continues to be paid to non-commissioned officers and in recognition of the additional demands now being placed on these institutions and staff due to the increased recruitment demands of the Defence Forces, a claim for the payment of the allowance for officers is advanced.
5. The majority of these institutions are currently under strength in officer staff numbers. The work load and hours required to ensure that students on these course receive the required level of training places significant demands on officer instructors.
6. Below is outline of the commitments/demands placed on officer instructor in a range of schools and training establishments and is as such an example of the requirements/necessities of the officer instructor both within and outside the “normal”

working hours. The roles and responsibilities outlined take these officer instructors away from the homes, families, friends and their own personal lives for substantial periods of time throughout courses of training and typical working environments of respective institutions, but yet still do not fully outline the personal commitment that officers give towards ensuring that the personal and professional development of students on such courses is attained.

#### **Cadet School Officer Instructor**

- 14 weeks on tactical exercise/training per year.
- Unpaid Duty Officer eight (8) weeks/year
- Always on call to Cadets - no duty phone
- No routine working hours
- Regular early morning starts and late evening finishes
- Work consecutive weekends for training and ceremonial

#### **Officer Training Wing Officer Instructor**

- Three (3) weeks on examinations and field trips per Junior Command and Staff Course.
- Two (2) week on Command Post Exercises per Junior Command and Staff Course.
- Up to 20 hours per week (outside 'normal' working hours) on student corrections.
- Two (2) weeks per Mission Readiness Exercise - four (4) per year.
- Regular early morning starts and late evening finishes

#### **Brigade Training Centre Officer Instructor**

- Three (3) hours extra (outside 'normal' working hours) per day – this may be conducted at the training establishment or at home.
- Nine (9) weeks on tactical exercise/training per Potential NCO Course.
- Three (3) weeks on tactical exercise/training per Recruit Training.

*“The responsibilities of an Instructor are above the normal required of such a grade and are qualification based. The allowance ensures the attraction and retention of suitably qualified personnel to instructor posts. The loss of this in-house capability to maintain instructional output would result in the requirement to procure these services from external military providers at an exceptionally high cost.” <http://www.per.gov.ie/wp-content/uploads/Instructors-Allowance1.pdf>*

7. RACO hereby claims for the reinstatement of Special Instructors Allowance for Commissioned Officers.

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(Earnán Naughton)  
Commandant  
General Secretary RACO

**Claim for Review and Increase to Change of Station Allowance- COSA**

1. The allowances pertaining to Change of Station that are currently applied to Commissioned Officers of the Irish Defence Forces have been in effect for over 21 years (13 July 1995). These provisions are contained in a series of documents (DFR S3 Pay and Allowances, DFR S3 Amendment 291 & DFR Q10) for expenses that are incidental, miscellaneous or pertaining to special circumstances. These documents can be said to be out-dated and in urgent need of review and updating, in order to align them with modern day norms across the Public Service.
2. A review of the relevance and applicability of this allowance is long overdue. This claim is necessary because the contents of Part VI of DFR S3 is incongruous to the work demands, tasks and expectations on serving officers. It should be noted that RACO has previously requested reviews of this DFR on a number of occasions since 1995, where the association's policies (numbers 40, 67 and 186) clearly illustrate the need for modernisation of this policy. It should also be noted that while the allowance operates on a similar basis to the practice outlined in Revenue's Statement of Practice on removal /Relocations Expenses, it is more restrictive with regards to amounts paid and term of payments - a point that is fully acknowledged and accepted by the Department of Defence and Revenue Commissioners.
3. Due to the exigencies of Military Service, Officers are required to move appointments frequently, normally every 18-24 months. *The average instance of posting is 8.82 times in a five-year period 2011-2016 (Defence Forces 2016)*. Such instance of appointment changes invariably involves station relocation. No other grouping within the Public Service are subject to such frequency of change in appointments that more often require relocation from home station.
4. For example, in the period 2011-2016, the cohort of 2/Lt to Lt Col rank comprising 1056 Officers, experienced 9315 posting which equates to an average of 8.82 posting changes. Consequent relocation changes arising from such posting changes can negatively affect officers, based on the current regulations as laid down in DFR S3. Under DFR S3, an Officer can only claim the allowance for a maximum nine (9) month period as a result of a change of station within a five-year period. *These timelines are completely inadequate based on the demands of military service nowadays relative to when the allowance was first configured. The current regulations do not factor the duration that the individual may remain in these appointments, and thus be financially disadvantaged.*
5. It is the position of the Association that the COSA is out-dated and not fit for purpose placing commissioned officers at a distinct disadvantage relative to other Public Servants in spite of the significantly greater demands and costs associated with their profession.
6. The Association submits this claim to the Commission for a review and increase in COSA.

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(Earnán Naughton) Lt Col  
General Secretary RACO